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Abstract 
The main focus of this thesis is the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate’s regulation 
model for the grid companies in Norway. We have taken a special interest in distributed generation 
and how the model compensates the companies for including this kind of production. We analyze in 
depth how one distributed generation project affects the revenue cap of a few companies, as well as 
the effect of future potential changes to the industry and model. We found that the project is very 
lucrative, but that the underlying assumptions are sensitive to changes in the industry. We also 
looked at a possible future regulation model, in which the project is even more lucrative, and where 
the data are less sensitive to changes in the industry. We also analyze the effect of changing some of 
the model parameters (e.g. rho) and illustrate the effects of charging investment contribution. 
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Part 1 –  
      Introduction 
 
 
 
  3 
1 Introduction 
There are two major issues in energy politics. One is the security of supply of electricity and the 
other is CO2 emissions. Both these issues will only be more important in the future, and this is why 
Norwegian politics and the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) now want to 
increase the amount of distributed generation in Norway, because distributed generation is an 
important factor in tackling both of these issues. In order to ensure that these goals are met it is 
important to give the right incentives to both new producers and grid companies. Facilitating easy 
entry for the producers also requires one to consider the grid companies they will be connected to. 
Distributed generation should be placed where it is most economically and environmentally sound, 
rather than where it is more lucrative due to unintended incentive effects in the regulation model. 
Several new laws and regulations have been put in place to usher the industry in the right direction. 
Our research questions were as follows: 
How does adding distributed generation change the revenue caps of the grid companies? How 
sensitive are these revenues to changes in the model and the industry? One of our main goals is to 
present a general intuition for the grid companies to understand how distributed generation works in 
the model, and how their business is affected by it. 
In Part 2 we illustrate the transportation of electricity in Norway, and why the transmission and 
distribution companies need to be regulated. We also look at relevant theory to the regulation 
model. 
In Part 3 we describe in detail how the Norwegian regulation model benchmarks each grid company 
and creates a revenue cap. We describe the project and how to add it to the model. 
In Part 4 we analyze how changes to the model affect the grid companies, and we answer our 
research questions. This is followed by a concluding summary of our findings and suggestions for 
further research in Part 5. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 2 –  
Theory 
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2 The Electricity Supply Chain 
Although electricity is vital to today’s standard of living, most people do not think much about how 
electricity actually arrives at their houses and how a reliable electricity supply is guaranteed. This 
thesis will not attempt to explain how the physical side of it works. In order to understand the issues 
of the electricity industry, it is important, though, to understand how electricity is produced, 
transported, traded and consumed. 
The most important and challenging issue in electricity production is the balance between electricity 
production and consumption (Energi Norge, 2007). Electricity has to be used at the same time as it is 
produced, else it is lost. The perfect balance can be reached by an optimal interaction between the 
four main factors of the electricity flow: generation, transportation, trade and consumption. Figure 
2-1 illustrates the electricity flow. 
 
Figure 2-1 Electricity Flow 
A short description of each factor is presented in the following sub-chapters. 
2.1 Generation 
Before electricity can be consumed, it has to be produced – or generated. The energy for electricity 
production can originate from various sources like fossil fuels and nuclear power or renewable 
energy sources like solar or wind power. 
In 2008, 98.5 percent of the electricity in Norway originated from both large and small scale 
hydropower generation facilities. The remaining 1.5 percent of electricity production was either 
from thermal or wind power (NVE, 2009). 
There are 174 generation companies in Norway, of which Statkraft is the largest. The Norwegian 
state owns 37% of generation capacity through its ownership in Statkraft. Municipalities and county 
Generation
Transportation/ 
Trade
Consumption
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municipalities own another 50% of electricity production. The remaining 13% of electricity 
generation is carried out by privately owned companies (Energi Norge, 2007). 21 of the 174 
generators are generating companies only (OED, Regjeringen - Faktaheftet, 2008). The ten biggest 
producers account for approximately 70% of generation capacity (Energi Norge, 2007). 
The generation of electricity is not regulated and anyone can start a new generation plant as long as 
they get a concession from the state. As will be pointed out in more detail in chapter 6.1, the 
Norwegian state has the goal to decrease Norwegian CO2 emissions by focusing on an increase in 
electricity production from renewable resources. Several laws that have come into effect in the 
beginning of 2010 are meant to incentivize the set-up of new CO2-free distributed generation plants. 
While 76% of the Norwegian grid companies have distributed generation plants in their area today, 
82% of the Norwegian grid owners expect to have new distributed generation plants coming up in 
the years to come. (Svartsund, 2008) 
The produced electricity must then be transported to the consumers. The next step in the chain is to 
transport the electricity through the electricity grid. 
2.2 Transportation 
A very important step in the flow of electricity – and the focus of this paper – is the secure 
transportation of electricity. After generation, the electricity has to be transported from the 
generators to the end users. Generators send the electricity to the transmission grid from where it is 
transported via the regional and distributional grid to the consumers. The total Norwegian 
electricity grid amounts to 300.000 km. In addition to this, there are several connections to other 
countries’ electricity grids to enable electricity exchange between Norway and other countries 
(Energi Norge, 2007). 
The transportation of electricity is quite difficult not only due to physical limitations. Physical 
limitations of transporting electricity are that energy gets lost when it is transported. It is therefore 
important for the network companies to keep their networks at a high standard, to keep power 
losses as low, and line outages as few as possible. 
THEORY  9 
 
There are in total 159 grid companies that own grids on one or more levels. (OED, Regjeringen - 
Faktaheftet, 2008) The grids in Norway are divided into three different levels (Grønli, 2003): 
- transmission grid (>132 kV) 
- regional grids (60-132 kV) 
- distribution grids (22-60 kV). 
Of all grid companies in Norway, 42 are pure grid companies, while others own parts of generation 
or trade companies as well. The biggest grid-only company is Statnett, which owns approximately 87 
percent of the transmission grid. There are a total of 117 vertically integrated companies that 
operate both a competitive business (generation and/or trade) and a regulated business (grid 
owner) (OED, Regjeringen - Faktaheftet, 2008). 
The transportation of electricity is a natural monopoly, since it is economically infeasible to have 
more than one transmission line per region (Rud, 2009). Therefore it is extremely likely that grid 
companies will be regulated by the state. However, the major goal of regulation should not be 
limited to keeping prices low. It is equally important to ensure a suitable expansion of the 
transmission grid through the construction of new lines or the upgrade of existing grids, as this 
increases both the amount of power that can be traded securely and the number of generators and 
consumers that can take part in the electricity market, which in turn increases the competitiveness 
of the market (Kirschen & Strbac, 2004). 
In Norway, these goals are pursued by the usage of an elaborated revenue cap regulation model, 
which will be described in more detail in later chapters. Through benchmarking, the network 
companies are assessed according to efficiency, which results in the determination of a revenue cap 
that in turn sets the tariffs the network company can ask for. This also influences the electricity 
prices for the end-users to a great extent. Legislation on how exactly companies have to report their 
costs and on what costs they can cover help maintain the regulation. They will be further explained 
in chapter 6.3. 
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2.3 Trade 
One prerequisite for maintaining a balance between generation and consumption is a well working 
electricity market or trade of electricity. This market has been developed and was a major 
institutional precondition for the Norwegian reform of the electricity market in 1991 (Houmöller, 
2000). 
In a well working market the price of electricity serves as a pricing signal that increases and 
decreases according to demand (Energi Norge, 2007). The price of electricity in Norway and the 
other Nordic countries is determined by the Nordic Power exchange Nord Pool, which today 
includes all Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway) and Estonia, and which is the 
place where – amongst other things - sellers and buyers trade electricity on a day-to-day basis (Nord 
Pool ASA, 2009). 
In an electricity market like Norway, which is highly dependent on hydropower, the electricity price 
has for a long time been determined by factors like filling height of the water storages. With the 
establishment of a common Nordic electricity market and the opening up to continental Europe, this 
effect has been lowered and the price is more dependent on other factors like oil and gas prices or 
prices of CO2-emission certificates. Further, factors that influence production and psychological 
factors like expectations influence the price of electricity. Examples would be precipitation or 
extension of production capacity, for example the building of new distributed generation plants. 
2.4 Consumption 
The consumers are the end users of the electricity produced. Electricity consumers can either be big 
production facilities (business customers) or the 4.5 million inhabitants of Norway wanting to switch 
on lights, computers, televisions or use electricity elsewhere. 
Total electricity consumed in Norway was 111,471 GWh in 2008. Of this, industry and mining 
consumed a share of approximately 44.6% (49,721 GWh), while the private households consumed a 
share of approximately 30 % (34,512 GWh). The rest is consumed by private and public service 
providers, and other sectors like fishing and agriculture (Statistisk sentralbyrå, 2010). These end 
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users are at the end of the distribution grid and are provided with electricity by their distribution 
company. The electricity bill for end-users is divided into three different parts (BKK, 2010) (NVE, 
2008): 
1. Fixed part, paid to the local energy company (hook-up fee) 
2. Variable part, based on the amount of electricity used, paid to the distribution company 
(transmission fee) 
3. Variable fee per kWh consumed, paid to the company the user chooses to buy electricity 
from (this company can be located anywhere in Norway) (consumption fee) 
The fact that consumers can choose where to buy their electricity is a big step towards market 
liberalization. Consumers are also entitled to buy electricity from Nord Pool on a contract provided 
by energy retailers. 
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3 Natural monopolies in Electricity Transmission 
“A natural monopoly is a firm that can produce the entire output of the market at a cost that is 
lower than what it would be if there were several firms” (Rubinfeld & Pindyck, 2009). Public utilities 
are examples of, and are usually considered to be, natural monopolies. Natural monopolies also 
tend to be associated with industries where there is a high ratio of fixed to variable costs. This is also 
the case with electricity transmission where there are significant barriers to entry in the form of 
large investment costs. It would not be economically feasible for a competitor to establish itself in a 
market because the already established company has already made the investment and has a very 
low marginal cost for adding another customer. Due to the risk of pricing wars a new competitor 
would find it very difficult to make the investment pay off. Also, the presumed efficiency gained 
from exposing the monopolist to competition would be more than offset by the enormous cost of 
establishing a secondary overlapping grid. “If a firm is a natural monopoly it is more efficient to let it 
serve the entire market rather than have several firms compete” (Rubinfeld & Pindyck, 2009). 
Therefore, it is in the public interest to have one distribution grid. This poses a problem however, 
because monopolies are notoriously inefficient, and the monopoly price is not necessarily the same 
as the utility maximizing price. 
It is uncertain what the economies of scale are in the distribution business, but there is likely an 
optimal size for a grid company where it is neither so large it loses efficiency in bureaucracy nor so 
small it wastes economies of scale. There are, however, few recent studies on what this optimal size 
might be. Wangensteen refers to a study done in the 1980s which found that there were cost 
advantages of increasing the size to about 10,000 customers (Wangensteen, 2007). He also notes 
however that “things have probably changed since then *…+ but other investigations support the 
findings that there is an upper limit on economical size for a distribution utility” (Wangensteen, 
2007). It follows that the optimal solution is probably an unknown number of distribution 
companies, each serving a region as a natural monopoly. 
3.1 Regulating the monopoly 
There are two main areas that need to be regulated in a natural monopoly of a necessary good. 
“Monopolies will typically try to set the price so that the marginal revenue equals the marginal 
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costs” (Rubinfeld & Pindyck, 2009) in order to take out as much profit from the market as possible. 
This is not the price that gives the maximum social benefit. In addition they will not have clear 
incentives to keep costs down, as costs can be transferred to the customer. These two inefficiencies 
are defined as market inefficiency and x-inefficiency (Wangensteen, 2007). The main goal of the 
regulation regime should be to reduce these two inefficiencies for the electricity transmissions 
market. 
3.1.1 Market inefficiency 
“A natural monopoly is characterized by a decrease in average total cost (ATC) with increasing 
quantity. That means that marginal cost (MC) is lower than ATC over the interval we consider” 
(Wangensteen, 2007). Therefore, setting the price at MC will not cover the total cost of the 
company. “At that level however the price would not cover average cost and the firm could go out 
of business” (Rubinfeld & Pindyck, 2009). One solution would be to offer government subsidy to 
make up for the loss, however then there would be the problem of determining exactly how much 
this subsidy should be. “The best alternative is therefore to set the price at P2 (Figure 3-1) where 
average cost and [demand] intersect.  In that case, the firm earns no monopoly profit, while output 
remains as large as possible without driving the firm out of business” (Rubinfeld & Pindyck, 2009). 
 
Figure 3-1 Market Inefficiency 
The loss of social surplus is in part determined by the price elasticity of the good, i.e. the slope of the 
demand curve. Electricity is known to be an inelastic good so the loss in social surplus is not 
assumed to be the largest inefficiency of the two. 
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3.1.2 X-Inefficiency 
X-inefficiency is caused by several factors (Wangensteen, 2007): 
 Scale inefficiency – i.e. the company can be too small or too large compared to the optimal 
size 
 Technical inefficiency - i.e. using larger quantities of production factors than necessary 
 Cost-inefficiency - i.e. uneconomical composition of production factors. 
X-inefficiency is illustrated in Figure 3-2 by two ATC curves. ATC is the cost that the monopolist could 
be producing at if it was producing efficiently. Should the company increase the efficiency of 
production the ATC* curve would shift downwards. 
 
Figure 3-2 X-inefficiency 
In an unregulated market the monopolist would just transfer its full costs on to the consumer 
because there is no real incentive to reduce cost. This is x-inefficiency and can have a significant 
impact on social surplus, and the incentive to reduce cost is one of the most important points that 
NVE addresses with its regulation model. 
In Figure 3-3 below Wangensteen (2007) illustrates the effect of x-inefficiency and market 
inefficiency. 
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Figure 3-3 X-Inefficiency & Market-inefficiency 
From the figure it would appear that the potential gain from reducing X-inefficiency is much larger 
than reducing the market inefficiency. A regulation scheme however should seek to address both 
issues. 
3.2 The Norwegian Regulation Model 
NVE’s regulation model attempts to tackle both types of inefficiency. In some ways it is a return on 
investment regulation. “In this practice the regulatory agency determines an allowed price, so that 
its rate of return is in some sense competitive or fair [and] the maximum price allowed is based on 
the expected rate of return that the firm will earn” (Rubinfeld & Pindyck, 2009). This type of control 
by itself however is not enough, because it does not give good incentives to keep costs low. In fact, 
Return on Investment regulation can lead to the exact opposite; i.e. gold plating. Therefore the NVE 
model also has an element of regulation via benchmarking. All grid companies in Norway are 
compared to each other via a model that attempts to classify their efficiency via a DEA 
benchmarking model. This efficiency score is intended to reveal a cost norm that is the correct cost 
for the grid companies (refer to the lower ATC curve in Figure 3-3). The right mechanism is not tied 
to what the cost is, but what it should be. A company that is rated 100% efficient will be allowed to 
cover all its costs and in addition earn a specified rate of return equal to the regulated rate of 
return, which is determined by NVE. Companies that are not efficient, e.g. rated at 80% efficiency 
will not be allowed to charge their customers for all of the 20% of their inefficiency costs, and will 
have to reduce costs and thereby increase efficiency to see a profit.  
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4 Data Envelopment Analysis – Overview of the 
Theoretical Model 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is one way to distinguish between decision making units (DMU) in 
terms of efficiency scores. In brief, the tool creates a frontier along the most efficient DMUs and 
compares less efficient units to these frontier defining units. In this section we shall give a brief 
overview of the DEA model and a few of its most relevant modifications. 
In any production scenario using inputs and outputs, there is a feasible production set. We can 
imagine Figure 4-1 (Bjørndal, Bjørndal, & Fange, Forthcoming) where all possible inputs are mapped 
against all possible corresponding outputs. 
 
Figure 4-1 Feasible Production Sets 
All points to the right of the graph are possible points of production. The graph itself is the efficient 
frontier, or one could say the points where one cannot increase output any further without 
increasing input. Point A is within the feasible production set, however compared to B it could be 
producing more output with the same amount of inputs and compared to C it could be producing 
the same amount of output with a lower use of inputs. C and B are both on the efficient frontier. We 
say however that C is scale efficient because it cannot produce more output per input than it 
already does. B produces as much output as is possible for its size, but some efficiency is lost 
because it is on a point on the efficient frontier where the marginal productivity is decreasing. 
In an efficiency analysis therefore it would be interesting to plot the individual DMUs in a figure like 
Figure 4-1 and rate their efficiency based on how far they are from the efficient frontier. The 
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problem is that “the efficient frontier is not known” (Bjørndal, Bjørndal, & Fange, Forthcoming). One 
way to estimate such a frontier is using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). 
Both Coelli et al. (2005) and Cooper et al. (2004) introduce the DEA model by first illustrating the 
ratio form, then the multiplier form, and finally the dual of the multiplier form which forms the DEA 
model. This development will be summarized in the following paragraphs. 
In the ratio form we measure each company according to a ratio, say by dividing all outputs over all 
inputs. This ratio is calculated for each firm, and says something about the relative efficiency of each 
firm. Our goal then is to maximize the relative efficiency h0 by variables u and v: 
           
       
       
  
                       
                      
 
The weights u and v help us to determine the most efficient firm. Further we have i number of 
inputs x, and r number of outputs y. We now also constrain the efficiency measure so that it is equal 
to or less than one, and also that the input and output weights are non-negative. 
 
This construction has one problem however; it is unbounded. For any correct solution         the 
solution           is also correct. We solve this problem by adding another constraint      
 
   
 , “which yields the equivalent linear programming (LP) problem in which we change the variables 
from       to      ” (Cooper, Seiford, Zhu, & Banker, 2004). 
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Using the dual of the LP problem, we can derive an “equivalent envelopment form of this problem” 
(Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, An Introduction to Efficiency and Productivity Analysis, 1998). We 
use the dual of the LP problem because it has fewer restrictions and is therefore easier to solve. 
 
Here θ is the efficiency of the i-th firm. We run the minimization once for every firm. The λ is a 
weight that assists us in forming an efficient virtual-firm for every firm. Firms where      are 
technically efficient and define the efficient frontier to which all other companies are compared. The 
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constraints have their own intuitive meanings (Figure 4-2). These constraints ensure that the 
projected point cannot lie outside the feasible production set. 
 
Figure 4-2 Meanings of the constraints (Bjørndal, Bjørndal, & Fange, Forthcoming) 
We illustrate the input-oriented CRS model with a simple numerical example from (Coelli, Rao, 
O'Donnell, & Battese, 1998). They set up five firms that produce one output (y) with two inputs (x1, 
x2). The data are as follows: 
firm y x1 x2 x1/y x2/y
1 1 2 5 2 5
2 2 2 4 1 2
3 3 6 6 2 2
4 1 3 2 3 2
5 2 6 2 3 1  
Table 4-1 Example Data for CRS DEA Example 
The minimization is run once per firm and resulting values are found in Table 4-2. The problem, 
solved for firm 3 would appear as follows: 
 
        
            
                               
                                     
                                     
                                        
    
 
            - Firm i should use at least as many inputs as its reference. 
    
 
           - Firm i should produce at least as many outputs as its reference. 
        - Decision variables to define reference firms. 
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Table 4-2 shows the value for the five solutions, with the λ and θ that provide the minimum value 
for θ. The λ values are linear weights that in combination give a projected point on the efficient 
frontier where an efficient firm 3’ is thought to be. We see in Table 4-2 as well as Figure 4-3 that 
the reference firms for firm 3 are firm 2 and 5. 
firm θ λ1 λ2 λ3 λ4 λ5
1 0.50 - 0.50 - - -
2 1.00 - 1.00 - - -
3 0.83 - 1.00 - - 0.50
4 0.71 - 0.21 - - 0.29
5 1.00 - - - - 1.00  
Table 4-2 CRS Input-Oriented DEA Example (Coelli et.al., 2005) 
The reference firms can be distinguished from the others in two ways. One is by seeing which 
companies have θ   . These are the efficient firms that define the efficient frontier. One can also 
tell that these are reference firms because they are fully weighted on themselves, i.e. when running 
the LP problem for Firm 2, then      and similarly when running the LP problem for Firm 
5,      . 
 
Figure 4-3 CRS Input Oriented DEA Example (Coelli et.al., 2005) 
To visualize how the efficiency score is determined, one can draw a line that starts at the origin and 
ends where Firm 3 is placed in Figure 4-3. The point where this line crosses the efficient frontier (on 
the line between point 2 and point 5) is the virtual efficient version of Firm 3. If one were to divide 
the length of the line from the origin to point 3’ by the length of the line from the origin to point 3 
one would get the efficiency score – 0,83 – as it appears in Table 4-2. 
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4.1 Constant Returns to Scale or Variable Returns to Scale? 
Thus far we have only dealt with the assumption that we have constant returns to scale (CRS). 
However, there are many reasons why firms would not operate at optimal scale, and it is 
possible to modify the model to allow for variable returns to scale (VRS). This is done by adding 
the constraint: 
     
 
   
 
“This approach forms a convex hull of intersecting facets that envelope the data points more tightly 
than the CRS conical hull and thus provides technical efficiency scores that are greater than or equal 
to those obtained using the CRS model” (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 1998). This constraint 
makes sure that companies are only compared to reference companies that are of similar size. 
 
Figure 4-4 VRS vs. CRS (Coelli et.al., 2005) 
If the CRS and VRS values differ from each other, and we believe VRS frontier is correct, this implies 
that the firm suffers from scale inefficiency. In a VRS model with one input and one output like in 
Figure 4-4 the firm in point C would be technically efficient in point A, and scale efficient in point B.  
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4.2 Input vs. output oriented models 
The model we have defined thus far has only rated DMUs by how efficiently they use inputs while 
they keep the outputs fixed. This is interesting for firms where it is the inputs that are controllable. 
In some other scenarios we can imagine that firms have a fixed budget and seek to maximize the 
output. In this case an output oriented model would be more appropriate. Input and output models 
are identical under CRS, whereas under VRS a slight modification allows us to maximize according to 
fixed inputs and variable outputs. Even with an adapted model the two values are usually very 
similar (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 1998). 
4.3 Super efficiency 
In some cases it is interesting to discriminate between the companies that are part of the efficient 
frontier; these are in the regular model all rated at    . One way to do this is to allow efficiency 
scores that are greater than one. This can be accommodated by restricting the model from using a 
firm as a reference to itself. It follows that an efficient firm would not be part of the data set when 
the firm itself is being evaluated. It would however still be an efficient frontier defining firm when 
the other firms are being evaluated, so the DEA model does not change for any other firms than the 
efficient firms when allowing for super-efficiency. 
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5 Adjusting for the environment 
An issue that has been much discussed because it is vital to efficiency analysis is the effect of 
environmental factors on the efficiency score. Environmental factors are defined as all factors that 
could influence the efficiency of a firm and that are not controllable by the manager (Coelli, Rao, 
O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005). In other publications, environmental factors are named socio-economic 
factors, geography variables, fixed inputs or outputs, non-discretionary variables or non-controllable 
factors, but essentially they all mean the same. Examples for environmental factors are population 
sizes, mild or hard competition or extreme weather conditions; depending on the industry assessed. 
The following paragraphs present some of the suggestions that have been made for handling 
environmental factors. 
5.1 Categorization 
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes were the ones to introduce the method of DEA in the first place. They 
also considered environmental variables and came up with a first solution to taking into account 
environmental factors. 
Their suggestion was a very easy one, though it brings about some problems, especially when it 
comes to sample size. This approach is especially useful, when the environmental variable does not 
have a natural ordering (e.g. public versus private ownership). “Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes 
suggested a model that can be divided into three stages (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005): 
1. Divide the sample into public and private sub-samples and solve DEAs for each sub-sample; 
2. Project all observed data points onto their respective frontiers; and 
3. Solve a single DEA using the projected points and assess any difference in the mean 
efficiency of the two sub-samples.” 
As mentioned before, one problem with this method is the possible reduction of the comparison 
set, “resulting in many firms being found to be efficient and thus reducing the discriminating power 
of the analysis” (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005). Another problem is that with this approach 
only one environmental factor can be taken into account, as we can only have one category to 
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group the DMUs. A more flexible approach to categorical variables was suggested by Banker and 
Morey in 1986, as the next sub-chapter will show. 
5.2 Categorical Variables 
In 1986 Banker and Morey suggested that the original DEA model had to be extended “in order to 
estimate the extent to which the controllable or discretionary inputs can be reduced by the DMU 
manager while keeping the exogenously fixed inputs at their current level” (Banker & Morey, 
1986a). 
The necessary extension of the DEA model is to change the set-up so that it determines whether, 
and to what extent, a discretionary input or output can be reduced or increased, given that the level 
of the other input or output will remain fixed at its current value (Banker & Morey, 1986a). Figure 
5-1 illustrates this approach by looking at discretionary and fixed inputs. 
 
Figure 5-1 Discretionary versus Fixed inputs 
As explained in chapter 4, the traditional DEA approach determines the efficiency of A by comparing 
it with point E on the efficient frontier. Because xf is exogenously fixed, the information about a 
possible reduction in xf (in this case | xf A- xf E|) is not valuable to the manager of DMU A. In case of 
environmental variables, it is more meaningful to compare A to point R’ on the efficient frontier. 
DMU R’ consumes the same quantity of the fixed input xf but less of the discretionary input xd and 
the new amount of reduction possible in xd can be estimated at the distance |xdA-xdR’| (Banker & 
Morey, 1986a). 
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In this illustration we make sure that DMU A is compared to a DMU with the same quantity of the 
fixed input. Banker and Morey developed a DEA model where the requirement is that the composite 
reference group shall use no more of the uncontrollable resource than the unit under evaluation, 
but not necessarily the same amount. This procedure has the advantage of enriching the 
comparison set immensely. (Banker & Morey, 1986a) 
This work paved the way for the suggestion of a new DEA model including categorical variables, 
presented in a later paper in 1986 by Banker and Morey. 
The idea behind using categorical variables in DEA presented by Banker and Morey in 1986 (Banker 
& Morey, 1986b) is to group the DMUs into categories so that they are only compared to units that 
face the same non-controllable or environmental factors. 
This approach is meant to ensure that companies are only compared to companies that face the 
same issues. Imagine as an example network companies operating in an area with a lot of average 
snow fall in winter. They will face different issues about electricity transmission and distribution – 
e.g. regarding maintenance needs - than network companies operating in an area with low average 
snowfall (Banker & Morey, 1986b). Assume network companies are categorized into three snowfall 
categories ‘mild’, ‘medium’ or ‘heavy’ snowfall. A network company in the ‘heavy snowfall’ category 
will then only be compared to other companies in the same category. Network companies in the 
‘mild snowfall’ category on the other hand would have its peer group composed of network 
companies in all three categories, if any of these companies outperformed the assessed company 
despite of their more difficult situation. (Banker & Morey, 1986b) 
This approach ensures fair assessment of each company by taking into account the non-controllable 
environmental factors that each company faces. However, as easy as this approach sounds, it can 
only be used if the values of the environmental variable can be ordered from the least to the most 
detrimental effect upon efficiency (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005). Furthermore, we 
assume that it needs a large enough sample, if we want to divide the DMUs into categories. 
In their article, Banker and Morey suggest modifications to the mathematical formulation of the LP 
problem. They also include a comparison of the normal DEA and the one that includes categorical 
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variables and find that, at least for their example, “very little discriminating power is lost, while 
greatly increasing the credibility of the findings” (Banker & Morey, 1986b). 
5.3 Two-stage method 
A very popular procedure for adjusting for environmental factors is the two-stage method (Barnum 
& Gleason, 2008). With this method, in the first stage a DEA is conducted with endogenous factors 
only. The resulting efficiency scores are regressed on the chosen exogenous variables in a second 
stage (Ray, 1991) (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005) (Barnum & Gleason, 2008). 
The two-stage method helps to identify statistical significant environmental factors and with this to 
adjust the efficiency scores such that it represents the pure managerial efficiency (Ray, 1991) 
(Barnum & Gleason, 2008) (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005). 
In more detail, the signs of the coefficients the regression delivers indicate the directions of the 
influences of the environmental variables. These can then be used to adjust all efficiency scores so 
that they are better comparable, i.e. that they correspond to a common level of environment. 
(Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005) 
Advantages of the two-stage method are that it can be used for both continuous and categorical 
variables. The two-stage method also does not make prior assumptions regarding the direction of 
the influence of the environmental factor and this can thus be assessed unprejudiced. (Coelli, Rao, 
O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005). 
A considerable disadvantage of the two-stage method is the potential for biased estimates due to 
correlation of the endogenous variables of the first stage (DEA) and the exogenous factors of the 
second stage regression. (Barnum & Gleason, 2008) (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005) 
Concerning this disadvantage, Barnum and Gleason (2008) suggest an alternative two-stage method, 
where the order of the stages is reversed. This means that inputs are adjusted for environmental 
factors in a first stage by regressing each output on endogenous and exogenous inputs and adjusting 
the outputs accordingly by removing the estimated effect of the exogenous factor. In a second stage 
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the adjusted variables are then used to calculate the efficiency score with a conventional DEA 
method (Barnum & Gleason, 2008). 
This reverse two-stage method has the advantage of removing the correlation that causes the 
biased results in the conventional model. However, Barnum and Gleason (2008) point out that the 
method has neither been extensively tested empirically, nor has the methodology been proven 
analytically yet. Once this is done, this reverse two-stage method might become a good alternative 
to the conventional two-stage method. 
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6 The Norwegian Regulation Authority and Energy 
Politics 
6.1 Goals of energy politics 
Norway is very abundant in renewable energy sources. It is therefore understandable that politics in 
Norway see the major goal of Norwegian energy policy to have Norway develop a leading role in 
developing a climate-friendly community by setting an example in reducing its own emissions 
significantly. (Regjeringen.no, 2010) 
For achieving this goal, the following prerequisites will need to be met (Regjeringen.no, 2010): 
- to supply electricity in an economically rational way 
- to use less energy by using energy more efficiently 
- to increase the percentage of renewable energy sources for electricity production 
- to maintain and create good market solutions to pursue the goal 
While aiming at this overall goal, energy policy shall ensure high security of energy supply by 
focusing both on the national and international development of the industry. 
The energy demand is expected to increase until 2050 (Regjeringen.no, 2010). This increased 
demand can be covered both by increase in production and a reinforcement of the grid in order to 
be able to transport the energy. 
The objective to increase the amount of distributed generation has been well received and a further 
extension of distributed generation plants in Norway is to be expected. Geographically these 
resources are located in Northern and Western Norway and in coastal areas, as the distributed 
generation majorly consists of wind power and small-scale hydropower generators. 
The challenges to be met in distributed generation are (Regjeringen.no, 2010): 
- The need to strengthen the grid to be able to integrate wind power and small-scale 
generation as well as to guarantee for the market to function 
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- Avoiding bottlenecks in the grid 
- Secure grid capacity to and from Europe and the Nordic countries 
- Grid planning needs to take into account both production and consumption 
- Strengthen the interaction between production and the grid 
The increased focus on climate measures, conversion and new distributed generation means that 
the development of the grid will play a vital role in meeting these goals. 
6.2 The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate 
The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE), a directorate under the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy, is the authority responsible for the regulation of the network companies in 
Norway. Their areas of responsibility range from management of the country’s water resources to 
the promotion of efficient energy markets and cost-effective energy systems. Their overall goal is to 
achieve a more efficient use of energy (NVE, 2009). 
The Energy Act of 1990 delegates the power for regulation of the transmission network companies 
to NVE (Edvardsen, Førsund, Hansen, Kittelsen, & Neurauter, 2006). Besides regulation and 
controlling grid activities, NVE is empowered as a licensing authority for investment grants for large 
distribution grids (22-60 kV) and geographical area licenses (Magnus, 2000). 
Since the very beginning of the deregulation in Norway, NVE has put great focus on cost efficiency in 
the transmission networks by introducing an incentive regulation regime (Edvardsen, Førsund, 
Hansen, Kittelsen, & Neurauter, 2006). After a few years of a rate of return regulation with the 
principle of cost reimbursement (Andersen, 2007), the regulation model has been changed to a 
revenue-cap regulation, which enables higher rates of return in utilities which are able to reduce 
short- and long-term slack (Bråten & Magnus, 2000). 
From theory we know that ideally, the regulator should motivate the network companies to price 
their services efficiently, to ensure that product quality is satisfactory, incentivize the right 
investments in a timely fashion both in the short and long run, and to contribute to increased cost-
efficiency of the grid companies. In addition, the regime should minimize the administrative costs 
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incurred through regulation. According to Magnus (2000) experience in Norway and elsewhere has 
shown that these goals might be conflicting objectives. 
Since the start of the deregulation, NVE has been working on creating a benchmarking model that is 
both stable and fair, where by stable we mean that the model does not overreact to changes and 
has low variability and by fair we mean that it does not over or under compensate companies for 
being special in one way or the other. In the course of the last two decades, a benchmarking model 
has been developed in cooperation between NVE, the grid companies and Energi Norge. This model 
is constantly being developed and improved to make the regulation more fair and transparent. 
6.3 Laws and Regulations 
6.3.1 The Market Reform in 1990 and laws that followed it 
The process of reform was initiated by a conservative government that envisaged both a 
privatization of the major state production and transmission company, Statkraft, as well as an 
increase in competition. Due to a change in government, the privatization was postponed. The 
deregulation of the power market, however, was implemented and while Statkraft was split up into 
production and transmission companies, the market was opened up for competition (McGowan, 
1993). There have been two major laws that set the ground rules for the deregulation and 
regulation of the industry. These will be presented in the following sub-chapters. 
6.3.2 On the Energy Act of 1990 
The Energy Act first came into force January 1, 1991. It provides a framework for the organization of 
power supply. The Energy Act liberalized the power supply in Norway by introducing unbundling of 
accounts between production, trade, distribution and transmission of electricity, and sets the legal 
framework for the monopoly control of the distribution and transmission activities (Edvardsen, 
Førsund, Hansen, Kittelsen, & Neurauter, 2006). The basic objectives of the Energy Act are to ensure 
an economically rational use of the power resources, to facilitate a secure electricity supply and to 
even out the prices to consumers. The law has since been modified repeatedly (EnergiLink, 2008). 
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Since 2006, the Energy Act is being re-evaluated by the government with the help of the whole 
political environment, industry organizations and interest groups that have been asked to help re-
evaluate the Energy Act and conduct studies related to four key issues in Norway’s energy policy: 
- The conditions for new electricity generation 
- The allocation of water reservoirs 
- The conditions for the development of the heating sector, and 
- The energy efficiency on the consumer side (OED, 2006). 
One current result of this research group has been the amendments made to paragraph 3-4 of the 
Energy Act. 
§ 3-4 of the Energy Act: Connection Responsibility 
The law about connection duty has been changed with effect from January 1, 2010. Earlier network 
companies could choose whether or not to give access to the grid to new generators. Now they are 
required to connect any generator that wishes so to the grid. This means that from now on network 
companies will have the requirement to assess, apply for concession and invest in needed 
extensions of the grid, if the undertaking is economically rational. This change in the law is meant to 
incentivize economically rational grid investments in connection with new economically rational 
generation plant projects. While this law requires the grid companies to give access to the grid to 
everyone, the ‘regulation on economic and technical reporting, revenue caps for network 
companies and tariffs’ regulates which party will have to pay for the necessary investments. 
6.3.3 On ‘The Regulation on Financial and Technical Reporting, Revenue Caps for 
Network Companies and Tariffs’1 
Another law that has been passed with the beginning of the deregulation of the electricity sector is 
the ‘Regulation on financial and technical reporting, revenue caps for network companies and 
tariffs’. 
This regulation covers all necessary topics that both the network companies and the regulator need 
to know about for their operations. One could say that it serves as a kind of guideline for market 
participants. Amongst other things, the regulation sets rules for how the network companies’ 
                                                        
1
 In Norwegian: Forskrift om økonomisk og teknisk rapportering, inntektsramme for nettvirksomheten og tariffer 
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accounting practices should look, how to deal with excess income, in what cases companies can be 
compensated for extra costs and how to set tariffs. 
One special paragraph in the law has recently been changed and is likely to affect most network 
companies, also due to the newly established connection requirement. This paragraph, § 17-5 of the 
regulation, regulates the sharing of the investment costs for grid investments caused by a new 
generation plant. 
§ 17-5 of the Regulation: Investment Contribution 
This paragraph on investment contribution2 regulates to what extent grid companies have the right 
to charge customers the construction cost of new grid connections or costs in connection with 
reinforcements of the grid. This reimbursement is called investment contribution and can only be 
taken, when the customer, i.e. the production company, causes demand for increased capacity or 
quality that triggers the need for grid expansion. The regulation requires that a fixed amount is 
calculated for the investment contribution that covers the costs for the connection of the client to 
the grid minus possible future investments to be made by the grid company (e.g. reinforcement of 
old infrastructure) (Lovdata, 2010). 
The investment contribution has to be determined independently of the client’s expected energy 
output and can be set to the maximum fixed cost for the new grid minus the connection fee. The 
project costs are equal to the necessary costs of the improvement or extension, including man-
hours for personnel, machinery, and equipment. 
Network companies have the possibility to distribute the investment contribution amount amongst 
the facilities and customers that are being connected to the grid within a period of ten years after 
completion of the grid. This distribution of costs may either be decided upon in the beginning of the 
period, i.e. assuming the company knows how many and what kind of customers need to be 
connected to the grid in the next ten years, or it may be calculated when new customers actually get 
connected to the grid. This may involve some redistribution of money to the first-comers. The major 
difference here lies in who takes on the investment risk. 
                                                        
2
 Investment Contribution = Anleggsbidrag 
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The regulation further emphasizes the importance of the transparency of the process. The 
customers (end users or generators) must always be notified in advance about the collection of, and 
the basis for calculating the investment contribution. 
Exceptions for when the investment contribution cannot be used are for investments in meshed 
grids. In this case the investment contribution can only be taken in extraordinary cases. Also for 
reinforcements of the radial grid, only a proportionate share of these costs can be included in the 
investment contribution amount. 
The above being a summary of the law text, we point out that this text was originally written with 
regard to end users who want to be connected to the grid and having to pay an investment 
contribution for possible grid expansions. Since the change in the Energy Act in the beginning of 
2010 where connection duty was expanded to generation plants as well, § 17-5 also applies for 
generation plants that want to be connected to the grid. (NVE, 2009a) 
While approving of the general legislation, NVE suggests that the investment contribution is 
maintained and that it is expanded to meshed grids as well. We expect § 17-5 to be expanded 
according to the suggestions of NVE in the near future. 
6.3.4 Summary 
With effect from January 1, 2010, the connection duty has been introduced and from now on, every 
distributed generation plant has the right to be connected to the grid. In relation to this, the 
paragraph on investment contribution gets a new meaning added to the old one. It is now also valid 
for generation plants. 
In practice, this means that each distributed generation plant that wants access to the grid will have 
to pay the investment contribution to the corresponding grid company. The amount of the 
investment contribution then depends on the amount of investment needed, i.e. length of new lines 
needed or amount of reinforcement needed. It has to be taken into account that, if the one asking 
for the extension of the grid does not accept to pay the investment contribution the grid companies 
are not required to connect them. We furthermore point out that the investment contribution is a 
good tool to make the actual costs of the investment visible and ensures that the increased costs 
due to new connections of new distributed generation plants are not passed on to the end users. 
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A study conducted by Energi Norge in 2010 found that 76% of the respondents had distributed 
generation in their area and that 100% of the respondents used the possibility of imposing an 
investment contribution on the distributed generators when they could. (Svartsund.pdf XX) 
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7 Explaining Efficiency Scores and Revenue Caps 
In the following we shall give an overview of how to calculate the revenue cap for each company. 
The first step is to calculate the cost base to be used as the input in the DEA analysis, as well as to 
gather data for each company’s outputs. In the second step we run the DEA analysis and retrieve 
DEA efficiency scores for each company. Then we run a Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression 
to correct these scores for certain environmental factors. After calibrating the efficiency scores we 
have an efficiency rating for each grid company that is used to calculate the revenue cap. We will 
only be looking at the distribution grid efficiencies in this thesis, however there is also an efficiency 
calculation for the regional grid that is weighted together with the distributional efficiency score. 
When the individual efficiency scores are calculated we calculate a cost base to be used in the 
revenue cap, and then finally the revenue cap. Then there are two corrections before the final 
revenue cap is determined. In the following we shall give a detailed overview of each step in this 
process. 
7.1 Calculating the Efficiency Scores 
7.1.1 Cost Base for DEA Inputs 
The DEA analysis uses only one input: the cost base. This is the representative cost that each grid 
company uses to provide their amount of outputs. The costs included in this cost base are: 
 Operations & maintenance costs 
 Capital costs (including capital financed by investment contribution) 
 Depreciation 
 Value of lost load (VOLL)3 
 Network losses in regional & distributional grids 
In the DEA model, all the grid companies are compared to each other based on this cost relative to 
their respective outputs. 
                                                        
3
 Value of Lost Load (VOLL) = Kostnad av ikke levert energi (KILE) 
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7.1.2 Calculating the DEA efficiency 
The DEA model is the first step in determining the efficiency scores. The only input is the cost base 
as detailed in the previous sub-chapter. The current NVE model includes eleven outputs, three of 
which are included in the second stage of the efficiency analysis in chapter 7.1.3. The output 
variables are chosen so that they together reflect the amount of output each company has, but 
should also reflect cost increasing environments that cannot be controlled by the grid companies’ 
management. Part of the purpose of the regulation is to measure the efficiency of the companies 
based on what they can ‘change’. Several of the output variables are geography variables and are 
intended to compensate for the added challenge of operating in different regions, i.e. regions with 
different environmental factors such as forest, snow, population density etc. The outputs included in 
the DEA analysis are: 
 Subscriptions without vacation homes 
 Subscriptions for vacation homes 
 Delivered Energy 
 High Voltage Lines 
 Network stations 
 Forest 
 Snow 
 Wind 
We run the DEA analysis allowing for super efficiency, in a CRS model. Because the model is volatile 
NVE has decided that only companies that are super-efficient (over 100% efficient) on average over 
the last four years shall be allowed to keep their super efficient score. This means we have to run 
two separate DEA analyses. Once with 2008 data and a second time with averaged data for 2004-
2007. Companies that were over 100% efficient in 2008, but were not super efficient in the 2004-
2007 period will be capped at a 100%. Companies that were super efficient in the 2004-2007 period 
and in 2008 will be allowed to keep the super efficient score from the 2004-2007 analysis. These 
scores are then carried on to the second stage where they will be corrected for the last three 
environmental factors. 
7.1.3 Stage 2 – Correction for Environmental Factors 
The second stage is designed to correct the DEA efficiency scores according to inefficiencies caused 
by the environmental factors Interfaces, Islands and Distributed Generation (DG). This is done by 
calculating coefficients for each variable with the help of a panel data model. These coefficients are 
then used to calculate a value for an environmental factor correction (EFC) for each company. 
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The GLS regression4 model we use to determine the coefficients is specified as follows: 
                                    , 
where   is a constant term,   is a vector of the different environmental factors,   is a vector of 
estimates for the coefficients for each environmental factor and   is an error term. 
The DEA efficiency scores from the years 2004 to 2008 without super efficiency are used as the 
dependent variable, which is described by the three independent variables: Interfaces, Islands and 
DG. The use of panel data in the second stage makes sure that variations are kept as low as possible. 
The dependent variable is size independent, which is why we need to make the independent 
variables size independent as well before adding them to the regression. This is done by dividing 
them by a grid value that is calculated for each company.5 
After running the regression analysis specified above, we have coefficients for each of the 
independent variables. These coefficients can then be used to calculate an EFC score for each 
company: 
        
           
     , 
where    is the estimated constant term and the different   ’s are the estimated coefficients for each 
independent variable. EFC is a number that describes how much of a disadvantage (in units of 
efficiency score) each grid company suffers for its amount of Islands, Interfaces and DG. 
We use the coefficients of 2010 to illustrate what the EFC calculation looks like:  
        
 
   
          
             
 
   
       
             
 
   
  
              
                       
          
                      
       
                       
  
                     
To determine the corrected total efficiency score for each company, we subtract EFC from the DEA 
efficiency scores: 
                                                        
4
 We run the GLS regression with random effects and robust t-values 
5
 Calculation of the net value for each company: 419,000 NOK * High voltage lines (km) + 147,000 NOK * number of 
network stations + 12,000 NOK * total amount of customers 
REGULATION OF DISTRIBUTION COMPANIES IN NORWAY   41 
 
                  
Because EFC is a negative number, this will result in an increased total efficiency for all companies 
with Islands, Interfaces or DG. The next step then is to calibrate the efficiency score. 
7.1.4 Calibrating the Efficiency Score 
Due to the way the model is formulated, only a handful of companies will be efficient. This is 
because the DEA model is a best practice model, and ranks all companies by the most efficient 
companies. This means that if we do not calibrate the efficiency scores, most companies will not be 
reimbursed for all their costs. Therefore, NVE calibrates the results to make the average company 
100% efficient, which also means that on average, the companies will be able to cover their costs. 
This calibration is done by dividing each cost base by the total cost base for the industry determining 
a weight (  ). 
    
          
                  
 
Each weight is then multiplied with its respective efficiency score and the sum of these values is the 
average calculated efficiency of the industry. 
                                            
 
   
 
To calibrate the efficiency scores the difference between 100% and the average efficiency score is 
added to each individual efficiency score. 
                                                                    
The average should now be roughly 100% for the industry. We say roughly because the efficiency 
scores are rounded to two decimal places resulting in an average that is slightly incorrect. This will 
however be taken care of in the calibration correction when we calculate the revenue cap. 
7.1.5 Combining Distribution Grid with Regional Grid Results 
The efficiency scores calculated thus far have been for the distribution grid. A similar process is used 
to calculate efficiency scores for the regional grid. The two scores are merged to one total efficiency 
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score for each company. The weight is determined by how large a share of the company’s costs is 
caused by either the regional (R) or the distribution (D) grid. 
                                    
          
            
              
          
            
 
The resulting number, finally, is the efficiency score used to calculate each company’s revenue cap. 
7.2 Calculating the Revenue Cap 
The revenue cap is the maximum revenue a grid company is allowed to take during year t. The basis 
for calculating the revenue cap is the cost base. Unfortunately, this is an estimated number, as the 
actual costs of each grid company will typically not be known until two years after the revenue cap 
has been set. Similarly, the revenue cap is not necessarily known exactly to the grid companies 
during the year, though usually they are given a preliminary number. The result is that the grid 
companies may charge their customers too much or little. They are however required to make up 
for this difference in following years. Over the long term the revenue cap and total revenue for the 
grid companies must match each other. 
7.2.1 Calculating the Cost Base for the Revenue Cap  
After calculating the efficiency score for each grid company, it is possible to calculate the revenue 
cap. The first step is to calculate the cost base to be used to determine the revenue cap. This cost 
base is slightly different from the one used as the DEA input. The cost base used in calculating the 
revenue cap is an estimated cost for year t, which is the real cost for year t-2, where some of the 
costs have been adjusted for inflation: 
 Operations & maintenance costs, adjusted for two years of inflation 
 Capital Costs (Not including capital financed by investment contribution) 
 Depreciation 
 Value of Lost Load (VOLL), adjusted for two years of inflation 
 Network Losses in Regional and Distributional grids 
Note that the capital base used to calculate capital costs no longer includes the capital paid for by 
investment contribution. 
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7.2.2 Calculating the Cost Norm 
The cost norm is the cost that the model estimates for a 100% efficient company, i.e. what the cost 
base should be. Companies that are inefficient will have a cost base that is above their cost norm 
and will not be allowed to charge their customers for the full difference between the two. The 
intended incentive is that the grid company will cut costs to reduce inefficiency and by doing so 
increase their profits while keeping the price low for its customers. The cost norm is calculated as 
the cost base, minus the network loss in the regional grid and required planning costs6 multiplied 
with their efficiency score. 
                                                                              
After multiplying, the network loss and required study costs are then added at full cost and the 
result is the cost norm. This cost norm is then calibrated in two stages before it becomes part of the 
revenue cap for the company. 
7.2.3 Rho – Weight of Norm vs. Actual Costs 
The model NVE uses cannot be seen as a perfect evaluator of efficiency because clearly there are 
differences between the grid companies that the model does not take into account. It is not known 
what exactly drives the costs and similarly what the cost should be for an efficient company; there 
will always be errors. Some may be due to measurement errors in the outputs, or the input may be 
calculated differently between companies. Other errors might be due to factors that are outside 
management’s control, but are not reflected in the model. As an example distributed generation has 
not been included in the model before 2010. To lessen the impact of these errors in measuring the 
efficiency NVE has added a multiplier that defines how much of the revenue cap should be based on 
the model’s cost norm and how much should be based on the grid company’s actual cost. 
                                          
This multiplier rho (ρ) is currently set equal to 0.6. This means that the revenue cap is the sum of 
60% of the cost norm and 40% of the cost base. Recall that the cost norm is the estimated cost of a 
fully efficient company of the same size, as defined by NVE’s benchmarking model. The cost base is 
the budgeted cost for year t. 
                                                        
6
 Required Planning Costs = Utredningsansvar 
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7.2.4 Calibration Correction 
The calibration correction is related to discrepancies between the total Revenue Cap1 and the total 
cost for the industry. This discrepancy was initially caused in the calibration in chapter 7.1.4, where 
the efficiency scores have rounding errors when they were rounded to two decimal points. 
However, the model is intended to cover the total industry costs, and therefore a difference 
between the industry total revenue cap and industry total cost base must be accounted for. This is 
done by calculating how much of an impact this has relative to the total return base of the industry. 
                     
             
                                         
                     
 
 
In other words, the industry total cost base is subtracted from the total industry Revenue Cap1 and 
divided by the industry total return base; the resulting number is a fraction of how much the 
discrepancy is compared to the total return base. This fraction is then multiplied with the individual 
return base and the result is the amount by which the grid company has been under- or over-
compensated by the model. This is then divided by rho and subtracted from the cost norm. We 
divide by rho because the cost norm will later be multiplied with rho again, and we want the full 
effect of the correction to be carried into the revenue cap. The new Revenue Cap2 is determined by: 
                                           
The total effect of this calibration is relatively small and only reduces the revenue cap for the entire 
industry in 2010 by 38 MNOK, or about a quarter of a percent of the total costs of the industry. 
7.2.5 Deviation Correction 
In the previous calibration the model attempts to match the total industry revenue cap to the total 
industry cost. This correction step addresses another problem in a similar way. The cost base we use 
for the current year is an estimation of costs for year t based on the costs of year t-2 adjusted for 
two years of inflation. Naturally, the actual costs of year t will be different from those estimated. 
Typically the actual costs for the grid companies are not known before the financial statements are 
available, one or two years later. This correction step reimburses the grid companies for the 
deviation in the estimated cost base used in the set revenue cap for year t-2 and the actual costs 
base of year t-2. 
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We subtract the actual cost base of year t-2 from the cost base used to set the revenue cap for year 
t-2. The resulting amount is the amount by which the industry has been over- or under-
compensated in year t-2. We add two years of lost interest and then divide by the industry total 
return base. The resulting fraction shows by how many percent the estimated cost base was off 
from the actual one, compared to the industry total return base. We have termed this the Variation 
Factor. 
                 
                                                                                   
                    
 
The grid companies will be compensated for the same fraction, plus the fraction in the calibration 
correction step, on their own return base, divided by ρ. We divide by rho for the same reason as in 
the calibration correction: we want the full effect of the correction to be added to the revenue cap. 
The cost norm will later be multiplied with rho and we preemptively divide by rho now, so that the 
full amount is added to the revenue cap. 
                    
                                                                  
 
 
In summation, the grid companies receive the fraction by which the estimation was off in year t-2 on 
their own return base, added two years of interest plus the calibration correction fraction. This is 
then divided by rho and subtracted from the cost norm. Again, the actual effect this has on the 
revenue cap is determined in the yardstick formula: 
                                           
7.3 Addition for Investments 
In earlier years the revenue cap has had an addition for investments. This was added because the 
grid companies would make investments, but the costs of these investments would not make it into 
the model before two years later. NVE has issued a statement that this will no longer be in use from 
January 2011 (NVE, 2010). We therefore consider this step irrelevant to the analysis later in this 
paper, and have decided to drop this step entirely. 
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8 Project Presentation 
8.1 Project Facts 
The project that will be used in the analyses has been presented to us by SKS Produksjon, located in 
the Beiarn region south of Bodø. 
We investigate the costs for the extension of the grid to eight new distributed generation facilities 
that want to get access to the grid. These companies will increase the generation capacity the grid 
needs to transport by 25 MW. In case all planned generation is put into place, the grid will be 
overloaded which in turn will lead to an increased network loss and voltage. Thus, the grid as it is 
cannot be used when the new generation is introduced and action must be taken, i.e. the grid needs 
reinforcement. 
The expected yearly production of the new generators amounts to 91 GWh (assuming 40% usage of 
the distributed generation) and the generation facilities are meant to be connected to the already 
existing high voltage lines (>22kV). 
As a baseline, SKS uses the alternative of leaving the grid as it is. We call this the reference 
alternative – alternative R - where we assume that the 22kV grid from Beiarn to Beiardalen remains 
as it is now and no distributed generation enters the scene. The other alternative – alternative 1 – 
assumes that distributed generation will be connected and the grid is optimized both technically and 
economically. 
Considering the above mentioned conditions, adding the project will result in the following costs: 
- Today’s value of the future reinvestments alternative 1: 13.013 MNOK 
- Today’s value of the future reinvestments alternative R: 3.933 MNOK 
- This results in a difference of 9.080 MNOK, which can be charged as investment contribution 
from the distributed generators 
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To require a fair share of the investment contribution from each distributed generator, an amount 
payable per megawatt is calculated and results in 0.364 MNOK / MW, which with the assumption of 
a 40% usage rate (i.e. 91 GWh) results in 10 Øre / kWh. 
For the analyses we will assume that grid companies always take 100% of the investment 
contribution and thus make the distributed generators pay. In chapter 12, we will however also 
analyze if this is always the right decision profit wise. 
The dataset we use is the data provided by NVE for 2010. (NVE, 2009b) 
8.2 How the Project is Added to the Model 
For the reader to be able to follow our analysis more closely, this chapter points out the details of 
how we added the project to the model. 
In a first step we adapt the input and output variables for the respective company for the efficiency 
analysis. The only variables that are affected by the project are the DEA input costs and the 
distributed generation variable in the second stage regression. The DEA input cost is increased by 
adding the total investment cost (13.013 MNOK) of the project to the book value as well as to the 
depreciation cost. For depreciation we assume a linear depreciation over a period of 30 years. The 
distributed generation variable in the second step is increased by the full new amount of distributed 
generation, i.e. in this case 25 MW. 
We do not change any of the other outputs, because the project strengthens the existing 
architecture and thus does not increase the length of lines or the number of network stations. This 
results in the project being added in the least beneficial manner, which will result in the worst case 
scenario possible for this project. The reason that we add no outputs is that we do not know a 
specific number of outputs, so we do not want to overly optimistic about the project. 
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When running the DEA analysis, we change the cost input for those companies that we add the 
project to. As described earlier, the full project costs are accounted for in the DEA input that thus 
increases by 1,288,070 NOK7. 
The resulting DEA efficiency scores are then transferred to the second step, where we run the 
regression with the new dependent variables (natural logarithms of DEA efficiency scores) and the 
adapted DG variable (additional 25 MW divided by the net value of the respective companies) for 
the companies the project is added to. The new coefficients are used to calculate the EFC for each 
company. 
After calibration and combination of regional and distribution grid efficiency scores, the new 
revenue cap efficiency scores are used to calculate the new revenue caps. Again, we have to adapt 
the input cost for the revenue calculation. It is important to note that the cost base is calculated 
differently to the DEA input cost. Also, the change in the cost base for the revenue calculation 
depends on if the grid companies demand investment contribution or not. Because it is common 
practice to take the full amount of investment contribution, we run most analyses assuming that 
investment contribution is taken to the full extent. A separate analysis on the effects of investment 
contribution is done in chapter 12. 
In the likely case that the company demands investment contribution, only the costs the company 
actually had from the project, i.e. total investment costs (13.013 MNOK) minus investment 
contribution (9.080 MNOK), are added to the cost base. The respective amount is also added to the 
depreciation costs assuming linear depreciation over a period of 30 years, which then results in an 
increase of the revenue cap cost base of 389,301 NOK8. 
These adaptations to the inputs and outputs then yield new revenue caps that show the effect of 
adding the project. 
  
                                                        
7
 Total project cost: 13,013,000 NOK; 1% working capital; NVE regulated rate of return 2010: 6.5%; Linear 
depreciation over 30 years; 13,013,000*1.01*0.065+13,013,000/30 = 1,288,070 NOK 
8
 Project costs paid by the grid company: 3,933,000 NOK; % working capital; NVE regulated rate of return 2010: 
6.5%; Linear depreciation over 30 years; 3,933,000*1.01*0.065+3,933,000/30 = 389,301 NOK 
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9 Effects of Adding the Project to Different Companies 
9.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we analyze the effects of adding the project to different companies. Although the 
project has been researched for the Beiarn area south of Bodø, we add the project to different 
companies along the west coast of Norway, because this is the only well researched project 
available. 
We are adding the project to three different companies separately first, and then to all three 
companies at the same time. For each single analysis, we will both look at the effects the project has 
on the company and the industry as a whole with respect to changes in revenue cap. 
The companies we chose for our analysis are: 
 BE Nett AS 
 Dalane Energi IKS 
 Lyse Nett AS 
The reason we chose these three companies is that all three of them are represented in the 
reference group we have been working with and that provided us with the project numbers. Also, 
the companies are good examples for companies that deal with a considerable amount of 
distributed generation and may deal with even more of it in the future. Table 9-1 shows the major 
characteristics of the three companies and illustrates major differences between the companies. 
ID Company DEA 
Efficiency
calibrated 
efficiency
Distribution 
grid
Regional 
grid
Revenue Cap Distributed 
Generation in 
MWh*
Energy 
Delivered (ED) 
in MWh
% of 
DG in 
ED
Cost base for 
Revenue Cap 
(Distribution + 
Regional)
5112008 Lyse Nett AS 99.27% 111.50% x x kr 714,948,990 135,983 3,735,746 4% kr 603,244,276
2572008 Dalane Energi IKB 69.01% 92.27% x kr 81,300,197 97,306 362,808 27% kr 74,989,357
7262008 BE Nett AS 93.35% 109.71% x kr 133,003,310 76,874 841,421 9% kr 113,648,992
*assuming DG being operated at 40%  
Table 9-1 Company characterisitics 
From Table 9-1, we see that Lyse Nett is a very large company and therefore interesting to consider. 
Their DEA efficiency score is with 99.27% close to fully efficient, which adds another characteristic 
that is valuable to have in our analysis. Dalane Energi on the other hand represents a much smaller 
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company, both with respect to their revenue cap and the amount of energy delivered. Their DEA 
efficiency score is only 69.01%, a score ranging amongst the lowest DEA efficiency scores in the 
industry. With these two example companies, we have very different characteristics in our analysis. 
BE Nett is the third company being analyzed. There are two major reasons for including it into the 
analysis. On the one hand, the data we have available has been researched for BE Nett. Thus, it is 
evident that we include BE Nett into our analysis. Also, it is an interesting medium-sized company 
that is close to efficient with a DEA efficiency score of 93.35%. 
The project we are adding has been described in detail in chapter 8. We add the same project to 
each company. Due to the differences of the companies with respect to size, adding the project will 
have different effects on the companies, both because of the different relations of input to project 
costs and the relations of already available to newly added DG capacity. It is also important to note 
that because none of the companies are frontier efficient in the DEA analysis, they do not change 
the efficient frontier, thus the DEA efficiency scores of all other companies remain the same, with 
one exception that does not have an effect on the later correction and calibration values.9 The 
efficiency scores will however change when we adjust for environmental factors in the second stage 
and be further increased in the calibration step. The purpose of this analysis is to find out how the 
project affects the companies themselves as well as how other companies are affected, when one or 
more companies make an investment into DG. 
9.2 Effects of the project on the company that adds the project 
9.2.1 Effects on BE Nett AS 
Adding the project to BE Nett results in an increase of the company’s total revenue cap of 0.88 
MNOK in the first year, amounting to approximately 22.5% of the additional investment paid for by 
BE Nett. This chapter will show how adding the project changes both efficiency scores and revenue 
caps of BE Nett. 
                                                        
9
 When adding the project to Lyse Nett AS, the efficiency score of Klepp Energi AS increases by 0.27%-points. 
Because Klepp Energi AS is a superefficient company in 2008 and has not been superefficient before, the efficiency 
score to be considered is set to 100% either way; thus the further calibration is not affected by this and does not 
have an effect on Klepp Energi AS or any other company. 
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BE Nett AS w/o project w/ project Δ DEA efficiency
DEA Efficiency 93.35% 92.31% -1.04%
EFC efficiency 96.67% 97.06% 0.39%
Calibrated Efficiency 109.71% 110.16% 0.45%  
Table 9-2 Change in efficiency scores when adding the project to BE Nett AS 
Table 9-2 shows how the efficiency scores differ comparing BE Nett without the project and with the 
project for the year 2010 (base year 2008). As can be seen from the table, the DEA efficiency 
decreases by 1.04%-points when adding the project. This is due to the project costs increasing the 
DEA input, while they are not being matched with an increase in any of the outputs. Correcting for 
environmental factors in the second stage compensates BE Nett for adding DG. As a result the 
efficiency increases to 97.06% (compared to 96.67% before adding the project). After the calibration 
of the efficiency scores, BE Nett observes a total increase in efficiency of 0.45%-points. Thus, BE Nett 
is rewarded with an increase in efficiency by 0.45%-points for adding the project, which results in an 
increase in revenue cap of 0.88 MNOK after calibration and deviation correction. 
BE Nett AS w/o project w/ project     Δ       
DEA Efficiency kr 109,114 kr 108,777 -kr 338
Environmental Factor Correction kr 2,264 kr 3,251 kr 987
Calibration of efficiency kr 8,892 kr 8,963 kr 71
Calibration correction -kr 296 -kr 302 -kr 6
Deviation correction kr 13,029 kr 13,197 kr 168
Sum / Total Revenue Cap kr 133,003 kr 133,885 kr 882  
Table 9-3 Decomposition of the effects of the project on the revenue cap (values in thousand NOK) 
Table 9-3 shows a decomposition of the effects of each step of determining the revenue cap both 
with and without the project. The sum of all steps determines the total revenue cap. It shows very 
clearly that the biggest part of the revenue cap is determined by the DEA efficiency. The EFC and the 
calibration of the efficiency score have a lesser, but not unimportant impact on the revenue cap. 
Further, the deviation correction also adds a considerable amount to the revenue cap. It is however 
important to note once more that this value can vary considerably amongst years, in fact, it can 
even be negative. This problem is approached in connection with the investment contribution 
analysis in chapter 12. 
To show the effects of adding the project, the last column in Table 9-3 compares the composition of 
the effects for BE Nett with and without the project. This is also illustrated in Figure 9-1. Due to the 
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initial decrease in efficiency, it is evident that the revenue cap decreases when looking at the DEA 
efficiency in the first step. 
 
Figure 9-1 Changes in revenue cap in each step 
The second step, the environmental factor correction (EFC), adds a considerable amount to the 
revenue cap when adding the project. This is exactly what we expect from the second step, since it 
compensates the company for adding more DG. Because we are adding a DG project and the second 
stage corrects for environmental factors including DG, this implies that the model works according 
to its intentions. Taking a closer look at the coefficients and the second stage, however, shows that 
although the company adding the DG project gets compensated for it, it would get compensated 
even more if the model was less volatile and the coefficients did not change. 
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Figure 9-2 Efficiencies and revenue caps of BE Nett AS in three different scenarios (revenue cap in thousand NOK) 
We would expect that no companies experience a change in EFC unless they increase one of the 
three independent variables (DG, Islands or Interfaces). In the case of BE Nett, this means that their 
EFC would remain stable at 3.32% with no changes. It would increase by 1.62%-points to 4.94% 
when adding DG, assuming the coefficients are stable. Thus, if the coefficients did not change, this 
would result in an additional increase in efficiency and an additional increase in revenue cap by 
129,000 NOK to 134 MNOK. Because this is not the case and the second stage regression is volatile, 
the coefficients decrease with more DG in the industry and the EFC increases to only 4.75%. Thus, 
BE Nett looses 0.19%-points in efficiency increase due to the changes in the coefficients. The total 
effects are shown in Figure 9-2. As will be shown in chapter 10, the payback period for the project is 
expected to be very good, however uncertain due to possible future changes in the coefficients. The 
decrease in coefficients and the resulting decrease in compensation for DG in general thus only have 
an effect on the industry as a whole and usually an insignificant negative effect on the company 
adding the project. The effects of the project on the industry will be looked at more closely in 
chapter 9.3. 
The third step in Figure 9-1, the difference in the revenue cap caused by calibrated efficiency, results 
from the minor decrease of the average efficiency of the industry (decrease of 0.06%-points) due to 
BE Nett adding the project and the resulting increased calibration value (by 0.06%-points). 
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We recall from chapter 7 that the next step corrects for rounding errors made in the calibration of 
the efficiency score. This step has a small but negative impact on the revenue cap both with and 
without the project. 
Further the correction for discrepancy amongst the regulated and actual values of year t-2 are 
adjusted for in the last step. As noted before, this value can vary considerably amongst the years 
and we therefore point out that changes in this step are not important for this analysis. 
The same analysis has been done for Dalane Energi and Lyse Nett, with similar results. A comparison 
of the results follows in the following sub-chapter. 
9.2.2 Comparing the effects adding the project has on the three sample companies 
 
Figure 9-3 Fractional effect of each step on changes in revenue cap in percentage of total change in revenue cap for each 
company 
Figure 9-3 compares the effects of each step for all three companies in percentage of the total 
change in revenue cap of each company. This comparison shows that adding the project has similar 
effects on the companies, despite their different characteristics. The larger differences of Lyse Nett 
to BE Nett and Dalane Energi stem from the regional grid, which is reflected here as well. This also 
causes the negative change in the revenue cap of the calibrated efficiency for Lyse Nett. As 
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mentioned in chapter 7, the regional network losses and the required planning costs are taken out 
of the cost base for the part of the revenue cap that is determined by the efficiency score and thus 
remain stable and do not increase the revenue cap with increased efficiency scores. 
9.2.3 Summary of Results 
From the three examples we analyzed, we reason that the model as it is today compensates for DG 
projects to a good extent. We conclude this, because the biggest change in Total Revenue Cap 
results from changes in EFC and the biggest change in EFC results from extra compensation for 
added DG capacity. The model does what we expect, i.e. compensates the company that adds the 
project for extra DG, but it decreases the coefficient for DG capacity as well, which results in the 
project having an impact on the whole industry. This is an effect that is not desirable and which 
weakens the assumption that adding the second stage makes the efficiency outcomes less volatile. 
In order to find out, how much less volatile the two-stage method is, we would need to compare the 
current model to a one-stage DEA analysis with all eleven outputs. The scope of this thesis does 
however not allow for this and we leave this question to be answered. The following chapter looks 
at the industry effects that occur when adding the project. 
9.3 Effects of the Project on the Industry 
9.3.1 Effects on the Industry when Adding the Project to the Companies Separately 
Adding the project to any company increases the total industry revenue cap by the amount the cost 
base for the companies adding the project is increased. For the DG project we are analyzing, this 
means that the total industry revenue cap after calibration correction and before deviation 
correction (RC2) increases by 389,000 NOK10. This implies that adding the project to one company in 
the industry has an effect on the total industry besides changes in coefficients and thus efficiency. 
All three companies we added the project to had a larger effect of adding the project than the 
increase in total industry revenue cap. This implies a distributional effect on the revenue caps of all 
companies 
                                                        
10
 Increase in cost base due to project: 3,933,000*1.01*0.065+3,933,000/30 = 389,000 NOK 
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To eliminate the uncertainty of the deviation correction, we are analyzing Revenue Cap 2 for this 
anaylsis. In Revenue Cap 2, the increase in total industry revenue cap amounts to 389,000 NOK. We 
also see a small average increase of 3,000 NOK for the whole industry. Nevertheless, there are a 
number of companies that suffer losses of up to 207,000 NOK. The five largest losses and gains of BE 
Nett, Lyse Nett and Dalane Energi adding the project are shown in Table 9-4 Changes in Revenue 
Cap 2 when BE Nett AS adds the project (numbers in thousand NOK). Details for all companies can 
be found in Appendix 20. 
Company Δ RC2 Company Δ RC2 Company Δ RC2
SFE Nett AS -207 SFE Nett AS -55 SFE Nett AS -107
Tussa Nett AS -187 Tussa Nett AS -44 Tussa Nett AS -93
Sunnfjord Energi AS -171 Sunnfjord Energi AS -37 Sunnfjord Energi AS -85
Stranda Energiverk AS -82 BKK Nett AS -20 Agder Energi Nett AS -68
x x x x x x
x x x x x x
Fortum Distribution AS 78 Trondheim Energiverk Nett AS 8 Trondheim Energiverk Nett AS 21
Skagerak Nett AS 116 Fortum Distribution AS 14 Fortum Distribution AS 33
Hafslund Nett AS 438 Hafslund Nett AS 53 Hafslund Nett AS 135
BE Nett AS 714 Lyse Nett AS 785 Dalane Energi IKS 881
Average 3 Average 3 Average 3
Adding project to BE Nett AS Adding project to Lyse Nett AS Adding project to Dalane Energi IKS
 
Table 9-4 Changes in Revenue Cap 2 when BE Nett AS adds the project (numbers in thousand NOK) 
We see very clearly that the company that adds the project experiences the largest positive effect. 
When BE Nett adds the project, its Revenue Cap 2 increases by 714,000 NOK. Besides BE Nett, a few 
other companies gain large amounts by the changes caused by BE Nett. All of these winning 
companies are companies with very small amounts of Islands and DG, the two coefficients that 
change the most, and thus only experience small changes in their efficiency scores and resulting 
revenue caps. The companies that suffer a large decrease of their revenue cap are those companies 
with the largest amounts of DG; except for BE Nett which adds 25 MW in DG capacity, all DG 
abundant companies lose both in efficiency and resulting revenue cap. The same reasoning applies 
to the industry effects of Lyse Nett and Dalane Energi when they add the project. 
We see a very similar result when looking at the percentage effects adding the project has on other 
companies. The largest increases and decreases are shown in Table 9-5. Results for all companies 
are shown in Appendices 21-23. 
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BE Nett AS Dalane Energi IKS Lyse Nett AS
Company Δ RC 2 Company Δ RC 2 Company Δ RC 2
BE Nett AS 0.60% Dalane Energi IKS 1.24% Lyse Nett AS 0.12%
Løvenskiold Fossum Kraft 0.05% next 15 companies 0.02% Yara Norge AS 0.02%
next 14 companies 0.04% next 24 companies 0.01% next 12 companies 0.01%
x x x x x x
x x x x x x
Kvinnherad Energi AS -0.23% Kvinnherad Energi AS -0.11% Modalen Kraftlag BA -0.05%
Modalen Kraftlag BA -0.24% Modalen Kraftlag BA -0.12% Kvinnherad Energi AS -0.05%
Norddal Elverk AS -0.27% Norddal Elverk AS -0.13% Norddal Elverk AS -0.06%
Stranda Energiverk AS -0.32% Stranda Energiverk AS -0.16% Stranda Energiverk AS -0.07%
Average -0.019% Average -0.005% Average -0.006%  
Table 9-5 Effects on Revenue Cap when adding the project to the companies separately 
Note that the average change for the industry is very small and slightly positive in all three cases, 
which was to be expected from the revenue cap example in Table 9-4. The comparison of 
percentage changes shows even better that the company adding the project experiences the biggest 
change in revenue cap. The large negative effects occur for the same few companies in every 
analysis and can be explained by the large amount of DG these companies have. The coefficient for 
DG decreases when a company adds DG, and as a result the companies are compensated less for 
each unit of DG. Thus, companies with DG are compensated less and receive a lower revenue cap. 
The changes for the whole industry are illustrated in Figure 9-4, where all companies’ percentage 
changes in the revenue cap are mapped out. This shows graphically that most companies will only 
experience a very minor change in revenue cap, when one company adds a project, with the 
exception of those companies with a comparatively large amount of DG. The results for all 
companies can be found in Appendices 21-23. 
 
Figure 9-4 Industry Revenue Cap 2 changes (in %) when adding project to Dalane Energi IKS 
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When adding the project to companies separately, we thus only experience a minor change for the 
majority of companies. This outcome justifies the statement that the model is not very much 
influenced by changes of just one company, as is intended. 
In the following sub-chapter we will add the project to three companies simultaneously and take 
another look at the volatility. 
9.3.2 Effects on the Industry when Adding the Project to Three Companies 
Simultaneously 
Because it is very probable that more than one company will start a project in a year and to move 
the analysis closer to reality, we add the project to all three companies simultaneously. We used the 
same project and added it to all three of our test companies. The results can be seen in Table 9-6. 
Company %Δ RC 2 Company Δ RC 2
Dalane Energi IKS 1.06% Dalane Energi IKS 755
BE Nett AS 0.54% Hafslund Nett AS 714
Lyse Nett AS 0.11% Lyse Nett AS 691
x x BE Nett AS 652
x x x x
Modalen Kraftlag BA -0.40% Sunnfjord Energi AS -287
Norddal Elverk AS -0.45% Tussa Nett AS -316
Stranda Energiverk AS -0.54% SFE Nett AS -351
Average -0.029% Average 8  
Table 9-6 Percentage changes in Revenue Cap when adding the project to three companies simultaneously (values in 
thousand NOK) 
Again, as expected, companies that add the project have the highest positive changes in revenue 
cap in percent. Hafslund Nett gains 714,000 NOK in revenue cap without adding the project. While 
this is more in total numbers than Lyse Nett and BE Nett gain from adding the project, the 
percentage increase for Hafslund is only 0.03%, thus the only reason for Hafslund gaining this much 
is its size. Again, the same companies as before experience a negative change in their revenue cap. 
It is interesting to note that adding the project to different companies simultaneously, we observe 
larger volatility in changes, although the average is still very close to zero; and again the slight 
negativity of the average originates in the extreme values of that handful of companies. Figure 9-5 
illustrates the percentage changes in the industry by mapping all companies’ changes in Revenue 
Cap 3. It becomes visible that more companies have a slightly negative change in revenue cap. 
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Figure 9-5 Industry revenue cap changes (in%) when adding the project to three companies 
The reason for this is the more extreme change of the coefficients when adding the project to more 
companies. The total amount of DG is increased for the industry by more than when just adding one 
project; thus the coefficients decrease by more than before. Table 9-7 shows the changes of the 
coefficients in comparison to the original coefficients, when adding the project to the three 
companies separately and simultaneously. Although the other coefficients change as well, the 
biggest changes occur in the DG coefficient, with a considerable larger decrease when adding more 
than one project at a time. 
Interfaces Δ to original Islands Δ to original DG Δ to original
original -0.00474 -1.26697 -0.72678
Adding project to BE Nett AS -0.00475 0.00001 -1.26282 -0.00415 -0.68330 -0.04348
Adding project to Dalane Energi IKS -0.00474 0.00000 -1.26549 -0.00148 -0.70537 -0.02141
Adding project to Lyse Nett AS -0.00474 0.00001 -1.26631 -0.00066 -0.71748 -0.00929
Adding project to all three companies -0.00476 0.00002 -1.26081 -0.00616 -0.65445 -0.07233  
Table 9-7 Change in coefficients when adding the project 
9.3.3 Summary of Results 
When adding projects, the biggest changes in revenue caps in both total numbers and percentages 
occur in the company that added the project, while the industry average change remains close to 
zero. Even though adding the project to one or three companies does have an effect on some 
companies – in this case those companies with a large amount of DG capacity -, the change can with 
less than 0.5% in all cases still be considered to be small enough to not overly affect each single 
company. So far, the model seems to incentivize companies to invest in DG projects, as companies 
will get a higher revenue cap for investing in it. We point to chapter 10 for a short profitability 
analysis. It might also be good to know for managers that their decisions will not overly benefit or 
penalize other companies.  
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10 Profitability of the Project 
10.1 Introduction 
To get an idea about the profitability of our project, we measure the profitability by a simple 
payback analysis, a present value calculation and the internal rate of return at the example of BE 
Nett. Recall that the grid companies are obliged to connect any producer to the grid and the 
question of whether or not to invest in a project is not up to the grid company. Despite this, it is 
interesting to see how profitable the project is. The project costs amount to 13.013 MNOK, of which 
the grid company must invest 3.93 MNOK, while the remaining 9.08 MNOK are paid for by the 
producers as an investment contribution. This is, if we assume that the grid company asks for 100% 
investment contribution. Thus, the increase in revenue cap, i.e. the extra amount of money the grid 
company is allowed to make in order to cover their costs, has to be compared to the 3.93 MNOK. 
For our project analysis, we use BE Nett as an example and make the questionable assumption that 
the rest of the industry will not change over time. This assumption is questionable because it is very 
unlikely that the industry will not change over the next 30 years. We run an analysis for 30 years, 
where we change both cost base11 and depreciation costs of the project continuously. This causes a 
continuous decrease in the cost base both for the DEA analysis and the revenue cap analysis, with a 
result of increasing DEA efficiency scores, changing coefficients for the EFC calculation and a slight 
increase in the final revenue cap. 
We use Revenue Cap 1, i.e. before calibration correction and deviation correction for this analysis in 
order to eliminate correction errors and uncertainties of how these corrections will change over the 
next 30 years. This is supposed to make our vague assumptions a little bit less unpredictable. 
The above mentioned assumptions then lead to the following changes in depreciation costs and cost 
bases each year. Assuming a linear depreciation over 30 years, this means that the value added to 
the depreciation is the same every year. For the DEA input costs this is 434,000 NOK12 and for the 
                                                        
11
 Cost base = Avkastningsgrunnlag 
12
 Depreciation: 13,013,000/30 = 434,000 NOK 
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revenue cap this is 131,000 NOK13. The cost bases decrease by the depreciated value each year. This 
can be calculated with the following formula: 
                                                   
This is the same calculation for both DEA inputs and revenue cap cost base, only the project costs 
are different (13,013,000 NOK for the DEA, 3,933,000 NOK for the revenue cap calculations). The 
sum of depreciation and change in cost base in year t are then added to the total cost of BE Nett. 
The resulting changes can be seen in Appendix 25, an excerpt of the changes is shown in Table 10-1. 
year
Revenue Cap 
Efficiency RC 1
Revenue 
from project
1 110.16% 120,990 720
2 110.18% 120,995 724
3 110.21% 121,006 736
4 110.23% 121,011 740
5 110.25% 121,015 745
6 110.27% 121,020 750
7 110.30% 121,031 761
8 110.32% 121,036 765
9 110.34% 121,040 770
10 110.36% 121,045 774
x x x x
20 110.59% 121,110 840
x x x x
30 110.81% 121,169 899
after depreciation 111.17% 121,541 1,271
BE Nett (RC1 w/o project 120,270)
 
Table 10-1 Project revenue over 30 years 
The following sub-chapters use these numbers to calculate payback, net present value and internal 
rate of return. 
                                                        
13
 Depreciation: 3,933,000/30 = 131,000 NOK 
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10.2 Payback Analysis 
With an investment of 3.93 MNOK and a continuous increase of the revenue cap as shown in Table 
10-1, a simple calculated payback period for the investment amounts to 5.5 years to cover the 
project costs. 
This makes the project very profitable, especially accounting for the expected lifetime of the grid of 
30 years. This calculation does, however, not take into account any costs for operation and 
maintenance, which will probably decrease profitability by a bit. Also, we use Revenue Cap 1 to 
calculate the payback. Revenue Cap 1 is considerably smaller than the potential final Revenue Cap 3, 
but more stable and reliable. This means that there is a potential of an even larger increase in 
profitability or a slight decrease, depending on the calibrations. 
10.3 Net Present Value Analysis 
A Net Present Value (NPV) calculation with the values of Table 10-1 yields a similar result: a positive 
present value is reached in year 7, when assuming a rate of return of 6.5%, which is the NVE’s 
regulated rate of return for 2010. 
     
  
       
  
     
          
 
     
          
 
     
          
 
     
          
 
     
          
 
     
          
 
     
          
 
     
          
       
This is a very good result as well. Again, no operation and maintenance costs are taken into account. 
10.4 Internal Rate of Return Analysis 
The NVE regulation model is in part a return on investment calculation, thus we also use an internal 
rate of return calculation. For this, we find the rate of return for which the Net Present Value is zero, 
assuming a lifetime of the project of 30 years. The internal rate of return is given by r in: 
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With the values in Table 10-1, the internal rate of return would amount to 19.03%. This is a very 
high return on investment for the regulated industry, especially when compared to the NVE’s 
regulated rate of return of 6.5% in 2010. 
10.5 Summary of Results 
We conclude that the project is profitable to BE Nett, especially, if NVE manages to increase 
regulation stability and therefore to decrease the risk of large changes in the revenue cap and 
earnings for the grid companies. There are, however, many uncertainties to these calculations. The 
model is very volatile and even though the company who adds the project may not change its inputs 
or outputs, and thus perform on par with earlier years, it is possible that the revenue cap will 
decrease and the payback period for the project will be prolonged. Besides the volatility, it is also 
unclear if changes in the model will benefit companies as much as the current model does. One 
possible scenario of a changed model is examined in chapter 16, in which the project becomes even 
more profitable to the grid company. 
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11 Effects of Changing Rho 
11.1 Introduction 
In the following we illustrate the effect of changing rho. Recall first the function of rho, which is to 
reduce the weight of the model. A low value for rho should put the revenue cap closer to the cost 
base, whereas a high value for rho puts the revenue cap closer to the cost norm: 
                                         
Rho then sets a relation between the cost norm and the cost base. Recall also that the initial 
difference between the cost base and the cost norm is that the cost norm is the cost for an efficient 
version of the same company. Therefore we can assume that changes in rho will somehow be 
related to efficiency scores. 
11.2 Illustration of Effects of Changing Rho 
The first step in our analysis is to set up a table over the revenue caps at different steps of 
correction for both values of rho. The data is sorted by ascending efficiency and we include only the 
bottom and top three efficient companies. The sums at the bottom are from the full table, which 
can be found in Appendix 26. 
Revenue Cap ρ = 0.6 ρ = 0.5 ∆
Company Efficiency RC1 RC2 RC3 RC1 RC2 RC3 RC1 RC2 RC3
Åbjørakraft Kolsvik Kraftverk 46.77% 830 825 1,039 895 891 1,105 7.82% 7.97% 6.33%
Løvenskiold Fossum Kraft 54.47% 2,425 2,415 2,877 2,577 2,569 3,030 6.26% 6.36% 5.34%
Vinstra Kraftselskap DA 61.87% 441 441 462 463 463 484 4.94% 4.97% 4.74%
× × × × × × × × × × ×
× × × × × × × × × × ×
Yara Norge AS 134.50% 17,285 17,270 17,896 16,791 16,779 17,404 -2.86% -2.85% -2.75%
Sira-Kvina Kraftselskap 146.77% 7,410 7,395 8,046 7,139 7,126 7,778 -3.65% -3.63% -3.33%
Ringeriks-Kraft  Produksjon AS 245.07% 1,030 1,025 1,207 965 962 1,143 -6.25% -6.21% -5.28%
15,085,168 15,046,730 16,726,819 15,078,762 15,046,730 16,726,819 -0.04% 0 0  
Table 11-1 Summary of Effects of Changing Rho (values in thousand NOKs) 
Table 11-1 confirms our idea that the changes in the revenue cap are related to the efficiency of the 
company. All the companies that are over 100% efficient have their revenue cap decreased, while 
the lower efficiency companies have their revenue cap increased. This is because super efficient 
companies have cost norms that are larger than their cost base, and for inefficient companies the 
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opposite is true. Considering that the revenue cap is a fraction of each of these costs, it makes sense 
for each company to want the rho to put weight on whichever cost base or cost norm is higher for 
them. For super efficient companies, the larger cost is the cost norm (i.e. they prefer a high value of 
rho), for inefficient companies this is the cost base (i.e. they prefer a low value of rho). 
Company ρ = 0.6
Åbjørakraft Kolsvik Kraftverk 1,039 46.77% 131 12.61% 66 6.35% - -66 -6.35% -131 -12.61%
Løvenskiold Fossum Kraft 2,866 54.47% 307 10.71% 154 5.37% - -154 -5.37% -307 -10.71%
Vinstra Kraftselskap DA 462 61.87% 43 9.31% 22 4.76% - -22 -4.76% -44 -9.53%
× × × × × × × × × × × ×
Yara Norge AS 17,724 134.50% -983 -5.55% -492 -2.78% - 492 2.78% 984 5.55%
Sira-Kvina Kraftselskap 8,047 146.77% -536 -6.66% -268 -3.33% - 269 3.34% 537 6.67%
Ringeriks-Kraft Produksjon AS 1,207 245.07% -128 -10.61% -64 -5.30% - 63 5.22% 127 10.53%
ρ = 0.4 ρ = 0.7 ρ = 0.8
Revenue 
Cap 3
RC 
Efficiency
ΔRevenue Cap 3 for changes in ρ:
ρ = 0.5
 
Table 11-2 – Changes in Revenue Cap for Changing Rho (numbers in thousand NOKs) 
Table 11-2 shows the change in Revenue Cap 3 for the same three companies as before when rho 
changes from the base case of 0.6. For Yara Norge the change in rho has a very significant impact on 
their revenue cap. By increasing or decreasing the rho by 0.1 their revenue cap changes by as much 
as 500,000 NOK (2.78%). Since this is a super efficient company, increasing rho will increase their 
income. On the other hand, for Vinstra Kraftselskap increasing rho from 0.6 decreases the revenue 
cap by 21,700 NOK (4.76%), and vice versa for decreasing rho. Because the table shows the most 
and least efficient companies, these are likely the companies that will show the most extreme 
changes in revenue caps. 
From Table 11-1 we also see that the aggregate effect before calibration correction and deviation 
correction is almost zero. The industry revenue cap before calibration correction (RC1) changes by 
0.04% and after the first stage of calibration correction (RC2) the total effect of changing rho is zero. 
Recall that the calibration correction matches the industry revenue cap to the industry cost base, so 
changing rho cannot affect earnings of the industry as a whole. In other words, the only effect of rho 
is a distributional effect; it will take from some companies and give to others. 
When changing rho, it appears that the change in revenue cap is entirely linked to the efficiency 
rating of the companies. If that were true, we could conclude that the less efficient the company is 
rated, the more interested they would be in a decreased value of rho. However, if we study the 
table below we see there is another factor we have to consider to understand how rho affects the 
ANALYSIS  69 
 
revenue cap. Table 11-3 shows the cost base and change in revenue cap after corrections (RC3), but 
also shows two new costs: Network Losses in Regional Grid14 and Required Planning Costs15. 
Company Cost Base
Network Losses 
in R-Grid
Required 
Planning costs
Revenue Cap 
Efficiency ∆RC3
Extra Cost/ 
Cost Base
Forsand Elverk KF 8,695 0 0 73.39 % 2.87 % 0.00 %
Sandøy Energi AS 7,544 0 0 73.58 % 2.89 % 0.00 %
Opplandskraft DA 10,643 5,596 0 73.61 % 1.28 % 52.58 %
Malvik Everk 26,535 0 0 75.11 % 2.68 % 0.00 %
Aurland Energiverk AS 16,197 0 0 75.75 % 2.59 % 0.00 %  
Table 11-3 – Effect of Regional Grid and Required Planning Costs (numbers in thousand NOKs) 
These are all inefficient companies sorted according to efficiency rating. The ∆RC3 column 
shows how large a fraction their revenue caps increase due to reducing the value of rho from 
0.6 to 0.5. Because they are inefficient their revenue caps will increase. We see that as 
efficiency goes down, the fractional change in RC3 goes up. In our example, Opplandskraft has a 
much lower increase in revenue cap than its closest neighbors. One would expect the company 
to have a revenue cap increase of more than 2.68% but less than 2.89% as these are the values 
for the companies just above and below it in efficiency. The reason for Opplandskraft being 
much less affected by the change in rho is because more than half of its costs are related to 
network losses in the regional grid. When calculating the cost norm, the costs related to 
required planning and network losses in the regional grid are not multiplied with the efficiency 
score, but added in full after the multiplication. 
                                                                                                 
In terms of these specific costs then, the cost norm and the cost base are the same; they are 
exempt from regulation. Therefore rho, being a weight to determine shares of the cost norm 
and cost base cannot change the cost norm or revenue cap for these costs; they are added in 
full either way. 
In summary, companies that have costs related to required planning costs and network losses in 
the regional grid, will not have this part of their revenue cap changed by different values of rho. 
 
                                                        
14
 Losses Regional Grid Costs  = Nettap i Regional Nett 
15
 Required Planning Costs = Kostnader knyttet til utredningsansvar 
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11.3 How is the Project Affected by Rho? 
As we have demonstrated, the effect of rho depends on the difference between the cost norm and 
the cost base. In the case where these two are similar, rho does almost nothing. The primary driver 
for the difference between the cost base and cost norm is the efficiency rating of the company. In 
addition to this we also have to consider the company’s amount of costs in required planning and 
regional network losses. 
The way we have formulated the project, it increases the cost base in the first year by 389,000 
NOK16, which includes depreciation and capital costs. Naturally, this also affects the cost norm, 
depending on the efficiency score and finally the revenue cap depending on the value of rho. We 
have found that adding the project has a significant effect on the efficiency score for the companies 
we have selected. We therefore illustrate the effects of changing rho in the three companies we 
added the project to and compare the cases with and without the project for several values of rho. 
Because the project has an effect on the efficiency score of the company, and this ties in with the 
company’s cost norm we cannot separate the earnings for the project from the rest of the revenue 
cap because it changes the revenue cap for the whole company. 
Table 11-4, Table 11-5 and Table 11-6 show the change in revenue cap for the base case, where the 
project is not added, and compare it to the changes in revenue cap when the project is added; all for 
four different values of rho, compared to the 0.6 value. 
ρ Base RC3 Project RC3 ΔRC3 Project Earnings
0.4 -2 108 -2 217 -108 774
0.5 -1 054 -1 108 -54 828
0.6 x x x 882
0.7 1 054 1 108 54 936
0.8 2 108 2 217 108 990
BE Nett AS
 
Table 11-4 Effect of Rho on Project Earnings for BE Nett (Numbers in thousand NOKs) 
We see in Table 11-4 that when reducing rho to 0.5 BE Nett’s Revenue Cap 3 goes down to 
1,054,000 NOK when the project is not added, and 1,108,000 NOK when it is. The difference 54,000 
NOK is the changed profitability of the project when decreasing rho. In other words, reducing rho to 
                                                        
16
 Depreciation + Capital Cost = 3,933,000/30 + 3,933,000*1.01*0.065 = 389,000 NOK 
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0.5 will also reduce the project earnings from 880,000 NOK down to 828,000 NOK. Since both BE 
Nett and Lyse Nett are rated as super efficient companies after calibration and corrections they will 
both earn less money when reducing rho. 
ρ Base RC3 Project RC3 ΔRC3 Project Earnings
0.4 -12,533 -12,665 -132 832
0.5 -6,266 -6,332 -66 898
0.6 x x x 964
0.7 6,266 6,332 66 1,030
0.8 12,533 12,665 132 1,096
Lyse Nett AS
 
Table 11-5 Effect of Rho on Project Earnings for Lyse Nett (numbers in thousand NOKs) 
Similar to BE Nett, Lyse Nett has its revenue cap increased by 66 000 NOK per 0.1 increase in rho 
due to the project. Size in this case does not seem to play a big role in how rho changes the 
profitability of the project. 
ρ Base RC3 Project RC3 ΔRC3 Project Earnings
0.4 1,235 1,071 -164 884
0.5 618 536 -82 966
0.6 x x x 1048
0.7 -618 -536 82 1,130
0.8 -1,235 -1,071 164 1,212
Dalane Energi IKS
 
Table 11-6 Effect of Rho on Project Earnings for Dalane Energi (numbers in thousand NOKs) 
Dalane Energi is a smaller company that is not rated super efficient and therefore will receive a 
larger revenue cap when rho decreases. For each 0.1 decrease in rho, Dalane Energi receives 
roughly 80,000 NOK extra revenue cap with the project. 
11.4 Conclusion 
The purpose of this illustration has been to see what effect changing rho has on the project. As one 
might have guessed, it has practically the same effect on the project earnings as it does on the 
revenue cap itself. The original observation holds, and we see that super-efficient companies will 
earn more with a higher rho, while inefficient companies will earn less. 
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The effect of lowering rho is to bring the revenue cap closer to the cost base. In other words, 
the discriminating effect of the regulation model is lowered. The effect of changing rho is mainly 
distributional, and companies with low efficiency ratings will be punished less for their 
inefficiency, while high efficiency companies will be rewarded less for their high efficiency when 
rho is lowered. We have also shown however that this effect is lowered for companies with high 
costs in regional network losses and required planning. In the preliminary revenue cap 
calculations for 2010 we found that about 80 grid companies would have their revenue caps 
increased, while 73 would see a decrease, although for 76 of the companies the change in 
revenue cap would be less than 1%. For most companies changing rho to 0.5 has a small effect, 
although for a handful of grid companies the change in revenue cap can be very significant. 
A final reason for the grid companies to want a lower value of rho would be to guard against the 
volatility in the model. The model is not perfect and NVE may very well change the model in the 
near future, potentially resulting in large changes in efficiency for the individual grid company. 
Also changes in inputs and outputs for other companies, mainly frontier companies, may have a 
large impact on how other companies are rated in efficiency. Lowering rho will reduce the 
volatility risk for all companies. 
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12 Effects of Investment Contribution 
12.1 Introduction 
How does the use of investment contribution17 change the profitability? We have already illustrated 
what happens to the revenue cap when we add the project to our three selected companies. How 
does the question of charging investment contribution change this profitability, and could grid 
companies sometimes earn money by paying for larger parts of the projects themselves? The 
following aims to illustrate how investment contribution affects the revenue cap in unison with 
adding the project. 
In the following analysis we first explain the difference between demanding and not demanding 
investment contribution and look closer at what happens to the revenue cap as we increase the 
return base18 by the amount of the investment contribution. We will also briefly show how much 
the investment contribution adds to the revenue caps of both a super-efficient and an inefficient 
company. 
12.2 The Difference between Accepting and Not Accepting 
Investment Contribution 
Adding a project to a grid company in the model is different for the case where you use investment 
contribution versus the case where the grid company finances it themselves. There are two main 
differences in how the revenue cap changes according to the investment contribution question. The 
first is how the cost base is calculated; the second is by how much the company receives in the 
correction steps of the revenue cap calculation. 
The first difference concerns how the investment contribution cost base is calculated compared to 
the non-investment contribution cost base. In both scenarios the input for the DEA analysis is the 
same because all costs are included in this cost base. The cost base that is used in the revenue cap 
                                                        
17
 Investment Contribution = Anleggsbidrag 
18
 Return Base = Avkastningsgrunnlag 
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however differs in the two scenarios. When the grid company finances the project themselves all 
costs are included in their revenue cap cost base. If the grid company decides to use investment 
contribution to finance the project the depreciation and capital costs are not added to the cost base, 
but added to another account that is not included in the calculation of the revenue cap. This 
decision cannot change the efficiency rating of the company as the investment contribution account 
is included in the DEA analysis. When the company pays for the project themselves the depreciation 
and capital cost are added to their revenue cap cost base. What effect would we assume this to 
have? We know that a company that is 100% efficient should be able to cover all their costs plus the 
regulated rate of return on their invested capital. Therefore companies rated as super efficient 
should be able to cover more than the costs of the project plus the regulated rate of return. Roughly 
speaking a company rated at 110% for example should be able to add the project and cover all the 
project’s costs and an additional profit of 10% on the added costs. The opposite should be true for 
companies that are less than 100% efficient. It would seem then that companies above 100% 
efficiency would not want to charge investment contribution, while companies below 100% 
efficiency would require the investment contribution to add the project. 
The second difference is how the companies are compensated in the correction steps of the 
revenue cap. We have already looked at the effect adding the project to the firm has in terms of 
increasing total calibrated efficiency, and that the grid companies are required by law to add any 
projects as long as the producer pays the investment contribution. This leaves the question to the 
grid company on whether or not to demand investment contribution. By not demanding investment 
contribution the company is increasing its return base, and both corrections in the revenue cap are 
added as a fraction to the return base. So by increasing the return base, the grid company could also 
increase the amount it gains in the two correction steps. This could change the profitability to a 
point where the grid company may want to invest in the project themselves rather than require 
investment contribution. The amount gained in these correction steps may vary between years, and 
will only be a positive amount as long as the total industry cost in year t-2 was above the estimated 
cost in the revenue cap of year t-2. This means that the correction amount could even be a negative, 
and the increase in return base could mean losses instead of gains. The difference in the correction 
steps will be the main focus of our analysis. 
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12.3 Calibration & Deviation Correction for Investment 
Contribution 
In the following we look at what effect the decision to not take investment contribution has on the 
cost norm of the company in the correction steps, and look at what effect this decision has on the 
revenue cap of the company. Both the calibration correction and the deviation correction change 
the cost norms of each company by a fraction of their cost base. A company could then affect the 
amount of compensation they receive from these steps by increasing their return base. For the 
project as we have specified it, the investment contribution is 9,080,000 NOK, and allowing for 1% 
of working capital it is 9,170,800 NOK. It follows that a company that adds this project, but does not 
demand investment contribution, increases its return base by almost 9.2 MNOK. 
The calculations in the following show how the cost norm, and indirectly the revenue cap, will 
change for any company adding the project without accepting investment contribution. The first 
correction to the cost is the calibration correction: 
            
              
                                        
                     
 
 
If we then use numbers from 2010 the equation will look as follows: 
            
       
                      
           
   
         
The amount by which the cost norm changes here is as expected relatively small. The investment 
contribution investment deducts 14,685 NOK from the cost norm in this correction step. Note that 
this is will change by a very small amount depending on which company we do this for. This is 
because the industry total revenue cap changes when we add costs, and how much of these costs 
are transferred to the cost norm depends on the efficiency of the company. 
The second stage calibration however is interesting because it increases the industry revenue cap by 
the amount the cost base was off in year t-2 with two years of NVE’s regulated rate of return added. 
This can be a very significant amount of money; in 2010 it is almost as much as 1,700 MNOK. 
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In 2008, the cost base used in the revenue cap was 1 472 731 000 NOK below the actual industry 
cost. This difference is the amount of total compensation to be given back to the industry. It is 
multiplied with the rate of return for each of the two years the industry had to wait to be 
reimbursed this money; the rates of return for these years as determined by the NVE were 7.44% 
and 6.18%: 
                  
                          
          
            
This Variation Factor is added to the calibration correction fraction, which in 2010 is 0.0951%, then 
divided by rho and multiplied with the return base. 
           
                                
                                        
                      
 
 
We then add the numbers from the 2010 case to see how the cost norm changes for the project’s 
increase in return base: 
                 
                     
   
         
For the deviation correction the amount added to the cost norm is 627,327 NOK. To see the total 
change in revenue cap we have to use this number in the yardstick formula: 
                                             
The correction steps adjust the cost norm, and therefore the cost base is naturally unaffected. The 
cost base does increase based on whether or not the grid company receives investment 
contribution, however this cost is also added to the cost norm based on the company’s efficiency 
score. To get a rough idea how this might affect the revenue cap, we multiply with rho: 
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This change in revenue cap is related to the extra compensation in the correction steps only. We 
have not included the changes in cost base and cost norm due to increased depreciation and capital 
costs, but will do so in the next sub-chapter. 
In summation for the correction steps, the grid companies can by deciding to invest the 9,080,000 
NOK in the project increase their revenue caps by about 376,396 NOK in the two correction steps 
alone. Remember though that this is only for the year 2010, so if the deviation from the estimated 
industry cost base in the future is not 1,400 MNOK as it was in 2008-2010 the numbers would be 
quite different. In fact, the number for 2007-2009 is with 934 MNOK only about 65% of this (NVE, 
2010). Still, it serves to point out that the corrections have a significant impact on the revenue cap, 
and the effect of increasing the return base should not be ignored when deciding on the degree of 
required investment contribution for the project. 
12.4 Total Effect of the Investment Contribution Decision on the 
Revenue Cap 
In the following we look at the total effect of the choice of whether or not to demand investment 
contribution for a super-efficient and an inefficient company. 
We have already demonstrated that when a company adds the project there is a change in the 
efficiency score. This section does not address this effect, but seeks rather to illustrate the revenue 
cap differences of financing the project with investment contribution or not. We do this by 
comparing two companies to themselves and see what would be different if they had 9,080,000 
NOK moved from their investment contribution account to their return base account. This increases 
the cost base, the cost norm and the amount by which they are compensated in the correction 
steps. The cost base increases by 898,769 NOK19, and the cost norm increases depending on 
efficiency by a similar amount. 
                                                        
19
 The annual cost of the investment contribution for the first year is the depreciation of the 9,080,000 NOK 
(9,080,000 / 30 = 302,667 NOK plus the capital costs 9,080,000*1,01*0,065 = 596,102 NOK, the sum of which is 
898,769 NOK. 
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For the super efficient company we chose BE Nett. Table 12-1 below shows the change in BE Nett’s 
cost base and Revenue Caps 1 and 3 with and without the 9,080,000 NOK investment contribution 
(IC). 
BE Nett AS (RC Efficiency 108,97%) Cost Base RC 1 RC 3
BE Nett with Investment Contribution 113,649 119,766 132,497
BE Nett w/o Investment Contribution 114,548 120,713 133,813
Difference between IC choices 899 947 1,316
Profit for Financing Without IC 48 369
Sum Project Profits Without IC 417  
Table 12-1 BE Nett's Profit without Investment Contribution (numbers in thousand NOKs) 
On the third row is the difference in cost base, Revenue Cap1 and Revenue Cap3 for the company 
when financing with investment contribution and without investment contribution. We see in the 
first cell that the annual extra cost of the project without investment contribution is 899,000 NOK.  
The uncorrected revenue cap (RC1) increases by 947,000 NOK which is 48,000 NOK more than the 
annual costs. The 48,000 NOK is the annual extra profit BE Nett makes when foregoing investment 
contribution because it is super efficient. BE Nett is rated at 108.97% efficiency, it will therefore 
increase the revenue cap by 8.97% more than the costs it adds to its cost base: 
                                      
The increase gained from the deviation correction stage is 369,000 NOK. This is the correction 
amount BE Nett gains in the correction stages described in chapter 7.2.5. 
For the comparison company we selected a random company that is 81.69% efficient, Nore Energi 
AS. The increase in cost base for Nore Energi is the same as for BE Nett. 
Nore Energi AS (RC Efficiency 81,69%) Cost Base RC 1 RC 3
Nore Energi with Investment Contribution 13,561 12,071 13,392
Nore Energi w/o Investment Contribution 14,460 12,871 14,564
Difference between IC choices 899 800 1,172
Profit for Financing Without IC -99 372
Sum Project Profits Without IC 274  
Table 12-2 Nore Energi's Profit without Investment Contribution (numbers in thousand NOKs) 
We see however that the uncorrected Revenue Cap 1 goes down by 99,000 NOK. This is because 
Nore Energi is not efficient and this is the revenue penalty it receives on this project: 
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Nore Energi however gains this loss back in the correction steps which here amounts to 
approximately 372,000 NOK. Due to the correction steps the project is still profitable for Nore Energi 
this year. The costs increase by 899,000 NOK but the final revenue cap increases by 1,172,000 NOK, 
which would be 274,000 NOK of extra profit this year.  
BE Nett makes 143,000 NOK more than Nore Energi if it decides to forego investment contribution. 
Both companies receive about the same amount in the correction steps due to increasing their 
return bases. The small differences in these numbers are related to how their efficiency rating 
transfers the increased cost base to the industry revenue cap; the super efficient firm will increase 
the industry revenue cap by more than the cost, and the inefficient company by less than the 
increased cost base. The difference will not be much larger than the one we see here. 
Company
Efficiency 
Profit
Correction 
Profit
Sum 
Profit
Nore Energi AS -99 372 274
BE Nett AS 48 369 417  
Table 12-3 Profit Difference between Nore Energi and BE Nett (numbers in thousand NOKs) 
The main difference for the two companies stems from the different amounts they make on the 
increased cost base. BE Nett receives 48,000 NOK on top of the annual cost increase because they 
are rated super efficient, they will continue to receive extra profit every year they are super-efficient 
and as long as NVE rewards the super efficient companies like it does. The 370,000 NOK revenue 
increase is due to how NVE corrects the revenue caps. This is a strange incentive effect, and it is 
possible NVE will change this in the future; however, it is a good reason for the grid companies to 
manage their return base as well as their costs. 
12.5 Conclusion 
We have demonstrated in this chapter that demanding investment contribution for a project is 
not necessarily always the most profitable decision. The super efficient companies will gain the 
cost of the project plus a fraction extra as profit, depending on how much over 100% efficienct 
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they are. The opposite is true for companies that are not efficient as they will not be able to 
cover the entire cost of the project without the extra amount in the correction steps. 
In addition to this, we have demonstrated that the amount of compensation the companies gain 
in the correction steps by increasing their return base can be quite significant. This value is 
however highly dependent on how costs develop for the industry in the future. A negative 
correction could happen, but only if the total industry costs are below those of two years ago 
when they have been adjusted for two years of inflation. In fact, if the regulation model had the 
intended effect, one would assume that annual industry costs would decrease. 
Another risk is that of the volatility in the model. The companies know that the model will be 
modified within the next few years, and they do not know how much their efficiency scores will 
change. Therefore any project profitability calculations are made a little more difficult, because 
so much of the income is decided by the efficiency rating. The safest choice is to just demand 
investment contribution even though this is clearly not always the most profitable choice. For 
the super efficient companies, it would seem a wise choice to try to attract projects like this, 
and if the risk seems too great, share the project costs with the producers and demand a rate of 
investment contribution, e.g. 50% of total project costs rather than the full potential investment 
contribution. 
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13 Adding Distributed Generation to BE Nett – 
Sensitivity of Coefficients 
13.1 Introduction 
We found in chapter 9 that by adding the distributed generation project to grid companies, the 
coefficients in the EFC change. The distributed generation coefficient decreased, which means that 
adding the project reduces the amount of compensation per share of distributed generation20 for all 
companies. This is a little surprising, as one would have hoped that this part of the model would be 
stable enough as to not significantly reduce the revenue cap of other companies when another 
company adds a relatively small amount of distributed generation. We found that some companies, 
primarily the ones with significant amounts of distributed generation capacity suffered losses in EFC 
and therefore their revenue caps when BE Nett added the project. In comparison, when adding the 
project in the DEA analysis, the only company to experience an efficiency change was BE Nett. 
We will in this chapter look at what happens in the EFC calculations for all companies as BE Nett 
adds distributed generation. We do this to see how the coefficients might change according to the 
size of the project. 
13.2 How We Add the Project 
In this chapter we want to look at how different sizes of the project will affect the EFC calculation of 
all the companies in the industry. To do this, we split the 25 MW project we have already described 
earlier into smaller 5 MW projects. We then calculate the coefficients for each 5 MW increment of 
DG up to a 100 MW project. If BE Nett added 100 MW of DG in one year it would be the largest DG 
grid company in the country, therefore this is probably an unrealistically large project. It should 
however give us a good idea of how the coefficients change with the size of a project. 
                                                        
20
 In the EFC Calculation (        
 
                                  ), the coefficient (    , which is analyzed 
in this chapter, is multiplied with a grid company’s share of DG = 
      
          
. This is a company’s share of DG and it is 
this multiple that yields the final value of environmental correction for distributed generation. 
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We present the original coefficients, and the coefficients for every addition of 5 MW to BE Nett in 
Appendix 27. 
13.3 Changes in EFC and Compensation 
The coefficient is a measure of how much compensation the grid companies get per share of 
distributed generation. To get a full understanding of how the coefficients change, we would have 
had to do this analysis on several companies. This is because the coefficients will change differently 
according to which company we do this analysis on. We are also interested in seeing how the 
coefficients change when we add DG to large parts of the industry, and we will do so in chapter 14. 
Due to time constraints, this thesis will be limited to these two sensitivity analyses of DG. 
Our main interest here is to see how sensitive the coefficients are according to the size of the DG 
project that is added. Will the coefficients change differently according to the size of the project 
being added? Figure 13-1 shows how the DG coefficient changes. Recall that the higher a negative 
value the coefficient has, the larger the efficiency compensation in the environmental factor 
correction stage will be. 
 
Figure 13-1 The Distributed Generation Coefficient 
We see that as the project increases in size the DG coefficient moves toward zero. If BE Nett were to 
have added 100MW of DG, the coefficient changes from roughly -0.75 to -0.5. This means that each 
share of DG will change the EFC by about two thirds of what it previously did. The monetary value of 
this change is entirely company specific and will not translate as two thirds of the original amount. 
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Although it is hard to tell from the figure, the graph is slightly convex so the marginal change in 
coefficient increases as the added amount of DG increases. On average each 5 MW increment 
decreases the absolute value of the DG coefficient by 0.011. Although this is a very small amount, 
this coefficient change can mean a lot for the companies with a large share of DG. Appendix 28 
shows the new EFC values for all companies when BE Nett adds DG. Where BE Nett in its original 
state has an EFC of 3.32%, a 0.011 decrease in the coefficient would bring it down to 3.31%. This 
decrease of 0.01%-points does not seem a lot, but it adds up quickly. With the 25 MW added 
coefficient the EFC would be down to 3.23%. The effect is larger for companies whom already have 
significant amounts of distributed generation. Table 13-1 shows the decrease in EFC and 
corresponding Revenue Cap 3 (RC3) for a few companies with high amounts of DG. 
Company 0MW 25MW Δ EFC Δ RC3 Δ% RC3
Kvinnherad Energi AS -10.06 % -9.55 % 0.52 % -103 -0.26 %
Modalen Kraftlag BA -8.65 % -8.11 % 0.55 % -9 -0.26 %
Norddal Elverk AS -9.26 % -8.71 % 0.54 % -36 -0.30 %
Stranda Energiverk AS -13.20 % -12.44 % 0.76 % -97 -0.36 %
Suldal Elverk -13.62 % -13.22 % 0.39 % -66 -0.20 %
EFC with BE Nett adding:
 
Table 13-1 The Effect of BE Nett adding DG on Other Companies' EFC (numbers in thousand NOKs) 
For every 25 MW DG project BE Nett adds, the companies in the Table 13-1 lose around half a 
percentage-point on their efficiency scores. For Kvinnherad Energi this means that just because BE 
Nett adds DG capacity, their efficiency score decreases by 0.5%-points, which amounts to over 
100,000 NOK in decreased revenue cap.  
The change in the DG coefficient means something to the industry then. This is without factoring in 
any of the changes that occur in the Islands and Interface coefficients. The other coefficients do 
change, but much less than the DG coefficient does. Where the DG coefficient decreases by over 
30% for the 100 MW project the other two coefficients remain within 2% of their original values. 
The Islands coefficient changes in the same direction as the DG coefficient. For every 5 MW increase 
in DG in BE Nett each company in the industry is compensated slightly less for each of their island 
connections. 
84  PART 4 
 
 
The interfaces coefficient changes in the opposite direction of the other two coefficients. This 
means that companies that proportionately have very high values for interfaces will be slightly 
better compensated for their share of Interfaces. The changes in the other coefficients are small 
enough so that one can easily be ignored. Increasing DG capacity in the BE Nett will at least not 
affect the compensation companies get from Islands or Interfaces in any significant way. 
What do the total changes in EFC look like for the different levels of EFC? Figure 13-2 illustrates EFC 
changes for four different amounts of added DG in BE Nett. Note that as we add DG the EFC in 
Figure 13-2 moves upwards, toward 0%, which means the effect of the EFC is decreasing. The closer 
the EFC comes to zero (up in the graph), the less the grid company is reimbursed for the three 
environmental variables. 
 
Figure 13-2 Environmental Factor Correction for DG Increments 
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It is clear that some companies experience close to no change, while others experience a much 
larger change in their EFC. The companies with large changes in EFC are the ones with a large share 
of DG. The full table of figures for changes in EFC can be found in Appendix 28. 
How much does EFC compensation change compared to the old values? If we reformulate the data 
in the figure above, and now instead show by how many percent the EFC changes compared to the 
old values, and sort the companies according to how large a percentage change in EFC the 
companies get, we get Figure 13-3. 
 
Figure 13-3 Fractional Difference in Environmental Factor Correction 
We see that when BE Nett add 35 MW to their total distributed generation, a large share of the 
companies have their EFC reduced 7% less than it was before. In other words, the compensation 
these companies get from the EFC stage will be reduced by 7%. While this may not result in a 
dramatic drop in revenue caps it shows that the model is quite sensitive to the actions of individual 
companies. 
13.4 Conclusion Sensitivity BE Nett 
According to our findings so far the changes in the coefficients are mostly linear. Even when we add 
enough DG in one year to make BE Nett the largest DG company in the country, each increment of 5 
MW change in DG changes the coefficients in much the same manner. While it may not be what one 
would hope for, it at least seems predictable. 
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14 Adding Distributed Generation to the Industry - 
Sensitivity of DG 
14.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we looked at what happens to the EFC coefficients as we add DG to one 
company. We saw that as one company adds DG, the DG coefficient becomes smaller. We did this 
only for BE Nett, but it is clear that the coefficients are volatile enough to change as one company 
acts. It would seem that a further study of the sensitivity of the DG coefficient is merited. How does 
the coefficient change when more companies add DG, will the coefficient still decrease in a linear 
manner? In this chapter we add the project to a large part of the industry, and then try to see what 
happens to the coefficients and efficiency scores of these companies when doing so. 
14.2 How the Project is Added to the Industry 
In this chapter, we will try to see what happens to the DG coefficient as all DG companies add 
distributed generation capacity to their grids. NVE defines distributed generation as small 
generation plants that have a production capacity of 1 to 10 MW; facilities with capacity below this 
are defined as micro generation plants. We will then be adding DG to all companies in the industry 
who already have 1 MW of installed DG capacity. This means we will add the project to all the 
companies in the DEA/Regression analysis, but for 32. 
We add the project to each company by dividing the annual cost of the project by the DG capacity. 
This means that we increase the DEA input costs of the DG companies by 51,522 NOK per MW 
added in distributed generation. This is the annual cost of the project for BE Nett (1,288,070 NOK21) 
divided by the installed capacity of 25 MW. Our assumption throughout this paper is that the costs 
for the project will be the same for all companies. Another assumption is that the project is a 
marginal project, i.e. it is a strengthening of existing infrastructure. This means we will only be 
                                                        
21
 The annual cost of 1,288,070 NOK is the sum of capital costs and depreciation. The capital costs are the total 
project costs with 1% working capital multiplied by the NVE reference rent. The depreciation is the project costs 
divided by 30 years. E.g. 1,288,070=13,013*1.01*0.065 + 13,013/30 
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adding DG capacity and costs in the input of the DEA model. Clearly after a while this assumption 
becomes a little problematic. Sooner or later the project will no longer be marginal and new 
infrastructure will be added. Increasing outputs on so many companies will further cloud the results 
we find in the next sub chapter, when we look at what happens to the DEA Efficiency as we add the 
project to the DG industry. 
14.3 Changes in the DEA Analysis 
When we add the project in 5 MW increments, we get the DEA Efficiency scores as in Appendix 31 
and 32. Figure 14-1 shows the changes in DEA efficiency scores for each 5 MW increment of added 
distributed generation. We see that how each company’s efficiency score is affected varies greatly 
from company to company.  
 
Figure 14-1 DEA Efficiency for all Companies 
It would appear that the changes in efficiency are random. Some companies will suffer reduced 
efficiency, while others will have increased their efficiency. If we isolate the companies that have 
added the project, we get Figure 14-2. 
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Figure 14-2 DEA Efficiency - DG companies only 
We notice that one company in particular seems to suffer a very significant drop in efficiency, the 
93rd company on the x-axis Modalen Kraftlag BA. Although the company is a frontier company in the 
original data, it drops off the front with the first 5MW addition, and continues to drop sharply in 
efficiency. This means that another company has now taken Modalen Kraftlag’s place as a frontier 
defining company, and this will likely change the efficiency scores of a number of companies. This 
could be because Modalen Kraftlag is a very small grid company, and the project in relation to the 
grid company is relatively large. From the figure we also see that although most of the companies 
lose efficiency some also gain efficiency – even though they are adding costs and no new outputs in 
the DEA analysis. This is because frontier companies are also adding the project hence changing the 
frontier and how a number of companies are rated. 
When we put all the companies that do not add the project in one graph, we get Figure 14-3. None 
of these companies lose efficiency. This was to be expected because their costs remain the same 
while the rest of the industry is increasing costs without adding outputs. 
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Figure 14-3 DEA Efficiency - Non-DG Companies Only 
There is also much less variation in the efficiency scores of the companies that do not add the 
project. Also here we note that one company in particular gains more efficiency rating than the 
others. Rauland Kraftforsyningslag, company 18 on the x-axis is not a reference company initially but 
increases steadily in efficiency, and after 20 MW becomes a frontier company. A number of the 
reference companies in the DEA analysis are also DG companies to which we add extra capacity. If 
this were not so it is likely the DG companies’ efficiency scores decrease more distinctly in the DEA 
analysis than they do here. When a reference company adds costs and no outputs the efficient 
frontier moves so that the referenced companies will not have their efficiency scores reduced as 
much. 
We see in the data so far, that there is a lot of variation in the efficiency scores of the DG 
companies, while the non-DG companies either do not change much, or increase in efficiency. It will 
be interesting then to see how the EFC will compensate the DG companies for this loss in efficiency. 
After all, the function of the EFC is to compensate for losses that are not accounted for in the DEA – 
in the current model this would be Islands, Interfaces and Distributed Generation. 
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We are then interested in seeing how much of a decrease in efficiency the grid companies suffer 
from adding the project. We put the average DEA scores of all the grid companies in Table 14-1, 
both for the original case and for the case where the DG companies add 25 MW of DG. 
The average efficiency of the DG companies goes down by 1.34%-points, while the average 
efficiency of the non-DG companies goes up 1.88%-points. 
Average DEA Efficiency:
DG Companies 83.40%
DG Companies (25 MW project) 82.06%
Non-DG companies 84.89%
Non-DG companies (25 MW project) 86.77%
1.88%
-1.34%
 
Table 14-1 Average DEA Efficiencies 
We see in Table 14-1 that the average efficiency of the DG companies was already lower than their 
competitors before the projects were added at all. This could be one indication that distributed 
generation adds inefficiency to the grid companies in the model. It will be interesting to see if the 
EFC compensates the DG companies for this efficiency loss, and also if the average efficiencies will 
be more comparable. Also, a major change for some companies when adding distributed generation 
may be that they fall off the efficient frontier, as we see at least once in our trials. This means that 
adding DG can potentially affect many companies’ efficiency scores in an unpredictable manner as 
the efficient frontier changes in favor of non-DG companies. In the following section we look at how 
the EFC changes for the industry as we add the DG project. 
14.4 Changes in the Environmental Factor Correction 
After having looked at how the DEA scores change, we add the additional DG capacity to the 
companies in the second stage. Here we are interested in seeing how the coefficients in the EFC 
change as the industry increases their DG capacity, and how this changes the overall efficiency of 
the industry and the DG adding companies. We saw that in the DEA analysis, the DG companies 
decreased in DEA efficiency, and the non-DG companies increased in efficiency, we would then 
expect the EFC value to compensate for this difference. 
Our first step is mapping out the changes in the coefficients. We run the regression analysis with the 
new DEA efficiencies and DG / Grid Value for each 5 MW increment of DG, the full table for the new 
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coefficients can be found in appendix 35. The first coefficient we look at is the one for distributed 
generation. 
 
Figure 14-4 Distributed Generation Coefficient 
We see from Figure 14-4 that the coefficient drops sharply as the industry adds its first 5 MW. It 
continues to drop sharply until the addition of about 20-25 MW where the drop levels off. The 
coefficient changes from -0.73 to -0.6 with the first 5 MW added which means the industry 
compensation for distributed generation will be reduced by almost 18%. This change is much higher 
than when we added the DG to only one company, the curve of the change in the DG coefficient is 
also clearly concave and therefore each increment of DG affects the coefficients less than the 
previous ones. We might have expected this outcome as we are making the DG companies in the 
industry increasingly similar to each other. The more DG we add uniformly to each company, the 
more similar they are and the less discriminatory power the regression analysis will have. 
As for the other coefficients, the change is much less dramatic than the change in the DG coefficient. 
The Islands coefficient increases with the 5MW added and then decreases, and the total change in 
coefficient between the original case and the 50 MW case is 4%. 
 
Figure 14-5 Island Coefficient 
 
Figure 14-6 Interfaces Coefficient 
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The interfaces coefficient also changes direction after the first 5 MW increment and changes 
relatively little. The total change between the base case and the 50 MW increment is 2%. In the 5 
MW increment case, a much more realistic number, the change in Islands and Interfaces coefficients 
is 0.4% and 0.6% respectively. This is negligible in comparison to the 18% change in the DG 
coefficient for the same interval. 
The new coefficients change the EFC values for some companies dramatically. The full table of the 
new EFC values can be found in Appendix 29 and 30. Figure 14-7 and Figure 14-8 show the EFC 
compensation for the original case and the industry incremental DG scenarios. 
 
Figure 14-7 Environmental Factor Correction for DG Companies 
The graph confirms what we already know. The EFC effect for each company is reduced for every 
increment of distributed generation and the impact of each increment lessens substantially after the 
20-25 MW range is reached. We also see that the impact of adding the first 5 MW is quite severe. 
Moving upwards in the graph reduces company EFC compensation and therefore reduces the 
companies’ revenue caps. 
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For the companies without distributed generation the results are quite different. Figure 14-8 shows 
that there are almost no changes for these companies. In fact the graphs mostly overlap for all the 
different DG addition scenarios. 
 
Figure 14-8 EFC for Non-DG Companies 
The small change that some of these companies experience is due to the change in the coefficients 
for Islands and Interfaces. As mentioned earlier and made visible here, this effect is almost 
negligible. 
To further illustrate the effect of the drop in the DG coefficient for the industry 5 MW scenario, we 
calculate the compensation loss for the same companies as before, with the addition of BE Nett. 
Note that for this particular table we are not actually changing the inputs or outputs of the DG 
companies, we are only using the new coefficients. We are doing this to be able to compare Table 
14-2 and Table 13-1. By changing only the coefficients we see how much of an impact the coefficient 
change would have on the base case. 
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Company 0 MW 5 MW ΔEFC ΔRC3
Kvinnherad Energi AS -10.06 % -8.61 % 1.45 % -287
Modalen Kraftlag BA -8.65 % -7.13 % 1.52 % -25
Norddal Elverk AS -9.26 % -7.73 % 1.53 % -101
Stranda Energiverk AS -13.20 % -11.06 % 2.14 % -272
Suldal Elverk -13.62 % -12.46 % 1.16 % -196
BE Nett -3.32 % -3.06 % 0.26 % -176
EFC when Industry adds:
 
Table 14-2 Effect of Industry 5 MW scenario coefficients on selected companies (numbers in thousand NOKs) 
For the companies with large amounts of distributed generation, the change in EFC is about 1.5%-
points. Kvinnherad Energi’s revenue cap decreases by almost 300,000 NOK. BE Nett, while only 
losing 0.26%-points efficiency also loses a significant amount of revenue, about 180,000 NOK. This is 
all due to the efficiency lost because the EFC now compensates much less for distributed 
generation.  
Table 14-3 compares the changes in RC3 from Table 13-1 and Table 14-2.  
Company ΔRC3 Δ%RC3 ΔRC3 Δ%RC3
Kvinnherad Energi AS -103 -0.26 % -287 -0.72 %
Modalen Kraftlag BA -9 -0.26 % -25 -0.72 %
Norddal Elverk AS -36 -0.30 % -101 -0.84 %
Stranda Energiverk AS -97 -0.36 % -272 -1.02 %
Suldal Elverk -66 -0.20 % -196 -0.61 %
BE Nett 25 MW Industry 5 MW
 
Table 14-3 Comparison on effects on RC 3 
We see that the change in coefficients has a quite significant impact on the revenue caps of the 
companies. Where companies with a high share of DG before would lose 0.2-0.36% on their revenue 
caps, the industry 5 MW scenario coefficients reduces the RC3s even further, here the same 
companies lose 0.61-0.84% of their revenue caps. By increasing the amount of DG on all DG 
companies the DG coefficient changes significantly and revenue caps of companies with high shares 
of DG suffer. 
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14.5 Total Efficiency Score 
We have shown that the DEA efficiencies of the DG companies are reduced. In addition to this, we 
see that by adding large amounts of DG to the industry the DG coefficient is significantly reduced as 
well as the EFC. We will now present the total efficiency changes. 
The total efficiency scores can be found in Appendix 31 and 32. How do the DEA efficiency changes 
and the environmental factor correction changes look together? We look at DG companies and Non-
DG companies separately. Figure 14-9 shows the total efficiency changes for all the DG companies. 
 
Figure 14-9 Total Efficiency for DG Companies 
We see that many of these DG companies lose efficiency as distributed generation is added to the 
industry. Comparing to Figure 14-10 below, we see that the non-DG companies are much less 
affected by the change in industry DG capacity. 
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Figure 14-10 Total Efficiency Change for Non-DG Companies 
Non-DG companies suffer almost no reduction in efficiency. If we look at the averages, the 
difference becomes even clearer. Note that the DEA averages used here are different from the 
averages used in Table 14-4 because these are all DEA results for correction and are either capped at 
100% or are averages from the last years. 
Δ
DEA EFC RC Efficiency RC Efficiency
DG Companies 82.13 % -4.59 % 86.72 %
DG Companies after 5MW 82.12 % -4.18 % 86.30 %
Non-DG Companies 82.48 % -2.95 % 85.43 %
Non-DG Companies after 5MW 82.48 % -2.93 % 85.41 %
Averages
-0.42 %
-0.02 %
 
Table 14-4 Total Efficiency Before Calibration 
We see from the averages that before the EFC the DG companies are slightly less efficient than the 
non-DG companies. After the EFC the DG companies pull ahead however and are on average rated 
1.3%-points more efficient than their counterparts. When the 5 MW is added to the DG companies, 
they are still on average rated more efficient, however the gap is decreasing. The increase in DG has 
had almost no effect on the average scores of the non-DG companies, while the DG companies are 
now almost half a percent less efficient. Valuing the correctness of this reduction would require 
significant data on the actual costs of DG on the grid companies. Without this data, we can only 
conclude that as we add DG to the industry, the model remunerates the grid companies less and 
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less for distributed generation, and it would appear this decrease is very rapid from the first MW 
added. 
14.6 Conclusion 
We have seen in this chapter that when the industry adds large amounts of DG the DEA Scores drop 
for the companies that add this marginal project. If the companies were adding other outputs it is 
likely they would not be dropping as much in DEA efficiency. We also see that as enormous amounts 
of DG are added to the industry, the DG coefficient drops rapidly and the DG companies are 
compensated less and less for their share of DG. We also saw that even though the DG coefficients 
plummet, the EFC brings the DG companies ahead of the non-DG companies in total efficiency 
scores. Whether this means the model over- or under-compensates DG companies is impossible to 
tell without better cost data and further analysis. 
We also see however that large additions of DG and major changes in the industry on the most part 
leave the efficiency scores of the non-DG companies as they were. The DG coefficient in unison with 
the DEA analysis and the EFC regression step do not seem to influence the other companies’ scores 
at least. 
In conclusion, it seems that the DG coefficients can be quite volatile, and that this can affect the EFC 
calculation of the DG companies. Grid companies that are looking at projects where DG is connected 
to their grid should expect higher remuneration in the first years, and later, when more DG is 
connected, it seems likely the amount of compensation per share of DG will go down. 
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15 Price for Distributed Generation 
15.1 Introduction 
In chapters 13 and 14 we showed that the DG coefficient in the EFC is quite sensitive to changes in 
the DG capacity, particularly so if large parts of the industry move together. Considering this, 
calculating a precise price per MW of DG will be very difficult. Especially so when we consider that 
each company divides its DG capacity in MW by its grid value to make it size independent before the 
EFC calculation. Also, the EFC corrects the DEA efficiency for each company, and this is weighted 
with the regional efficiency score, which further clouds the final NOK/MW value. In this chapter we 
try to illustrate the price for one added MW of DG capacity. 
15.2 Method 
We want to find a price that the model gives for one added MW of DG. Adding DG changes the 
amount of efficiency compensation the company gets in the EFC. So, first, we will have to calculate 
the amount of compensation the model gives for one extra MW of DG. The EFC is calculated as 
follows: 
        
 
   
          
             
 
   
       
             
 
   
  
               
The coefficients   and    ,     and     are calculated for the entire industry, and are the same for all 
grid companies. Interfaces, Islands, DG and Grid Value are company specific variables. In this 
analysis we will compare the calculated EFC of the company for 2010 and then calculate a new EFC 
where we have added one MW to the DG variable; we keep all the other variables fixed. We will 
apply the difference between these two EFCs to the revenue cap calculation and by doing so gain an 
approximation of how much the revenue cap will change due to one more unit of DG. 
There is one problem however: we know from the previous chapters that as soon as we add DG 
these coefficients will change. We have also shown however that the only coefficient that changes 
significantly is the DG coefficient (   ). We will therefore do the same analysis three times with three 
different sets of coefficients. We will use the coefficients as they are in the revenue cap calculations 
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for 2010, the BE Nett adds 25 MW scenario and the Industry adds 5 MW scenario. We use the 
different coefficient sets to see an example of how much the price per MW can change as the 
industry changes.  We should then have three currency values for 1 MW of DG for each individual 
company. 
15.3 Analysis 
For our analysis we have decided to use three different companies. We chose BE Nett, for which the 
project was originally developed, and also Lyse Nett as the representative for large companies. We 
have also chosen Stranda Energiverk to represent smaller grid companies with exceptionally large 
share of DG compared to Grid Value. 
We start with BE Nett, which in 2010 has a calculated EFC of -3.32% at 21.939MW of DG. Table 15-1 
shows the efficiency changes for BE Nett from -2 MW to +2 MW change in DG. The table shows, in 
the grey middle row, BE Nett with its current amount of outputs for the three sets of coefficients. 
Hence ΔEFC is 0.  
DG Base ΔEFC BE +25MW ΔEFC Industry +5MW ΔEFC
19.939 -3.192336 % 0.065467 % -3.094413 % 0.061135 % -2.956941 % 0.053590 %
20.939 -3.257804 % 0.065416 % -3.155548 % 0.061090 % -3.010531 % 0.053556 %
21.939 -3.323219 % - -3.216638 % - -3.064087 % -
22.939 -3.388584 % -0.065364 % -3.277683 % -0.061045 % -3.117608 % -0.053521 %
23.939 -3.453896 % -0.065313 % -3.338683 % -0.061000 % -3.171095 % -0.053487 %
BE Nett AS
 
Table 15-1 Change in EFC BE Nett AS for 1 MW increments of DG 
We see that by adding one MW of DG increases the size of the EFC by 0.065%-points in the base 
case. The difference is 0.061%-points with the BE Nett 25 MW coefficients and much less with the 
industry 5 MW coefficients when the EFC changes by 0.053%-points. 
We have prepared an identical table for Lyse Nett. 
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DG Base ΔEFC BE +25MW ΔEFC Industry +5MW ΔEFC
36.808 -5.129587 % 0.019666 % -5.080063 % 0.018353 % -4.972912 % 0.016082 %
37.808 -5.149253 % 0.019661 % -5.098416 % 0.018349 % -4.988994 % 0.016079 %
38.808 -5.168914 % - -5.116764 % - -5.005073 % -
39.808 -5.188570 % -0.019656 % -5.135109 % -0.018345 % -5.021148 % -0.016076 %
40.808 -5.208221 % -0.019651 % -5.153450 % -0.018340 % -5.037221 % -0.016073 %
Lyse Nett AS
 
Table 15-2 Change in EFC Lyse Nett AS for 1 MW of DG 
For Lyse Nett the change in EFC is much smaller than the change for BE Nett. This is because Lyse 
Nett’s Grid Value is much larger than that of BE Nett and one extra unit of DG does not increase the 
fraction22 that is multiplied with the DG coefficient as much.  
When we prepare the same table for Stranda Energiverk we see that this grid company experiences 
a much larger increase in EFC when increasing the amount of DG by one. It is interesting to note that 
all three companies have comparable amounts of installed DG. 
DG Base ΔEFC BE +25MW ΔEFC Industry +5MW ΔEFC
27.58 -12.424174 % 0.389274 % -12.424174 % 0.389274 % -12.424174 % 0.389274 %
28.58 -12.813448 % 0.387226 % -12.813448 % 0.387226 % -12.813448 % 0.387226 %
29.58 -13.200673 % - -13.200673 % - -13.200673 % -
30.58 -13.585861 % -0.385188 % -13.585861 % -0.385188 % -13.585861 % -0.385188 %
31.58 -13.969022 % -0.383161 % -13.969022 % -0.383161 % -13.969022 % -0.383161 %
Stranda Energiverk AS
 
Table 15-3 Change in EFC Stranda Energiverk for 1 MW of DG 
With the information in these three tables, we have enough information to create a unit price per 
MW of DG for the three companies and each of the coefficient scenarios. We subtract the 1 MW 
ΔEFCs from the Revenue Cap efficiencies and note the changes in Revenue Cap1. We use RC1 to see 
the most direct changes to the revenue cap, without corrections. The results are in Table 15-4. 
RC1 ΔRC1 RC1 ΔRC1 RC1 ΔRC1
Original Revenue Cap 1 119766 - 642805 - 24509 -
Original Coefficients 119800 34 642828 23 24558 48
Coefficients BE Nett +25MW 119800 34 642828 23 24555 46
Coefficients Industry +5MW 119793 27 642828 23 24550 41
Stranda Energiverk ASLyse Nett ASBE Nett AS
 
Table 15-4 Price of 1 MW DG for 3 sets of coefficients (numbers in thousand NOKs) 
                                                        
22
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We see that the amount by which each company is compensated for one extra MW of DG is very 
different – for BE Nett this amount is 34,000 NOK per 1 MW when using the original coefficients. 
Respective values for Lyse Nett and Stranda Energiverk are 23,000 NOK and 48,000 NOK. If we use 
the coefficients from the industry +5 MW scenario however the price per megawatt for BE Nett is 
down to 27,000 NOK. Respective values for Lyse Nett and Stranda Energiverk are 23,000 NOK and 
41,000 NOK. 
The results in price per MW of DG are quite interesting. Where we initially would think that the 
price per MW would vary greatly between the different coefficients, it turns out that these numbers 
are quite stable for all three companies. The main difference is how much each company is 
reimbursed per unit of DG. We can only assume this is related to how large their Grid values are 
compared to the amount of DG. 
Where BE Nett has roughly 20 MW, Lyse has almost 40 MW of installed DG capacity. Stranda 
Energiverk is in between these two with 30 MW, so the difference between how these companies 
are compensated must be the grid values. Table 15-5 shows grid values, DG capacities and the 
change in EFC for the three companies. 
Company Delta EFC Grid Values DG DG/Grid Value
Lyse Nett AS 0.0197 % 3,003 38.808 0.01
BE Nett AS 0.0650 % 923 21.939 0.02
Stranda Energiverk AS 0.3850 % 138 29.58 0.21  
Table 15-5 Grid Values, DG Values and Change in EFC (numbers in thousand NOKs) 
We cannot determine any relationship between the unit price for DG and the specific DG or Grid 
Values. We shall have to settle on the fact that the higher a share of DG versus grid value the 
companies have, the higher a price they will receive per unit of DG.  
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16 Changing the model – Moving Environmental 
Variables into the Second Stage 
16.1 Introduction 
In this part of our analysis, we will change the model so that it follows theory more closely and 
clearly distinguishes between endogenous and exogenous, i.e. environmental, factors. For this, we 
will move the three environmental factors that remained in the DEA model until now over to the 
second stage, so that our new version of the model looks as follows: 
1. DEA with one input (costs) and five outputs (Energy Delivered, Customers with and without 
cabins, Network stations and High Voltage Lines) 
2. Regression with one dependent (DEA efficiency) and six independent variables (Islands, DG, 
Interfaces, Forest, Snow and Wind) 
In order to simplify the analysis and to limit the analysis to a pure model analysis, we use 2008 
values only when calculating the EFC and thus skip the comparison and adaptation to averaged 
values of the last four years. This change has been made to both the original and the adapted 
model. With this, we make the original and the adapted model directly comparable and 
independent of adjustments to average scores of the last four years. This change implies that the 
values of the previous analyses will not be directly comparable to the values we find in this analysis, 
when it comes to the calibrated efficiency scores and the revenue cap values in NOK. Thus, the 
results just serve as an indication of the direction of change and cannot be assumed to become the 
actual values if the model changes according to our new model. 
In order to be able to move the environmental factors over to the second stage, they need to be 
scaled. For the three independent variables Forest, Snow and Wind, we decided to scale them by 
total high voltage lines. Each of the variables will therefore be calculated as follows: 
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This scaling of the parameters takes the interaction effects between high voltage lines and 
environmental factors into account and gives us a value that shows us, how exposed each grid 
company is to the environmental factors forest, snow, or wind. 
After analyzing the changes in the model for the grid companies when we make no changes in 
inputs or outputs, we add the DG project to BE Nett once more and do a short analysis and 
comparison on the effects of adding the project in both the original and the adapted model. 
16.2 Effects of Moving the Variables 
Removing three output variables from the DEA has the expected effect on the DEA efficiency scores: 
they stay the same or decrease. While 18 of the 132 grid companies in the dataset experience no 
change in their efficiency score, 14 grid companies lose more than 20%-points in efficiency from 
DEA. One way to understand the large losses of efficiency in the adapted model for some companies 
would be that these companies have been overcompensated for the environmental variables forest, 
snow and wind in the old model. Figure 16-1 and Figure 16-2 show the industry development of the 
DEA score and the EFC. Intuitively, the decrease in DEA suggests a negative effect for the grid 
companies. Most of the EFC scores however decrease as well, resulting in an increase of the total 
efficiency scores. Looking at the new coefficients and the new EFC more closely will show how the 
new model compensates grid companies for environmental factors and in how far the overall 
efficiency changes when adapting the model. 
 
Figure 16-1 Change in DEA efficiency 
 
Figure 16-2 Change in EFC 
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As shown in Figure 16-2, the EFC values take a very interesting development. Ranging from an 
increase in EFC compensation of 20%-points up to a decrease in EFC compensation of 13%-points, 
the EFC in the adapted model has a much larger - positive or negative - effect on some companies 
and nearly the same effect on others. The reason for these large variations can be found when 
looking at the changes in the coefficients shown in Table 16-1, together with the composition of 
environmental factors of each grid company. As can be seen, the coefficients increase in value for all 
independent variables except the interfaces variable, where the coefficient increases by 71.34%. 
Thus, intuitively, companies with a high amount of Interfaces will suffer most from the change in the 
model, especially, if they do not have any other high values in one of the other variables to 
compensate for the loss. In contrast to the negative impact the change of the model has on grid 
companies with a high value in Interfaces, we assume that companies with large values in forest, 
snow or wind, will experience a decrease rather than an increase in their EFC. We will see later, if 
they are being compensated for their potential loss in the DEA efficiency score. 
coefficients Interfaces Islands DG Forest Snow Wind
original -0.0047354 -1.2669700 -0.7267780 - - -
adapted -0.0013570 -2.0479300 -1.2814660 -0.0965388 -0.0000142 -2.3855550
Δ coefficient 0.0033784 -0.7809600 -0.5546880 -0.0965388 -0.0000142 -2.3855550
% change 71.34% -61.64% -76.32% - - -  
Table 16-1 Change in Coefficients original versus Changed Model 
There are only a few companies that actually experience an increase in total efficiency before 
calibration when adapting the model. Those companies that have a positive increase of their total 
efficiency before calibration experience a small decrease in DEA efficiency plus a considerably larger 
increase in their EFC, benefiting from the large increase of the coefficients’ values used in both 
models, as well as from the three newly added coefficients. As an example we will take a short look 
at Sandøy Energi, the company that profits the most from the adapted model. Sandøy Energi is a 
very inefficient company with a huge amount of islands in its area (2nd largest) and a comparatively 
large amount of wind (ranks 15th). Due to these values, Sandøy Energi benefits a lot from the 
decrease in the Islands coefficient (decreases by 61.64%) and the additional coefficient for Wind and 
thus experiences an increase in total efficiency before calibration. 
Other companies that experience an increase in total efficiency before calibration when changing 
the model are mostly companies with very low efficiency (ranging from 48% to 88% with an average 
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of 68%). Similar to our example company Sandøy Energi, these companies experience a relatively 
small decrease in DEA efficiency and benefit from a large increase in their EFC. 
The companies with the biggest losses in total efficiency before calibration (Tysnes Kraftlag: - 
74.61%, Rødøy-Lurøy Kraftverk: - 51.19%) are extreme companies, whose efficiency scores will likely 
be manually adapted by the regulator as is the case in the current model. Both change from highly 
super efficient companies to very inefficient companies when the three environmental variables are 
moved out of the DEA model. The EFC, though quite high, does not compensate them for this loss. If 
we assume that the adapted model is more correct, these companies have probably been 
overcompensated through their high values in forest, snow or wind and are likely to experience a 
decrease in efficiency in case the model will be changed in the future. 
 
Figure 16-3 Decomposition of changes in total efficiency 
Figure 16-3 shows how much effect the change in DEA efficiency and the change in EFC have on the 
total change in efficiency. It illustrates how much of the change in total efficiency before calibration 
comes from changes in DEA efficiency and how much of the change comes from changes in EFC. The 
values of EFC have been inverted in this figure so that a positive value actually shows an increase in 
efficiency and vice versa. 
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As mentioned before, there are a total of 18 companies for which DEA efficiency does not change. 
Obviously, for those companies with no change in DEA efficiency, all of the change results from EFC, 
both negative and positive. For 30 companies the change in efficiency before calibration is less than 
1%-point. For all these companies, the changes in both DEA efficiency and EFC are very small and 
have similar amounts, so they almost offset each other (e.g. Malvik Everk AS: DEA efficiency 
decreases by 1.89%-points and is increased by EFC by 1.71%-points). 
All in all, we see a much larger negative effect of the decrease in DEA efficiency (-8.22%) than we see 
EFC decreasing (average -2.85%) and thus compensating. This leads to different conclusions. If we 
assume that, as according to theory, the adapted model is more correct and has a fairer way of 
compensating companies for environmental factors, today’s model is overcompensating most 
companies for their environmental variables Forest, Snow and Wind. If this is the case, NVE is likely 
to change the regulation model to a model closer to this one and the majority of companies will 
have to expect a slight decrease in efficiency. 
After calibrating the efficiency scores, we map them against each other in Figure 16-4. We can 
clearly see that the model change tends to have a negative effect on most companies (only 43 out of 
132 companies experience a slight increase). Looking at the calibrated efficiency, however, leaves 
approximately half of the grid companies (64 of 132) with a slightly positive change in calibrated 
efficiency, while the other half experiences partly dramatic decreases. The most extreme changes 
occur for Sandøy Energi with an increase in 8.96%-points after calibration and Tysnes Kraftlag with a 
decrease in calibrated efficiency of 73%-points. 
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Figure 16-4 Delta efficiencies original versus adapted model (before and after calibration) 
The cost weighted average efficiency used for calibration of the efficiency scores decreases by 
1.61%-points. This amount is added to the calibrated efficiency for each company. This decrease 
amounts to a decrease of 1.8% compared to the average efficiency of the original model. While this 
does not have a direct effect on the industry, it means that the calibration will have to add more in 
efficiency to each company in order to ensure an average efficiency of 100% and therewith full 
coverage of industry costs. It also means that – on average - with the new model less of the revenue 
cap will be granted to the companies due to their own efficiency. For the grid companies, this is 
rather better than worse, because they get more in the calibration. So unless their efficiency before 
calibration decreases by more than the average efficiency, they would appreciate the change of the 
model. 
It is important to note that a large amount of the decrease in total efficiency before calibration is 
caused by a handful of companies, which experience a huge loss in DEA efficiency (up to 86%) when 
removing the three environmental variables from the DEA model. This loss is not offset by the EFC 
and results in a decrease in total efficiency before calibration of up to 74%. While we would assume 
that this is due to these companies being largely overcompensated by the environmental variables 
Forest, Snow and Wind in the DEA model, we also assume that NVE will find a way to decrease the 
loss of these companies. This is partly done in the current model by using the average values of the 
last four years to determine the efficiency that is used to calculate EFC. As a result to that, the 
efficiency of these companies is not considered to be as high in the current model as it actually is. 
-80,00 %
-70,00 %
-60,00 %
-50,00 %
-40,00 %
-30,00 %
-20,00 %
-10,00 %
0,00 %
10,00 %
20,00 %
1 6
1
1
1
6
2
1
2
6
3
1
3
6
4
1
4
6
5
1
5
6
6
1
6
6
7
1
7
6
8
1
8
6
9
1
9
6
1
0
1
1
0
6
1
1
1
1
1
6
1
2
1
1
2
6
1
3
1
Δ
 e
ff
ic
ie
n
cy
 s
co
re
s 
in
 %
-p
o
in
ts
Companies
Δ efficiency before calibration
Δ calibrated efficiency
108  CHAPTER 4 
 
This will decrease their loss, if they are not efficient anymore in the adapted model. With the usage 
of the average values, the effects for extreme companies are likely to weaken and the change in the 
model will be even less volatile compared to the original used today. 
16.3 Effects of the Adaptation on Three Sample Companies 
To give an even better understanding of what happens when we change the model, we will take a 
short look at how our three sample companies are affected when the environmental variables are 
moved over to the regression stage. First of all, it is interesting to see that none of these companies 
experiences a very high decrease or increase in efficiency, and thus their revenue cap will be 
relatively similar. As can be seen from Table 16-2, both BE Nett and Lyse Nett actually increase their 
efficiency by 2.97%-points and 0.11%-points respectively. Dalane Energi experiences a decrease in 
efficiency by 0.73%-points. 
ID Company
Δ DEA 
efficiency
Δ EFC Δ Total 
Efficiency 
Δ Calibrated 
efficiency
7262008 BE Nett AS -5.11% 6.47% 1.36% 2.97%
2572008 Dalane Energi IKS -0.27% -2.08% -2.34% -0.73%
5112008 Lyse Nett AS -0.98% -0.51% -1.50% 0.11%  
Table 16-2 Effects of the Model Changes on Three Sample Companies 
Both Lyse Nett and Dalane Energi experience a decrease in DEA efficiency and EFC. This is due to 
their high values in Interfaces, which is the only factor that companies get less compensation for. 
16.4 Effects of Adding the Project to BE Nett AS in the Adapted 
Model 
As a last step of this analysis we add the project once more to BE Nett, to see how the effects of the 
project are both on BE Nett itself and on the industry as a whole. We keep the analysis simple, 
adding the project as described in chapter 8, and keeping everything else as it is in the original, i.e. 
in this case the adapted model. 
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coefficients Interfaces Islands DG Forest Snow Wind
adapted -0.0013570 -2.0479300 -1.2814660 -0.0965388 -0.0000142 -2.3855550
adapted w/ project -0.0013698 -2.0580970 -1.2263160 -0.0989986 -0.0000184 -2.3692590
Δ coefficient -0.0000128 -0.0101670 0.0551500 -0.0024598 -0.0000042 0.0162960
% change -0.94% -0.50% 4.30% -2.55% -29.58% 0.68%  
Table 16-3 Change in Coefficients when Adding the Project to BE Nett AS in the Adapted Model 
Table 16-3 shows how the coefficients change. As we would expect, the DG coefficient increases the 
most with 4.3% and will thus have a lesser impact on the EFC. While all other coefficients change in 
a range from 0.5% to 2.55%, the snow coefficient decreases by almost 30%, resulting in a much 
bigger compensation for a high value in snow. The following analysis will, however, show that 
neither the increase in the DG coefficient, nor the decrease in the snow coefficient, have an 
extremely large effect on the efficiency scores or the revenue caps of the industry. 
BE NETT Δ       
Δ DEA efficiency -0.99%
Δ EFC 2.38%
Δ efficiency before calibration 1.39%
Δ calibrated efficiency / total change 1.37%
Δ Total Revenue Cap 3 kr 1,518,392  
Table 16-4 Change in Efficiencies and Revenue Cap for BE 
Nett AS 
Industry averages Δ       
Δ DEA efficiency -0.01%
Δ EFC 0.00%
Δ efficiency before calibration 0.00%
Δ calibrated efficiency / total change -0.02%
Δ Total Revenue Cap 3 kr 6,000  
Table 16-5 Change in Efficiencies and Revenue Cap for the 
Industry 
Comparing the effects adding the project has for BE Nett and for the whole industry, we get very 
interesting results that are summarized in Table 16-4 and Table 16-5. DEA efficiency decreases by 
0.99%-points for BE Nett AS; this also is the single cause for the decrease in average industry DEA 
efficiency. The changes in EFC average at 0% change for the industry. The high increase in EFC for BE 
Nett however is offset by a few companies being less compensated for their environmental factors. 
The distribution of EFC changes can be seen from Figure 16-5. 
 
Figure 16-5 Changes in EFC when Adding the Project to BE Nett AS 
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As a result of the DEA efficiency as well as the EFC decrease, the total efficiency before calibration of 
BE Nett increases by 1.39%-points. The same companies that suffer an increase in their EFC have it 
offset by the increase in efficiency before calibration of BE Nett, causing the industry effect of the 
efficiency before calibration to be zero. Due to the calibrations and adjustments afterwards, the 
total industry is affected by BE Nett AS investing in their DG project by an increase in total revenue 
cap of 6,000 NOK. The effect on BE Nett AS however, is much more positive; it increases by 1.5 
MNOK 
 
Figure 16-6 Change in Industry Revenue Cap when Adding the Project to BE Nett AS 
The few companies that experience an increase in EFC, and thus less compensation for their 
environmental factors are again – like when adding the project to the old model - companies with a 
lot of DG in their area. The companies that lose the most are Stranda Energiverk AS, Kvinnherad 
Energi AS, Norddal Elverk AS, Hjartdal Elverk AS and Modalen Kraftlag BA. These are the same 
companies that experienced the largest decreases in their efficiency scores with the old model, 
when we added the project to BE Nett, Lyse Nett and Dalane Energi separately and at the same 
time. The distribution of changes in revenue cap for the industry is illustrated in Figure 16-6. We see 
from the graph that the effects are relatively small except for the few exceptions mentioned. 
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Figure 16-7 Comparison of Changes in Industry Revenue Caps when Adding the Project to BE Nett AS in the Original and the 
Adapted Model 
A very positive effect that can be observed here is that the average change in Revenue Cap 3 for the 
industry without BE Nett increases by 0.58%-points, while BE Nett AS is compensated 70% more for 
their project than in the old model. Figure 16-7 shows the effects on the companies’ revenue caps, 
when we add the project to BE Nett in the adapted model and compare it to the revenue cap effect 
of adding the project to BE Nett in the original model. 
16.5 Summary of Results 
Concluding, we can say that the adaptation of the model yields very interesting results. While all 
other coefficients increase in importance to the EFC, the Interface coefficient drops immensely and 
thus causes the companies with a high number of Interfaces a decrease in their efficiency. Looking 
at the results of this analysis, it seems this version of the two-stage model will be beneficial for 
many companies and less beneficial for other companies, especially those with high values in Snow, 
Forest and Wind. If we assume that they have been overcompensated for these variables in the 
current model, we can conclude that the adapted version of the model draws a better picture of 
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reality and assume it is possible that NVE will change the model to a version more similar to this one 
in the future. 
When analyzing the effects of adding the project to BE Nett in the adapted model, we find that the 
only difference when adding the project to the original model used by NVE today, is that the effects 
on the company adding the project are even more positive. BE Nett earns almost twice as much 
when adding the project in the new model compared to adding it to the original. As a result of this, 
the profitability of the project would be even higher and executing the project will be less risky with 
respect to uncertainty of the size of revenue caps in the years to come. Further research on both the 
sensitivity of the coefficients to changed inputs and outputs as well as the effect of other projects 
will need to be done. 
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17 Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis was to examine how adding distributed generation would change revenue 
caps of companies. We also wanted to analyze how sensitive the model was to different changes in 
the inputs and outputs, parameters and model-specification. Also we presented a general intuition 
for the grid companies to understand how distributed generation works in the model, and how their 
business is affected by it. 
In the first step of our analysis we found that the project increases the revenue cap significantly for 
the companies we added it to. We also found that the project also affects the revenue caps of other 
companies in the industry, however not to a great extent. 
We illustrate how changing one of the model’s parameters changes the revenue cap for the 
companies in the industry, also related to the project. Changing the parameter rho had a 
distributional effect and by reducing it to 0.5 the model would reward the efficient companies less, 
and compensate the inefficient companies more. 
For our investment contribution chapter we illustrated how demanding investment contribution 
may not always be the most profitable decision. In addition to showing that super-efficient 
companies will earn more revenue than the costs due to their efficiency rating, we also showed that 
the companies are rewarded higher revenue caps due to increases in their return base. 
Adding the project to the companies had an effect on the rest of the industry. For the sensitivity 
analysis we examined how the addition of distributed generation affected the amount of 
compensation the companies receive. We found that the companies receive less and less 
compensation per unit of distributed generation as the industry, or a single company, adds 
distributed generation capacity. 
Finally we looked at the future model we think is the most likely to be presented by NVE in 2012. 
According to theory, we moved all environmental variables out of the DEA model and into the 
second stage regression. We found that the new model compensates the company that adds the 
project even more, and affects the industry to the same extent. This is only a short analysis of the 
new model and future research into this topic would be very interesting. 
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Our analysis is focused on the revenue side and we have not really analyzed the cost side of the 
project. We can conclude that the current model is responsive to the individual company’s addition 
of distributed generation, and that the revenue cap increases significantly for the companies that 
add DG. We also found that the earlier they do it the better as the revenue increase for adding 
distributed generation decreases as other grid companies and the industry increase their DG 
capacity. 
  
CONCLUSION  117 
 
18 Suggestions for Future Research 
Because of time limitations and the complexity of the project we were unable to research all the 
issues we would have liked to. In the following we present a few ideas that we would have liked to 
develop. 
Simulating different levels of DG for each company in the sensitivity analysis of the industry is one 
approach to the DG sensitivity analysis that we did not have time to do. One possibility for our 
sharply decreasing DG coefficient could be our uniformly adding DG to all DG companies. By making 
the DG companies more similar to each other, we might be removing the regression models 
discriminatory power. 
Sensitivity analysis of the other variables in the model. We only looked at DG in our thesis; however 
the other environmental variables are also open to scrutiny. While most of them are more of a 
constant nature than the DG variable, they mean a lot to certain companies. Some few companies 
rely heavily on the interfaces variable while others have significant amounts of islands. It would be 
interesting to see how these variables compensate the grid companies for their disadvantages, and 
to see how these companies compare to the rest of the industry in terms of efficiency. 
Returning to a one stage model would also have been interesting. We cannot be sure that the NVE is 
satisfied with the two stage model and a return to the DEA only analysis is one possibility for future 
regulation models. It would be interesting to see how the model would compensate for DG in a 
model like this, along with the other variables. Also determining how much each variable means to 
each DG company by analyzing the shadow prices in the DEA model would be part of this analysis. 
Performing the regression step before the DEA analysis is a common alternative to the two stage 
model that is used in today’s regulation. By running a regression on the DEA input costs, one 
attempts to deal with one major problem in the two stage model: intercorrelation between the DEA 
and regression variables. 
New inputs and outputs in the DEA base model is another venue of possible research. The current 
outputs in the DEA model resemble the old model, and many still give a sense of describing 
geography rather than the pure input/output ratio the DEA model is supposed to benchmark. We 
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would have liked to explore new models that reflect this change, and then compensated the 
companies for environmental factors in another way. 
Weight Restrictions on Environmental Variables in the DEA model is an alternative model that NVE 
has done some research on. They have not used this method in the current model because industry 
representatives have commented that this method would make the model more complicated and 
they feel NVE should concentrate on making the model more easily understood (NVE, 2009).We feel 
however that this may be an interesting way to make the model more stable and fair. If NVE 
manages to design a stable and fair model, then the industry will eventually learn to understand it. 
Different projects for different companies would have added to the depth of this thesis. If one could 
do the same kind of analysis with data from different companies, then this would surely add to the 
strength of the analysis. In our paper we have only used the one project from BE Nett, because we 
had no other data to work with. Our data also lacked information on operation & maintenance costs 
after the completion of the project, so we could not do a full cost analysis of adding the project. 
An analysis for several years would have given us a better idea of how profitable the project would 
be over time. In our analysis we only look at how the revenue cap would have changed in 2010. 
Further research could be done to see what the changes in revenue cap might be when there are 
changes in the industry and over a period of several years. 
International comparisons would have been interesting to gain new insight in how other companies 
do the same job that NVE does. Possibly there are different ways of regulation that could be 
incorporated into the Norwegian model, and certainly it would be interesting to see how well the 
different models discriminate between efficient and inefficient companies. Also a discussion on the 
incentive effects of the different national models would have been interesting to see. 
A cost approach would be good to see what the real cost are for e.g. distributed generation and see 
how the model compensates due to this. It would be nice to set up an analysis that is closer to the 
cost than the revenues. 
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Glossary 
 
Distributed Generation  Småkraft 
Environmental Factor Correction Rammevilkårskorrigering 
Grid value    Nettverdi 
Cost Base    Kostnadsgrunnlag 
Cost Norm    Kostnadsnorm 
Deviation Correction   Avvikskorrigering 
Regulated Rate of Return  Referanse rente 
Return base    Avkastningsgrunnlag m/1% Arbeidskapital  
Revenue Cap    Inntektsramme 
Required Planning Costs  Utredningsansvar 
Network Loss    Nettverkstap 
Investment Contribution  Anleggsbidrag 
Meshed grid    Maskete Nett 
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19 Original Efficiencies and Revenue Caps 
ID Company
DEA 
Efficiency EFC
Total 
Efficiency
Calibrated 
Efficiency
Final 
Efficiency RC1 RC2 RC3
72008 Alta Kraftlag AL 72.83% -7.22% 80.05% 93.09% 93.09% 75533 75356 83136
92008 Andøy Energi AS 128.13% -0.40% 113.13% 126.17% 124.15% 27585 27519 30387
142008 Askøy Energi AS 95.30% -5.47% 100.77% 113.81% 113.81% 40048 39922 45468
162008 Austevoll Kraftlag BA 104.92% -5.25% 106.93% 119.97% 119.97% 21926 21872 24251
182008 Ballangen Energi AS 97.79% -7.27% 105.06% 118.10% 118.10% 19672 19622 21810
222008 Bindal Kraftlag AL 74.31% -1.25% 75.56% 88.60% 88.60% 9883 9866 10624
232008 Elkem Bjølvefossen AS 93.38% -2.95% 96.33% 109.37% 109.37% 2012 2012 2033
322008 Fredrikstad Energi Nett AS 106.66% -3.89% 105.16% 118.20% 118.20% 119381 119043 133898
342008 Dragefossen Kraftanlegg AS 69.72% -1.35% 71.07% 84.11% 84.11% 17619 17578 19360
352008 Drangedal Everk KF 77.35% -6.17% 83.52% 96.56% 96.56% 19296 19248 21363
372008 Eidefoss AS 100.15% -1.37% 101.37% 114.41% 120.40% 75332 75165 82516
412008 Etne Elektrisitetslag 69.12% -4.53% 73.65% 86.69% 86.69% 10168 10150 10943
422008 Fauske Lysverk AS 64.19% 0.00% 64.19% 77.23% 77.23% 28374 28289 32004
432008 Finnås Kraftlag 93.14% -2.09% 95.23% 108.27% 108.27% 34043 33950 38040
452008 Fitjar Kraftlag BA 72.01% -13.83% 85.84% 98.88% 98.88% 16392 16364 17597
462008 Fjelberg Kraftlag 70.87% -0.37% 71.24% 84.28% 84.28% 9908 9881 11050
522008 Forsand Elverk KF 54.08% -6.60% 60.68% 73.72% 73.72% 7324 7303 8194
532008 Fosenkraft AS 88.03% -1.53% 89.56% 102.60% 102.60% 35676 35545 41314
552008 Fusa Kraftlag 76.61% -1.83% 78.44% 91.48% 91.48% 20766 20706 23351
562008 Sunnfjord Energi AS 76.59% -6.99% 83.58% 96.62% 89.47% 120303 119944 135709
622008 Hadeland Energinett AS 79.40% -6.66% 86.06% 99.10% 99.10% 81918 81712 90802
632008 Trollfjord Kraft AS 98.70% -13.75% 112.45% 125.49% 125.49% 39346 39269 42656
652008 Hammerfest Energi Nett AS 84.88% -1.05% 85.93% 98.97% 92.93% 60943 60811 66596
712008 HelgelandsKraft AS 79.92% -2.29% 82.21% 95.25% 96.62% 342052 341215 378030
722008 Hemne kraftlag BA 75.00% -2.39% 77.39% 90.43% 90.43% 25560 25500 28143
822008 Hurum Energiverk AS 79.93% 0.00% 79.93% 92.97% 92.97% 27739 27671 30658
842008 Høland og Setskog Elverk 68.81% -0.20% 69.01% 82.05% 82.05% 26544 26465 29968
862008 Istad Nett AS 94.08% -1.58% 95.66% 108.70% 109.09% 126884 126532 142013
872008 Jondal Energi KF 72.64% -4.26% 76.90% 89.94% 89.94% 6323 6308 6944
882008 Jæren Everk Komm. f. i Hå 84.67% -8.54% 93.21% 106.25% 106.25% 35382 35261 40588
912008 Klepp Energi AS 108.65% -8.15% 108.15% 121.19% 121.19% 30165 30070 34235
932008 Kragerø Energi AS 67.19% -17.31% 84.50% 97.54% 97.54% 39847 39750 43986
952008 Krødsherad Everk KF 153.64% 0.00% 115.70% 128.74% 128.74% 8962 8942 9816
962008 Kvam Kraftverk AS 84.36% -4.84% 89.20% 102.24% 102.24% 25692 25604 29481
972008 Kvinnherad Energi AS 90.50% -10.06% 100.56% 113.60% 113.60% 35708 35613 39773
1022008 Lier Everk AS 93.50% -0.01% 93.51% 106.55% 106.55% 52489 52381 57116
1032008 Luostejok Kraftlag AL 71.15% -11.60% 82.75% 95.79% 95.79% 38337 38248 42170
1042008 Luster Energiverk AS 103.06% -5.85% 105.85% 118.89% 118.89% 20753 20717 22337
1062008 Lærdal Energi 50.61% -15.49% 66.10% 79.14% 79.14% 13757 13734 14732
1082008 Løvenskiold Fossum Kraft 40.91% 0.00% 40.91% 53.95% 53.95% 2415 2405 2866
1112008 Malvik Everk AS 61.55% 0.00% 61.55% 74.59% 74.59% 22489 22432 24965
1162008 Meløy Energi AS 95.52% -4.38% 99.90% 112.94% 112.94% 30713 30642 33735
1192008 Gauldal Energi AS 92.25% -0.80% 93.05% 106.09% 106.09% 28313 28257 30720
1212008 Modalen Kraftlag BA 108.18% -8.65% 108.65% 121.69% 121.69% 3053 3042 3489
1322008 Nord-Salten Kraftlag AL 118.71% -1.48% 101.48% 114.52% 117.52% 62557 62440 67582
1332008 Nord Troms Kraftlag AS 93.17% -2.16% 95.33% 108.37% 114.27% 79026 78861 86155
1352008 Nord-Østerdal Kraftlag AL 104.88% -1.21% 101.21% 114.25% 114.25% 59557 59432 64920
1362008 Norddal Elverk AS 77.81% -9.26% 87.07% 100.11% 100.11% 11052 11028 12090
1382008 Nordkyn Kraftlag AL 68.88% -2.34% 71.22% 84.26% 93.77% 27166 27115 29355
1462008 Odda Energi AS 84.51% -9.41% 93.92% 106.96% 106.96% 27055 26978 30358
1472008 Evenes Kraftforsyning AS 58.37% -4.48% 62.85% 75.89% 75.89% 9929 9911 10673
1492008 Oppdal Everk AS 89.67% -0.77% 90.44% 103.48% 103.48% 25571 25500 28630
1532008 Orkdal Energi AS 87.99% -1.82% 89.81% 102.85% 102.85% 26750 26658 30687
1572008 Rakkestad Energiverk AS 80.81% -3.93% 84.74% 97.78% 97.78% 24311 24254 26758
1612008 Rauland Kraftforsyningslag 91.30% -5.44% 96.74% 109.78% 109.78% 23625 23597 24792
1622008 Rauma Energi AS 93.87% -2.90% 96.77% 109.81% 109.81% 34031 33964 36945
1632008 Kvikne-Rennebu Kraftlag AL 95.04% -1.53% 96.57% 109.61% 109.61% 20022 19971 22208
1642008 Repvåg Kraftlag AL 69.28% -1.99% 71.27% 84.31% 94.70% 50861 50744 55866
1662008 Rissa Kraftlag BA 76.44% -0.71% 77.15% 90.19% 90.19% 17875 17833 19668
1812008 Sandøy Energi AS 51.19% -12.09% 63.28% 76.32% 76.32% 6472 6458 7100
1832008 Hjartdal Elverk AS 67.64% -7.94% 75.58% 88.62% 88.62% 11000 10977 12009
1842008 Selbu Energiverk AS 67.71% -8.38% 76.09% 89.13% 89.13% 17755 17707 19803  
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1942008 Skjåk Energi 66.38% -0.46% 66.84% 79.88% 79.88% 16714 16675 18376
1962008 Skånevik Ølen Kraftlag 81.67% -1.92% 83.59% 96.63% 96.63% 18789 18733 21210
1972008 Sognekraft AS 55.12% -1.93% 57.05% 70.09% 69.82% 70611 70460 77092
2042008 Stranda Energiverk AS 108.98% -13.20% 118.18% 131.22% 131.22% 25214 25181 26622
2052008 Stryn Energi AS 90.31% -5.67% 95.98% 109.02% 109.02% 26876 26817 29429
2062008 Suldal Elverk 77.23% -13.62% 90.85% 103.89% 103.89% 28854 28776 32248
2102008 Sunnhordland Kraftlag AS 56.15% -2.88% 59.03% 72.07% 102.32% 146320 145926 163255
2132008 Sykkylven Energi AS 72.28% -4.50% 76.78% 89.82% 89.82% 21055 20992 23726
2142008 Sør-Aurdal Energi BA 70.19% -5.24% 75.43% 88.47% 88.47% 17561 17503 20031
2152008 TrønderEnergi Nett AS 77.99% -1.62% 79.61% 92.65% 92.20% 226225 225631 251724
2182008 Sørfold Kraftlag AL 86.61% -3.24% 89.85% 102.89% 102.89% 10850 10836 11457
2192008 Tafjord Kraftnett AS 73.91% -0.53% 74.44% 87.48% 87.42% 194655 194112 217985
2232008 Tinn Energi AS 68.31% -3.24% 71.55% 84.59% 84.59% 40693 40573 45861
2272008 Troms Kraft Nett AS 97.16% -0.99% 98.15% 111.19% 112.77% 446596 445486 494312
2312008 Trøgstad Elverk AS 105.73% -0.96% 102.78% 115.82% 115.82% 16239 16201 17848
2332008 Tydal Kommunale Energiverk KF 110.01% -5.70% 109.54% 122.58% 122.58% 8770 8758 9310
2342008 Tysnes Kraftlag PL 144.75% -0.44% 115.06% 128.10% 128.10% 21057 21008 23165
2352008 Tyssefaldene Aktieselskabet 149.22% -6.26% 106.26% 119.30% 104.54% 20742 20708 22211
2382008 Indre Hardanger Kraftlag AS 99.88% -8.08% 107.96% 121.00% 121.00% 36806 36736 39813
2422008 Uvdal Kraftforsyning AL 77.78% -0.01% 77.79% 90.83% 90.83% 9324 9301 10313
2482008 Vang Energiverk KF 72.43% -2.16% 74.59% 87.63% 87.63% 15170 15131 16848
2492008 Varanger Kraftnett AS 82.29% -0.63% 82.92% 95.96% 101.93% 134239 133912 148283
2512008 Vest-Telemark Kraftlag AS 89.83% -2.33% 92.16% 105.20% 104.31% 88322 88126 96744
2572008 Dalane Energi IKS 69.01% -10.22% 79.23% 92.27% 92.27% 71511 71284 81300
2622008 Ørskog Energi AS 109.79% 0.00% 100.00% 113.04% 113.04% 17884 17840 19761
2642008 Øvre Eiker Nett AS 75.56% -2.60% 78.16% 91.20% 91.20% 43220 43106 48104
2672008 Årdal Energi KF 64.09% -0.49% 64.58% 77.62% 77.62% 15925 15877 17989
2692008 SFE Nett AS 71.84% -8.39% 80.23% 93.27% 97.21% 209267 208730 232369
2742008 Svorka Energi AS 78.18% -4.88% 83.06% 96.10% 96.10% 41672 41574 45871
2752008 Hallingdal Kraftnett AS 86.45% -1.40% 87.85% 100.89% 99.19% 102434 102199 112554
2952008 Gudbrandsdal Energi AS 80.49% -0.68% 81.17% 94.21% 96.71% 74541 74362 82234
3062008 Valdres Energiverk AS 64.43% -0.41% 64.84% 77.88% 77.88% 59750 59540 68766
3112008 Nordmøre Energiverk AS 86.12% -0.78% 86.90% 99.94% 104.38% 162350 161957 179258
3432008 Hemsedal Energi KF 82.52% -6.86% 89.38% 102.42% 102.42% 21662 21552 26410
3492008 Notodden average 100.00% 100.00% 44719 44605 49604
3542008 Lofotkraft AS 68.29% -2.27% 70.56% 83.60% 86.92% 123006 122700 136145
3732008 Nore Energi AS 66.23% -3.86% 70.09% 83.13% 83.13% 12189 12158 13509
4182008 Aurland Energiverk AS 58.29% -6.73% 65.02% 78.06% 78.06% 14065 14028 15653
4332008 Hålogaland Kraft AS 91.23% -1.67% 92.90% 105.94% 106.62% 124351 124006 139174
4602008 Tussa Nett AS 77.46% -5.73% 83.19% 96.23% 93.23% 167609 167140 187779
4642008 Vesterålskraft Nett AS 68.40% -1.93% 70.33% 83.37% 89.35% 73550 73360 81694
4912008 Elkem Energi Bremanger AS 56.70% -18.90% 75.60% 88.64% 88.64% 3553 3546 3853
4952008 Elverum Energiverk Nett AS 81.30% -3.51% 84.81% 97.85% 97.85% 49692 49528 56729
5032008 Haugaland Kraft AS 71.83% -0.71% 72.54% 85.58% 87.51% 279396 278795 305241
5112008 Lyse Nett AS 99.27% -5.17% 104.44% 117.48% 111.50% 642527 640842 714949
5122008 Lyse Produksjon average 100.00% 100.00% 5069 5050 5866
5362008 Trondheim Energiverk Nett AS 121.69% -0.31% 110.71% 123.75% 126.51% 343545 342754 377529
5422008 Vokks Nett AS 86.37% -1.50% 87.87% 100.91% 100.91% 60171 60017 66813
5492008 Fortum Distribution AS 83.22% -3.55% 86.77% 99.81% 99.81% 347846 346990 384638
5662008 BKK Nett AS 75.91% -3.88% 79.79% 92.83% 89.56% 988075 985374 1104214
5742008 Eidsiva Energi Nett AS 93.74% -0.52% 94.26% 107.30% 110.67% 849577 847337 945922
5782008 Flesberg Elektrisitetsverk AS 87.81% -0.95% 88.76% 101.80% 101.80% 15572 15532 17257
5912008 Midt Nett Buskerud AS 61.74% -8.04% 69.78% 82.82% 82.82% 62816 62625 71017
5932008 Nesset Kraft AS 115.75% -3.89% 103.89% 116.93% 116.93% 16124 16100 17133
5992008 Sunndal Energi KF 67.94% -5.75% 73.69% 86.73% 86.73% 27398 27333 30201
6112008 Skagerak Nett AS 73.02% -0.47% 73.49% 86.53% 87.62% 991521 988925 1103140
6132008 Nordvest Nett AS 100.96% -1.92% 104.30% 117.34% 117.34% 42718 42613 47220
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6142008 Energi 1 Follo-Røyken as 111.43% -0.17% 103.23% 116.27% 116.27% 107535 107274 118773
6152008 EB Nett AS 87.75% -0.84% 88.59% 101.63% 105.02% 317039 316138 355793
6242008 Agder Energi Nett AS 75.30% -1.33% 76.63% 89.67% 88.79% 878854 876343 986831
6252008 Voss Energi AS 71.88% -11.66% 83.54% 96.58% 96.58% 52920 52755 60009
6372008 Narvik Energinett AS 77.91% -0.41% 78.32% 91.36% 96.28% 69126 68940 77102
6522008 Svorka Produksjon AS average 100.00% 100.00% 685 682 785
6592008 Midt-Telemark Energi AS 77.83% -6.14% 83.97% 97.01% 97.01% 47762 47615 54110
6692008 Stange Energi Nett AS 80.35% -4.48% 84.83% 97.87% 97.87% 50666 50523 56801
6752008 Hafslund Nett AS 96.39% -0.16% 96.55% 109.59% 105.87% 2388680 2383070 2629915
6862008 Yara Norge AS 196.01% -19.71% 119.71% 132.75% 132.50% 17113 17098 17724
6932008 Ringeriks-Kraft Nett AS 78.30% -0.77% 79.07% 92.11% 92.11% 84962 84722 95278
6992008 Nord-Trøndelag Elektrisitetsverk 107.55% -0.96% 100.96% 114.00% 111.54% 489263 488131 537930
7262008 BE Nett AS 93.35% -3.32% 96.67% 109.71% 109.71% 120270 119974 133003
7432008 Mo Industripark average 100.00% 100.00% 23170 23101 26130  
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20 Efficiencies and Revenue Cap when BE Nett AS adds 
the project 
ID Company
DEA 
Efficiency EFC
Total 
Efficiency
Calibrated 
Efficiency
Final 
Efficiency RC1 RC2 RC3
72008 Alta Kraftlag AL 72.83% -7.13% 79.96% 93.06% 93.06% 75519 75341 83122
92008 Andøy Energi AS 128.13% -0.37% 113.10% 126.20% 124.17% 27588 27522 30390
142008 Askøy Energi AS 95.30% -5.48% 100.78% 113.88% 113.88% 40064 39937 45484
162008 Austevoll Kraftlag BA 104.92% -5.23% 106.91% 120.01% 120.01% 21931 21877 24256
182008 Ballangen Energi AS 97.79% -7.10% 104.89% 117.99% 117.99% 19660 19610 21799
222008 Bindal Kraftlag AL 74.31% -1.24% 75.55% 88.65% 88.65% 9886 9869 10627
232008 Elkem Bjølvefossen AS 93.38% -2.95% 96.33% 109.43% 109.43% 2013 2012 2033
322008 Fredrikstad Energi Nett AS 106.66% -3.89% 105.16% 118.26% 118.26% 119420 119080 133937
342008 Dragefossen Kraftanlegg AS 69.72% -1.27% 70.99% 84.09% 84.09% 17616 17576 19358
352008 Drangedal Everk KF 77.35% -6.04% 83.39% 96.49% 96.49% 19288 19239 21355
372008 Eidefoss AS 100.15% -1.29% 101.29% 114.39% 120.38% 75325 75157 82510
412008 Etne Elektrisitetslag 69.12% -4.53% 73.65% 86.75% 86.75% 10172 10154 10947
422008 Fauske Lysverk AS 64.19% 0.00% 64.19% 77.29% 77.29% 28386 28301 32016
432008 Finnås Kraftlag 93.14% -2.08% 95.22% 108.32% 108.32% 34053 33960 38050
452008 Fitjar Kraftlag BA 72.01% -13.71% 85.72% 98.82% 98.82% 16386 16358 17591
462008 Fjelberg Kraftlag 70.87% -0.37% 71.24% 84.34% 84.34% 9912 9885 11054
522008 Forsand Elverk KF 54.08% -6.46% 60.54% 73.64% 73.64% 7319 7299 8190
532008 Fosenkraft AS 88.03% -1.50% 89.53% 102.63% 102.63% 35682 35550 41321
552008 Fusa Kraftlag 76.61% -1.81% 78.42% 91.52% 91.52% 20772 20711 23357
562008 Sunnfjord Energi AS 76.59% -6.64% 83.23% 96.33% 89.25% 120134 119774 135541
622008 Hadeland Energinett AS 79.40% -6.58% 85.98% 99.08% 99.08% 81908 81700 90793
632008 Trollfjord Kraft AS 98.70% -13.70% 112.40% 125.50% 125.50% 39348 39270 42658
652008 Hammerfest Energi Nett AS 84.88% -1.00% 85.88% 98.98% 92.94% 60946 60813 66599
712008 HelgelandsKraft AS 79.92% -2.22% 82.14% 95.24% 96.62% 342036 341194 378016
722008 Hemne kraftlag BA 75.00% -2.27% 77.27% 90.37% 90.37% 25550 25490 28133
822008 Hurum Energiverk AS 79.93% 0.00% 79.93% 93.03% 93.03% 27749 27681 30669
842008 Høland og Setskog Elverk 68.81% -0.19% 69.00% 82.10% 82.10% 26553 26473 29977
862008 Istad Nett AS 94.08% -1.55% 95.63% 108.73% 109.11% 126902 126547 142032
872008 Jondal Energi KF 72.64% -4.10% 76.74% 89.84% 89.84% 6319 6304 6940
882008 Jæren Everk Komm. f. i Hå 84.67% -8.53% 93.20% 106.30% 106.30% 35392 35270 40598
912008 Klepp Energi AS 108.65% -8.16% 108.16% 121.26% 121.26% 30176 30081 34246
932008 Kragerø Energi AS 67.19% -17.11% 84.30% 97.40% 97.40% 39813 39716 43953
952008 Krødsherad Everk KF 153.64% 0.00% 115.70% 128.80% 128.80% 8965 8945 9819
962008 Kvam Kraftverk AS 84.36% -4.56% 88.92% 102.02% 102.02% 25658 25570 29447
972008 Kvinnherad Energi AS 90.50% -9.59% 100.09% 113.19% 113.19% 35626 35531 39692
1022008 Lier Everk AS 93.50% -0.01% 93.51% 106.61% 106.61% 52507 52398 57135
1032008 Luostejok Kraftlag AL 71.15% -11.60% 82.75% 95.85% 95.85% 38352 38262 42184
1042008 Luster Energiverk AS 103.06% -5.53% 105.53% 118.63% 118.63% 20724 20687 22308
1062008 Lærdal Energi 50.61% -15.32% 65.93% 79.03% 79.03% 13746 13724 14721
1082008 Løvenskiold Fossum Kraft 40.91% 0.00% 40.91% 54.01% 54.01% 2416 2406 2868
1112008 Malvik Everk AS 61.55% 0.00% 61.55% 74.65% 74.65% 22499 22441 24975
1162008 Meløy Energi AS 95.52% -4.29% 99.81% 112.91% 112.91% 30708 30637 33730
1192008 Gauldal Energi AS 92.25% -0.75% 93.00% 106.10% 106.10% 28315 28258 30722
1212008 Modalen Kraftlag BA 108.18% -8.15% 108.15% 121.25% 121.25% 3045 3035 3482
1322008 Nord-Salten Kraftlag AL 118.71% -1.44% 101.44% 114.54% 117.54% 62561 62444 67587
1332008 Nord Troms Kraftlag AS 93.17% -2.09% 95.26% 108.36% 114.26% 79023 78856 86152
1352008 Nord-Østerdal Kraftlag AL 104.88% -1.16% 101.16% 114.26% 114.26% 59560 59435 64923
1362008 Norddal Elverk AS 77.81% -8.76% 86.57% 99.67% 99.67% 11023 10998 12061
1382008 Nordkyn Kraftlag AL 68.88% -2.20% 71.08% 84.18% 93.70% 27155 27104 29345
1462008 Odda Energi AS 84.51% -9.04% 93.55% 106.65% 106.65% 27006 26929 30310
1472008 Evenes Kraftforsyning AS 58.37% -4.48% 62.85% 75.95% 75.95% 9933 9915 10678
1492008 Oppdal Everk AS 89.67% -0.73% 90.40% 103.50% 103.50% 25574 25502 28633
1532008 Orkdal Energi AS 87.99% -1.71% 89.70% 102.80% 102.80% 26742 26650 30679
1572008 Rakkestad Energiverk AS 80.81% -3.84% 84.65% 97.75% 97.75% 24307 24249 26753
1612008 Rauland Kraftforsyningslag 91.30% -5.44% 96.74% 109.84% 109.84% 23633 23605 24801
1622008 Rauma Energi AS 93.87% -2.73% 96.60% 109.70% 109.70% 34010 33942 36924
1632008 Kvikne-Rennebu Kraftlag AL 95.04% -1.46% 96.50% 109.60% 109.60% 20021 19970 22207
1642008 Repvåg Kraftlag AL 69.28% -1.94% 71.22% 84.32% 94.71% 50863 50746 55869
1662008 Rissa Kraftlag BA 76.44% -0.67% 77.11% 90.21% 90.21% 17877 17835 19671
1682008 Rollag Elektrisitetsverk LL 64.20% -1.73% 65.93% 79.03% 79.03% 8183 8166 8940
1712008 Rødøy-Lurøy Kraftverk AS 133.77% -7.92% 107.92% 121.02% 121.02% 41306 41231 44531
1732008 Røros Elektrisitetsverk AS 88.98% -3.71% 92.69% 105.79% 105.79% 26566 26513 28830
1812008 Sandøy Energi AS 51.19% -12.04% 63.23% 76.33% 76.33% 6473 6458 7101
1832008 Hjartdal Elverk AS 67.64% -7.56% 75.20% 88.30% 88.30% 10977 10954 11986
1842008 Selbu Energiverk AS 67.71% -8.19% 75.90% 89.00% 89.00% 17740 17692 19788  
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ID Company
DEA 
Efficiency EFC
Total 
Efficiency
Calibrated 
Efficiency
Final 
Efficiency RC1 RC2 RC3
1942008 Skjåk Energi 66.38% -0.46% 66.84% 79.94% 79.94% 16721 16682 18383
1962008 Skånevik Ølen Kraftlag 81.67% -1.84% 83.51% 96.61% 96.61% 18787 18730 21208
1972008 Sognekraft AS 55.12% -1.81% 56.93% 70.03% 69.77% 70586 70435 77068
2042008 Stranda Energiverk AS 108.98% -12.50% 117.48% 130.58% 130.58% 25132 25099 26541
2052008 Stryn Energi AS 90.31% -5.49% 95.80% 108.90% 108.90% 26858 26798 29411
2062008 Suldal Elverk 77.23% -13.26% 90.49% 103.59% 103.59% 28804 28724 32197
2102008 Sunnhordland Kraftlag AS 56.15% -2.88% 59.03% 72.13% 102.34% 146337 145940 163272
2132008 Sykkylven Energi AS 72.28% -4.28% 76.56% 89.66% 89.66% 21033 20971 23705
2142008 Sør-Aurdal Energi BA 70.19% -4.93% 75.12% 88.22% 88.22% 17532 17475 20003
2152008 TrønderEnergi Nett AS 77.99% -1.57% 79.56% 92.66% 92.21% 226233 225636 251734
2182008 Sørfold Kraftlag AL 86.61% -3.05% 89.66% 102.76% 102.76% 10842 10827 11449
2192008 Tafjord Kraftnett AS 73.91% -0.53% 74.44% 87.54% 87.46% 194704 194158 218035
2232008 Tinn Energi AS 68.31% -3.18% 71.49% 84.59% 84.59% 40693 40572 45861
2272008 Troms Kraft Nett AS 97.16% -0.95% 98.11% 111.21% 112.78% 446634 445517 494351
2312008 Trøgstad Elverk AS 105.73% -0.96% 102.78% 115.88% 115.88% 16244 16207 17853
2332008 Tydal Kommunale Energiverk KF 110.01% -5.36% 109.20% 122.30% 122.30% 8757 8745 9297
2342008 Tysnes Kraftlag PL 144.75% -0.41% 115.03% 128.13% 128.13% 21060 21011 23168
2352008 Tyssefaldene Aktieselskabet 149.22% -6.26% 106.26% 119.36% 104.55% 20743 20709 22212
2382008 Indre Hardanger Kraftlag AS 99.88% -7.91% 107.79% 120.89% 120.89% 36784 36714 39792
2422008 Uvdal Kraftforsyning AL 77.78% -0.01% 77.79% 90.89% 90.89% 9328 9305 10317
2482008 Vang Energiverk KF 72.43% -2.03% 74.46% 87.56% 87.56% 15163 15124 16842
2492008 Varanger Kraftnett AS 82.29% -0.59% 82.88% 95.98% 101.94% 134250 133921 148296
2512008 Vest-Telemark Kraftlag AS 89.83% -2.19% 92.02% 105.12% 104.24% 88289 88091 96711
2572008 Dalane Energi IKS 69.01% -10.06% 79.07% 92.17% 92.17% 71466 71237 81256
2622008 Ørskog Energi AS 109.79% 0.00% 100.00% 113.10% 113.10% 17890 17846 19767
2642008 Øvre Eiker Nett AS 75.56% -2.44% 78.00% 91.10% 91.10% 43192 43078 48077
2672008 Årdal Energi KF 64.09% -0.49% 64.58% 77.68% 77.68% 15931 15883 17996
2692008 SFE Nett AS 71.84% -8.09% 79.93% 93.03% 97.05% 209064 208523 232167
2742008 Svorka Energi AS 78.18% -4.77% 82.95% 96.05% 96.05% 41659 41560 45858
2752008 Hallingdal Kraftnett AS 86.45% -1.32% 87.77% 100.87% 99.17% 102423 102187 112544
2952008 Gudbrandsdal Energi AS 80.49% -0.63% 81.12% 94.22% 96.72% 74545 74364 82238
3062008 Valdres Energiverk AS 64.43% -0.39% 64.82% 77.92% 77.92% 59766 59555 68783
3112008 Nordmøre Energiverk AS 86.12% -0.76% 86.88% 99.98% 104.41% 162378 161983 179287
3432008 Hemsedal Energi KF 82.52% -6.83% 89.35% 102.45% 102.45% 21666 21555 26414
3492008 Notodden average 100.00% 100.00% 44719 44604 49604
3542008 Lofotkraft AS 68.29% -2.19% 70.48% 83.58% 86.90% 122993 122686 136133
3732008 Nore Energi AS 66.23% -3.63% 69.86% 82.96% 82.96% 12175 12144 13496
4182008 Aurland Energiverk AS 58.29% -6.39% 64.68% 77.78% 77.78% 14038 14001 15626
4332008 Hålogaland Kraft AS 91.23% -1.60% 92.83% 105.93% 106.61% 124345 123998 139169
4602008 Tussa Nett AS 77.46% -5.44% 82.90% 96.00% 93.05% 167425 166953 187596
4642008 Vesterålskraft Nett AS 68.40% -1.84% 70.24% 83.34% 89.32% 73537 73346 81682
4912008 Elkem Energi Bremanger AS 56.70% -18.65% 75.35% 88.45% 88.45% 3549 3542 3849
4952008 Elverum Energiverk Nett AS 81.30% -3.47% 84.77% 97.87% 97.87% 49698 49533 56735
5032008 Haugaland Kraft AS 71.83% -0.68% 72.51% 85.61% 87.53% 279440 278835 305287
5112008 Lyse Nett AS 99.27% -5.12% 104.39% 117.49% 111.51% 642550 640855 714975
5122008 Lyse Produksjon average 100.00% 100.00% 5069 5050 5866
5362008 Trondheim Energiverk Nett AS 121.69% -0.29% 110.69% 123.79% 126.54% 343602 342807 377588
5422008 Vokks Nett AS 86.37% -1.47% 87.84% 100.94% 100.94% 60182 60026 66824
5492008 Fortum Distribution AS 83.22% -3.53% 86.75% 99.85% 99.85% 347930 347068 384724
5662008 BKK Nett AS 75.91% -3.82% 79.73% 92.83% 89.56% 988075 985357 1104219
5742008 Eidsiva Energi Nett AS 93.74% -0.48% 94.22% 107.32% 110.69% 849646 847391 945995
5782008 Flesberg Elektrisitetsverk AS 87.81% -0.90% 88.71% 101.81% 101.81% 15573 15533 17258
5912008 Midt Nett Buskerud AS 61.74% -7.96% 69.70% 82.80% 82.80% 62807 62615 71009
5932008 Nesset Kraft AS 115.75% -3.66% 103.66% 116.76% 116.76% 16109 16085 17118
5992008 Sunndal Energi KF 67.94% -5.41% 73.35% 86.45% 86.45% 27348 27282 30151
6112008 Skagerak Nett AS 73.02% -0.44% 73.46% 86.56% 87.64% 991654 989041 1103278  
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DEA 
Efficiency EFC
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Efficiency
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Efficiency RC1 RC2 RC3
6132008 Nordvest Nett AS 100.96% -1.90% 104.28% 117.38% 117.38% 42727 42622 47229
6142008 Energi 1 Follo-Røyken as 111.43% -0.17% 103.23% 116.33% 116.33% 107570 107307 118809
6152008 EB Nett AS 87.75% -0.83% 88.58% 101.68% 105.05% 317093 316186 355849
6242008 Agder Energi Nett AS 75.30% -1.26% 76.56% 89.66% 88.78% 878811 876283 986793
6252008 Voss Energi AS 71.88% -11.61% 83.49% 96.59% 96.59% 52924 52758 60012
6372008 Narvik Energinett AS 77.91% -0.39% 78.30% 91.40% 96.31% 69138 68952 77115
6522008 Svorka Produksjon AS average 100.00% 100.00% 685 682 785
6592008 Midt-Telemark Energi AS 77.83% -6.03% 83.86% 96.96% 96.96% 47748 47599 54095
6692008 Stange Energi Nett AS 80.35% -4.49% 84.84% 97.94% 97.94% 50687 50544 56822
6752008 Hafslund Nett AS 96.39% -0.15% 96.54% 109.64% 105.91% 2389155 2383508 2630401
6862008 Yara Norge AS 196.01% -19.73% 119.73% 132.83% 132.58% 17119 17105 17731
6932008 Ringeriks-Kraft Nett AS 78.30% -0.73% 79.03% 92.13% 92.13% 84973 84731 95290
6992008 Nord-Trøndelag Elektrisitetsverk 107.55% -0.92% 100.92% 114.02% 111.56% 489306 488167 537976
7262008 BE Nett AS 92.31% -4.75% 97.06% 110.16% 110.16% 120990 120688 133885
7432008 Mo Industripark average 100.00% 100.00% 23170 23100 26130  
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21 Industry changes with project added to BE Nett AS 
ID Company RC1 RC2 RC3 ΔRC1 ΔRC2 ΔRC3 %Δ RC1 %Δ RC2 %Δ RC3
72008 Alta Kraftlag AL 75,519 75,341 83,122 -14 -15 -14 -0.02% -0.02% -0.02%
92008 Andøy Energi AS 27,588 27,522 30,390 3 3 3 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
102008 Arendals Fossekompani ASA 4,271 4,260 4,734 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
142008 Askøy Energi AS 40,064 39,937 45,484 16 15 16 0.04% 0.04% 0.03%
162008 Austevoll Kraftlag BA 21,931 21,877 24,256 5 4 5 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
182008 Ballangen Energi AS 19,660 19,610 21,799 -12 -12 -12 -0.06% -0.06% -0.05%
222008 Bindal Kraftlag AL 9,886 9,869 10,627 3 3 3 0.03% 0.03% 0.03%
232008 Elkem Bjølvefossen AS 2,013 2,012 2,033 1 1 1 0.03% 0.03% 0.03%
322008 Fredrikstad Energi Nett AS 119,420 119,080 133,937 39 37 39 0.03% 0.03% 0.03%
342008 Dragefossen Kraftanlegg AS 17,616 17,576 19,358 -2 -3 -2 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
352008 Drangedal Everk KF 19,288 19,239 21,355 -8 -9 -8 -0.04% -0.04% -0.04%
372008 Eidefoss AS 75,325 75,157 82,510 -7 -8 -7 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
412008 Etne Elektrisitetslag 10,172 10,154 10,947 4 4 4 0.04% 0.04% 0.04%
422008 Fauske Lysverk AS 28,386 28,301 32,016 12 11 12 0.04% 0.04% 0.04%
432008 Finnås Kraftlag 34,053 33,960 38,050 10 9 10 0.03% 0.03% 0.03%
452008 Fitjar Kraftlag BA 16,386 16,358 17,591 -6 -6 -6 -0.04% -0.04% -0.03%
462008 Fjelberg Kraftlag 9,912 9,885 11,054 4 4 4 0.04% 0.04% 0.04%
522008 Forsand Elverk KF 7,319 7,299 8,190 -4 -4 -4 -0.06% -0.06% -0.05%
532008 Fosenkraft AS 35,682 35,550 41,321 6 5 7 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
552008 Fusa Kraftlag 20,772 20,711 23,357 5 5 5 0.03% 0.02% 0.02%
562008 Sunnfjord Energi AS 120,134 119,774 135,541 -168 -171 -168 -0.14% -0.14% -0.12%
622008 Hadeland Energinett AS 81,908 81,700 90,793 -10 -11 -10 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
632008 Trollfjord Kraft AS 39,348 39,270 42,658 2 2 2 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
652008 Hammerfest Energi Nett AS 60,946 60,813 66,599 3 2 3 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
712008 HelgelandsKraft AS 342,036 341,194 378,016 -16 -21 -14 0.00% -0.01% 0.00%
722008 Hemne kraftlag BA 25,550 25,490 28,133 -10 -10 -10 -0.04% -0.04% -0.03%
822008 Hurum Energiverk AS 27,749 27,681 30,669 10 10 11 0.04% 0.04% 0.03%
842008 Høland og Setskog Elverk 26,553 26,473 29,977 9 8 9 0.03% 0.03% 0.03%
862008 Istad Nett AS 126,902 126,547 142,032 18 16 19 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
872008 Jondal Energi KF 6,319 6,304 6,940 -4 -4 -4 -0.06% -0.07% -0.06%
882008 Jæren Everk Komm. f. i Hå 35,392 35,270 40,598 10 9 10 0.03% 0.03% 0.03%
912008 Klepp Energi AS 30,176 30,081 34,246 11 11 11 0.04% 0.04% 0.03%
932008 Kragerø Energi AS 39,813 39,716 43,953 -34 -35 -34 -0.09% -0.09% -0.08%
952008 Krødsherad Everk KF 8,965 8,945 9,819 3 3 3 0.03% 0.03% 0.03%
962008 Kvam Kraftverk AS 25,658 25,570 29,447 -33 -34 -33 -0.13% -0.13% -0.11%
972008 Kvinnherad Energi AS 35,626 35,531 39,692 -81 -82 -81 -0.23% -0.23% -0.20%
982008 Kvænangen Kraftverk AS 2,041 2,019 2,956 0 0 0 0.00% -0.01% 0.00%
1022008 Lier Everk AS 52,507 52,398 57,135 18 17 18 0.03% 0.03% 0.03%
1032008 Luostejok Kraftlag AL 38,352 38,262 42,184 14 14 14 0.04% 0.04% 0.03%
1042008 Luster Energiverk AS 20,724 20,687 22,308 -29 -29 -29 -0.14% -0.14% -0.13%
1062008 Lærdal Energi 13,746 13,724 14,721 -10 -11 -10 -0.08% -0.08% -0.07%
1082008 Løvenskiold Fossum Kraft 2,416 2,406 2,868 1 1 1 0.05% 0.05% 0.04%
1112008 Malvik Everk AS 22,499 22,441 24,975 10 9 10 0.04% 0.04% 0.04%
1162008 Meløy Energi AS 30,708 30,637 33,730 -5 -6 -5 -0.02% -0.02% -0.01%
1192008 Gauldal Energi AS 28,315 28,258 30,722 2 1 2 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
1212008 Modalen Kraftlag BA 3,045 3,035 3,482 -7 -7 -7 -0.23% -0.24% -0.20%
1322008 Nord-Salten Kraftlag AL 62,561 62,444 67,587 5 4 5 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
1332008 Nord Troms Kraftlag AS 79,023 78,856 86,152 -3 -4 -3 0.00% -0.01% 0.00%
1352008 Nord-Østerdal Kraftlag AL 59,560 59,435 64,923 3 2 4 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
1362008 Norddal Elverk AS 11,023 10,998 12,061 -29 -29 -29 -0.26% -0.27% -0.24%
1382008 Nordkyn Kraftlag AL 27,155 27,104 29,345 -10 -11 -10 -0.04% -0.04% -0.03%
1462008 Odda Energi AS 27,006 26,929 30,310 -48 -49 -48 -0.18% -0.18% -0.16%
1472008 Evenes Kraftforsyning AS 9,933 9,915 10,678 4 4 4 0.04% 0.04% 0.04%
1492008 Oppdal Everk AS 25,574 25,502 28,633 3 3 3 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
1522008 Opplandskraft DA 9,844 9,826 10,613 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1532008 Orkdal Energi AS 26,742 26,650 30,679 -8 -8 -8 -0.03% -0.03% -0.03%
1562008 Porsa Kraftlag 649 646 778 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1572008 Rakkestad Energiverk AS 24,307 24,249 26,753 -4 -5 -4 -0.02% -0.02% -0.02%
1612008 Rauland Kraftforsyningslag 23,633 23,605 24,801 8 8 8 0.03% 0.03% 0.03%
1622008 Rauma Energi AS 34,010 33,942 36,924 -21 -22 -21 -0.06% -0.06% -0.06%
Differences in RCsRevenue Caps with project %-changes in RCs
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ID Company RC1 RC2 RC3 ΔRC1 ΔRC2 ΔRC3 %Δ RC1 %Δ RC2 %Δ RC3
1632008 Kvikne-Rennebu Kraftlag AL 20,021 19,970 22,207 -1 -1 -1 -0.01% -0.01% 0.00%
1642008 Repvåg Kraftlag AL 50,863 50,746 55,869 2 2 3 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1662008 Rissa Kraftlag BA 17,877 17,835 19,671 2 2 2 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
1672008 Norsk Hydro Produksjon AS 7,406 7,401 7,607 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1682008 Rollag Elektrisitetsverk LL 8,183 8,166 8,940 -3 -3 -3 -0.04% -0.04% -0.04%
1712008 Rødøy-Lurøy Kraftverk AS 41,306 41,231 44,531 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1732008 Røros Elektrisitetsverk AS 26,566 26,513 28,830 -3 -3 -3 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
1762008 SKS Nett AS 74,059 73,943 79,050 0 -1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1812008 Sandøy Energi AS 6,473 6,458 7,101 0 0 0 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
1832008 Hjartdal Elverk AS 10,977 10,954 11,986 -23 -23 -23 -0.21% -0.21% -0.19%
1842008 Selbu Energiverk AS 17,740 17,692 19,788 -15 -15 -15 -0.08% -0.09% -0.07%
1872008 Sira-Kvina kraftselskap 7,410 7,395 8,047 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1942008 Skjåk Energi 16,721 16,682 18,383 7 7 7 0.04% 0.04% 0.04%
1962008 Skånevik Ølen Kraftlag 18,787 18,730 21,208 -2 -3 -2 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
1972008 Sognekraft AS 70,586 70,435 77,068 -25 -26 -24 -0.03% -0.04% -0.03%
2042008 Stranda Energiverk AS 25,132 25,099 26,541 -82 -82 -81 -0.32% -0.32% -0.31%
2052008 Stryn Energi AS 26,858 26,798 29,411 -18 -19 -18 -0.07% -0.07% -0.06%
2062008 Suldal Elverk 28,804 28,724 32,197 -51 -51 -51 -0.18% -0.18% -0.16%
2102008 Sunnhordland Kraftlag AS 146,337 145,940 163,272 17 14 17 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
2132008 Sykkylven Energi AS 21,033 20,971 23,705 -22 -22 -21 -0.10% -0.10% -0.09%
2142008 Sør-Aurdal Energi BA 17,532 17,475 20,003 -28 -29 -28 -0.16% -0.16% -0.14%
2152008 TrønderEnergi Nett AS 226,233 225,636 251,734 9 5 10 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2182008 Sørfold Kraftlag AL 10,842 10,827 11,449 -8 -8 -8 -0.08% -0.08% -0.07%
2192008 Tafjord Kraftnett AS 194,704 194,158 218,035 49 46 50 0.03% 0.02% 0.02%
2232008 Tinn Energi AS 40,693 40,572 45,861 0 -1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2272008 Troms Kraft Nett AS 446,634 445,517 494,351 38 30 40 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
2312008 Trøgstad Elverk AS 16,244 16,207 17,853 5 5 5 0.03% 0.03% 0.03%
2332008 Tydal Kommunale Energiverk KF 8,757 8,745 9,297 -13 -13 -13 -0.15% -0.15% -0.14%
2342008 Tysnes Kraftlag PL 21,060 21,011 23,168 3 3 3 0.02% 0.01% 0.01%
2352008 Tyssefaldene Aktieselskabet 20,743 20,709 22,212 1 1 1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2382008 Indre Hardanger Kraftlag AS 36,784 36,714 39,792 -22 -22 -21 -0.06% -0.06% -0.05%
2422008 Uvdal Kraftforsyning AL 9,328 9,305 10,317 4 3 4 0.04% 0.04% 0.03%
2482008 Vang Energiverk KF 15,163 15,124 16,842 -7 -7 -7 -0.05% -0.05% -0.04%
2492008 Varanger Kraftnett AS 134,250 133,921 148,296 12 9 12 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
2512008 Vest-Telemark Kraftlag AS 88,289 88,091 96,711 -33 -35 -33 -0.04% -0.04% -0.03%
2572008 Dalane Energi IKS 71,466 71,237 81,256 -45 -46 -45 -0.06% -0.07% -0.05%
2622008 Ørskog Energi AS 17,890 17,846 19,767 6 6 6 0.03% 0.03% 0.03%
2642008 Øvre Eiker Nett AS 43,192 43,078 48,077 -27 -28 -27 -0.06% -0.07% -0.06%
2672008 Årdal Energi KF 15,931 15,883 17,996 7 6 7 0.04% 0.04% 0.04%
2692008 SFE Nett AS 209,064 208,523 232,167 -203 -207 -202 -0.10% -0.10% -0.09%
2712008 Driva Kraftverk 4,219 4,219 4,247 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2742008 Svorka Energi AS 41,659 41,560 45,858 -13 -13 -13 -0.03% -0.03% -0.03%
2752008 Hallingdal Kraftnett AS 102,423 102,187 112,544 -10 -12 -10 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
2822008 Åbjørakraft Kolsvik Kraftverk 830 825 1,039 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2872008 Ustekveikja Kraftverk DA 518 515 618 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2882008 Kraftverkene i Orkla 15,961 15,918 17,804 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2952008 Gudbrandsdal Energi AS 74,545 74,364 82,238 4 3 4 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
3062008 Valdres Energiverk AS 59,766 59,555 68,783 17 15 17 0.03% 0.03% 0.02%
3072008 Vinstra Kraftselskap DA 441 441 462 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
3112008 Nordmøre Energiverk AS 162,378 161,983 179,287 28 26 29 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
3432008 Hemsedal Energi KF 21,666 21,555 26,414 4 3 4 0.02% 0.01% 0.02%
3492008 Notodden Energi AS 44,719 44,604 49,604 0 -1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
3542008 Lofotkraft AS 122,993 122,686 136,133 -12 -14 -12 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
3732008 Nore Energi AS 12,175 12,144 13,496 -14 -14 -14 -0.11% -0.12% -0.10%
4182008 Aurland Energiverk AS 14,038 14,001 15,626 -27 -27 -27 -0.19% -0.20% -0.17%
4332008 Hålogaland Kraft AS 124,345 123,998 139,169 -6 -8 -5 0.00% -0.01% 0.00%
4472008 E-CO Vannkraft AS 29,906 29,827 33,249 0 -1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
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ID Company RC1 RC2 RC3 ΔRC1 ΔRC2 ΔRC3 %Δ RC1 %Δ RC2 %Δ RC3
4532008 Statoil ASA 1,984 1,969 2,633 0 0 0 0.00% -0.01% 0.00%
4602008 Tussa Nett AS 167,425 166,953 187,596 -184 -187 -183 -0.11% -0.11% -0.10%
4642008 Vesterålskraft Nett AS 73,537 73,346 81,682 -13 -14 -13 -0.02% -0.02% -0.02%
4842008 TrønderEnegi Kraft 8,298 8,277 9,185 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
4912008 Elkem Energi Bremanger AS 3,549 3,542 3,849 -4 -4 -4 -0.12% -0.12% -0.11%
4952008 Elverum Energiverk Nett AS 49,698 49,533 56,735 6 5 6 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
5032008 Haugaland Kraft AS 279,440 278,835 305,287 44 40 46 0.02% 0.01% 0.01%
5112008 Lyse Nett AS 642,550 640,855 714,975 23 12 26 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
5122008 Lyse Produksjon 5,069 5,050 5,866 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
5242008 Otra Kraft DA 56,923 56,881 58,693 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
5362008 Trondheim Energiverk Nett AS 343,602 342,807 377,588 58 52 59 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
5422008 Vokks Nett AS 60,182 60,026 66,824 11 10 11 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
5492008 Fortum Distribution AS 347,930 347,068 384,724 84 78 85 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
5662008 BKK Nett AS 988,075 985,357 1,104,219 0 -18 5 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
5742008 Eidsiva Energi Nett AS 849,646 847,391 945,995 69 54 73 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
5782008 Flesberg Elektrisitetsverk AS 15,573 15,533 17,258 1 1 1 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
5912008 Midt Nett Buskerud AS 62,807 62,615 71,009 -8 -10 -8 -0.01% -0.02% -0.01%
5932008 Nesset Kraft AS 16,109 16,085 17,118 -15 -15 -15 -0.09% -0.09% -0.09%
5992008 Sunndal Energi KF 27,348 27,282 30,151 -50 -50 -50 -0.18% -0.18% -0.17%
6112008 Skagerak Nett AS 991,654 989,041 1,103,278 133 116 138 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
6132008 Nordvest Nett AS 42,727 42,622 47,229 9 9 9 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
6142008 Energi 1 Follo-Røyken as 107,570 107,307 118,809 35 34 36 0.03% 0.03% 0.03%
6152008 EB Nett AS 317,093 316,186 355,849 54 48 55 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
6242008 Agder Energi Nett AS 878,811 876,283 986,793 -43 -59 -38 0.00% -0.01% 0.00%
6252008 Voss Energi AS 52,924 52,758 60,012 3 2 4 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
6372008 Narvik Energinett AS 69,138 68,952 77,115 13 12 13 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
6522008 Svorka Produksjon AS 685 682 785 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
6592008 Midt-Telemark Energi AS 47,748 47,599 54,095 -15 -16 -14 -0.03% -0.03% -0.03%
6692008 Stange Energi Nett AS 50,687 50,544 56,822 22 21 22 0.04% 0.04% 0.04%
6752008 Hafslund Nett AS 2,389,155 2,383,508 2,630,401 475 438 485 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
6842008 Ringeriks-Kraft  Produksjon AS 1,030 1,025 1,207 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
6852008 Statkraft Energi AS 469 464 690 0 0 0 0.00% -0.01% 0.00%
6862008 Yara Norge AS 17,119 17,105 17,731 7 7 7 0.04% 0.04% 0.04%
6932008 Ringeriks-Kraft Nett AS 84,973 84,731 95,290 11 9 11 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
6992008 Nord-Trøndelag Elektrisitetsverk 489,306 488,167 537,976 43 36 45 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
7262008 BE Nett AS 120,990 120,688 133,885 720 714 882 0.60% 0.60% 0.66%
7432008 Mo Industripark 23,170 23,100 26,130 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
7532008 Aktieselskapet Saudefaldene 16,333 16,282 18,487 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
15,085,559 15,047,119 16,727,695 644 389 876 0.00% 0.00% 0.01%Sum
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22 Industry changes with project added to Lyse Nett AS 
ID Company RC1 RC2 RC3 ΔRC1 ΔRC2 ΔRC3 %Δ RC1 %Δ RC2 %Δ RC3
72008 Alta Kraftlag AL 75528 75350 83131 -5 -6 -5 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
92008 Andøy Energi AS 27585 27519 30387 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
102008 Arendals Fossekompani ASA 4271 4260 4734 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
142008 Askøy Energi AS 40053 39926 45472 4 3 5 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
162008 Austevoll Kraftlag BA 21928 21873 24252 1 1 1 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
182008 Ballangen Energi AS 19669 19619 21808 -2 -3 -2 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
222008 Bindal Kraftlag AL 9884 9867 10625 1 1 1 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
232008 Elkem Bjølvefossen AS 2012 2012 2033 0 0 0 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
322008 Fredrikstad Energi Nett AS 119387 119047 133904 6 4 7 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
342008 Dragefossen Kraftanlegg AS 17619 17578 19360 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
352008 Drangedal Everk KF 19295 19246 21362 -1 -2 -1 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
372008 Eidefoss AS 75329 75160 82513 -3 -5 -3 0.00% -0.01% 0.00%
412008 Etne Elektrisitetslag 10169 10151 10944 1 1 1 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
422008 Fauske Lysverk AS 28376 28291 32006 2 1 2 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
432008 Finnås Kraftlag 34045 33952 38042 2 1 2 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
452008 Fitjar Kraftlag BA 16391 16362 17596 -1 -1 -1 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
462008 Fjelberg Kraftlag 9908 9882 11050 1 0 1 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
522008 Forsand Elverk KF 7323 7302 8193 -1 -1 -1 -0.01% -0.02% -0.01%
532008 Fosenkraft AS 35678 35546 41316 2 1 2 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
552008 Fusa Kraftlag 20768 20707 23353 1 1 1 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
562008 Sunnfjord Energi AS 120268 119907 135674 -35 -37 -34 -0.03% -0.03% -0.03%
622008 Hadeland Energinett AS 81918 81710 90803 0 -2 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
632008 Trollfjord Kraft AS 39348 39270 42658 2 1 2 0.01% 0.00% 0.00%
652008 Hammerfest Energi Nett AS 60943 60810 66596 0 -1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
712008 HelgelandsKraft AS 342052 341209 378031 0 -6 1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
722008 Hemne kraftlag BA 25557 25496 28139 -3 -4 -3 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
822008 Hurum Energiverk AS 27741 27672 30660 2 1 2 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
842008 Høland og Setskog Elverk 26546 26466 29969 2 1 2 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
862008 Istad Nett AS 126884 126529 142014 0 -3 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
872008 Jondal Energi KF 6322 6307 6943 -1 -1 -1 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
882008 Jæren Everk Komm. f. i Hå 35386 35264 40592 4 3 4 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
912008 Klepp Energi AS 30168 30073 34238 3 2 3 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
932008 Kragerø Energi AS 39842 39745 43982 -5 -6 -5 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
952008 Krødsherad Everk KF 8963 8943 9817 0 0 0 0.01% 0.00% 0.00%
962008 Kvam Kraftverk AS 25684 25596 29473 -8 -8 -8 -0.03% -0.03% -0.03%
972008 Kvinnherad Energi AS 35690 35595 39756 -18 -19 -18 -0.05% -0.05% -0.04%
982008 Kvænangen Kraftverk AS 2041 2019 2956 0 0 0 0.00% -0.01% 0.00%
1022008 Lier Everk AS 52492 52383 57120 3 2 3 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
1032008 Luostejok Kraftlag AL 38342 38252 42175 5 4 5 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
1042008 Luster Energiverk AS 20747 20710 22331 -7 -7 -7 -0.03% -0.03% -0.03%
1062008 Lærdal Energi 13756 13733 14731 -1 -1 -1 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
1082008 Løvenskiold Fossum Kraft 2415 2405 2867 0 0 0 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
1112008 Malvik Everk AS 22491 22433 24967 2 1 2 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
1162008 Meløy Energi AS 30711 30640 33733 -2 -2 -2 -0.01% -0.01% 0.00%
1192008 Gauldal Energi AS 28313 28257 30720 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1212008 Modalen Kraftlag BA 3051 3041 3488 -1 -2 -1 -0.05% -0.05% -0.04%
1322008 Nord-Salten Kraftlag AL 62557 62439 67582 0 -1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1332008 Nord Troms Kraftlag AS 79023 78856 86151 -3 -5 -3 0.00% -0.01% 0.00%
1352008 Nord-Østerdal Kraftlag AL 59557 59431 64920 0 -1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1362008 Norddal Elverk AS 11045 11021 12084 -7 -7 -7 -0.06% -0.06% -0.05%
1382008 Nordkyn Kraftlag AL 27163 27112 29352 -3 -3 -3 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
1462008 Odda Energi AS 27044 26966 30347 -11 -11 -11 -0.04% -0.04% -0.04%
1472008 Evenes Kraftforsyning AS 9929 9912 10674 1 1 1 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
1492008 Oppdal Everk AS 25571 25499 28630 0 -1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1522008 Opplandskraft DA 9844 9826 10613 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1532008 Orkdal Energi AS 26746 26654 30684 -3 -4 -3 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
1562008 Porsa Kraftlag 649 646 778 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1572008 Rakkestad Energiverk AS 24310 24252 26756 -1 -2 -1 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
1612008 Rauland Kraftforsyningslag 23626 23599 24794 1 1 1 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
1622008 Rauma Energi AS 34027 33959 36942 -4 -4 -4 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
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1632008 Kvikne-Rennebu Kraftlag AL 20022 19971 22208 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1642008 Repvåg Kraftlag AL 50861 50743 55866 0 -1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1662008 Rissa Kraftlag BA 17875 17833 19668 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1672008 Norsk Hydro Produksjon AS 7406 7401 7607 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1682008 Rollag Elektrisitetsverk LL 8186 8168 8942 -1 -1 -1 -0.01% -0.02% -0.01%
1712008 Rødøy-Lurøy Kraftverk AS 41306 41231 44531 0 -1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1732008 Røros Elektrisitetsverk AS 26568 26514 28831 -2 -2 -1 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
1762008 SKS Nett AS 74059 73943 79049 0 -1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1812008 Sandøy Energi AS 6472 6458 7100 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1832008 Hjartdal Elverk AS 10995 10972 12004 -5 -5 -5 -0.05% -0.05% -0.04%
1842008 Selbu Energiverk AS 17751 17703 19800 -3 -4 -3 -0.02% -0.02% -0.02%
1872008 Sira-Kvina kraftselskap 7410 7395 8047 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1942008 Skjåk Energi 16715 16676 18377 1 1 1 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
1962008 Skånevik Ølen Kraftlag 18788 18731 21209 -1 -2 -1 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
1972008 Sognekraft AS 70603 70451 77084 -8 -9 -8 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
2042008 Stranda Energiverk AS 25196 25163 26605 -18 -18 -18 -0.07% -0.07% -0.07%
2052008 Stryn Energi AS 26872 26812 29424 -5 -5 -5 -0.02% -0.02% -0.02%
2062008 Suldal Elverk 28844 28765 32238 -10 -11 -10 -0.04% -0.04% -0.03%
2102008 Sunnhordland Kraftlag AS 146326 145929 163261 6 3 6 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2132008 Sykkylven Energi AS 21049 20987 23721 -5 -6 -5 -0.03% -0.03% -0.02%
2142008 Sør-Aurdal Energi BA 17555 17497 20026 -6 -6 -6 -0.03% -0.03% -0.03%
2152008 TrønderEnergi Nett AS 226225 225627 251725 0 -4 1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2182008 Sørfold Kraftlag AL 10848 10834 11455 -2 -2 -2 -0.02% -0.02% -0.02%
2192008 Tafjord Kraftnett AS 194663 194117 217993 8 4 9 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2232008 Tinn Energi AS 40693 40572 45861 0 -1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2272008 Troms Kraft Nett AS 446596 445478 494313 0 -8 1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2312008 Trøgstad Elverk AS 16240 16202 17849 1 1 1 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
2332008 Tydal Kommunale Energiverk KF 8768 8755 9307 -3 -3 -3 -0.03% -0.03% -0.03%
2342008 Tysnes Kraftlag PL 21057 21008 23165 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2352008 Tyssefaldene Aktieselskabet 20743 20708 22211 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2382008 Indre Hardanger Kraftlag AS 36802 36732 39809 -4 -4 -4 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
2422008 Uvdal Kraftforsyning AL 9325 9302 10314 1 0 1 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
2482008 Vang Energiverk KF 15168 15129 16846 -2 -2 -2 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
2492008 Varanger Kraftnett AS 134239 133909 148284 0 -2 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2512008 Vest-Telemark Kraftlag AS 88314 88116 96736 -8 -10 -8 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
2572008 Dalane Energi IKS 71502 71273 81291 -9 -11 -9 -0.01% -0.02% -0.01%
2622008 Ørskog Energi AS 17885 17841 19762 1 1 1 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
2642008 Øvre Eiker Nett AS 43212 43097 48096 -8 -9 -8 -0.02% -0.02% -0.02%
2672008 Årdal Energi KF 15926 15877 17990 1 1 1 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
2692008 SFE Nett AS 209216 208675 232319 -51 -55 -50 -0.02% -0.03% -0.02%
2712008 Driva Kraftverk 4219 4219 4247 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2742008 Svorka Energi AS 41669 41571 45868 -3 -3 -2 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
2752008 Hallingdal Kraftnett AS 102434 102197 112554 0 -2 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2822008 Åbjørakraft Kolsvik Kraftverk 830 825 1039 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2872008 Ustekveikja Kraftverk DA 518 515 618 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2882008 Kraftverkene i Orkla 15961 15918 17804 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2952008 Gudbrandsdal Energi AS 74541 74360 82234 0 -1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
3062008 Valdres Energiverk AS 59750 59539 68766 0 -2 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
3072008 Vinstra Kraftselskap DA 441 441 462 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
3112008 Nordmøre Energiverk AS 162357 161961 179265 7 4 7 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
3432008 Hemsedal Energi KF 21664 21552 26412 1 0 1 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
3492008 Notodden Energi AS 44719 44604 49604 0 -1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
3542008 Lofotkraft AS 122999 122692 136139 -6 -8 -6 0.00% -0.01% 0.00%
3732008 Nore Energi AS 12185 12154 13506 -3 -3 -3 -0.03% -0.03% -0.02%
4182008 Aurland Energiverk AS 14059 14022 15647 -6 -6 -6 -0.04% -0.04% -0.04%
4332008 Hålogaland Kraft AS 124351 124004 139174 0 -3 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
4472008 E-CO Vannkraft AS 29906 29827 33249 0 -1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Revenue Caps with project Differences in RCs %-changes in RCs
 
XXXVIII  APPENDIX 
 
ID Company RC1 RC2 RC3 ΔRC1 ΔRC2 ΔRC3 %Δ RC1 %Δ RC2 %Δ RC3
4532008 Statoil ASA 1984 1969 2633 0 0 0 0.00% -0.01% 0.00%
4602008 Tussa Nett AS 167569 167097 187740 -40 -44 -40 -0.02% -0.03% -0.02%
4642008 Vesterålskraft Nett AS 73545 73355 81690 -4 -6 -4 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
4842008 TrønderEnegi Kraft 8298 8277 9185 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
4912008 Elkem Energi Bremanger AS 3553 3546 3852 -1 -1 -1 -0.02% -0.02% -0.02%
4952008 Elverum Energiverk Nett AS 49695 49530 56732 3 2 3 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
5032008 Haugaland Kraft AS 279396 278790 305242 0 -5 1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
5112008 Lyse Nett AS 643328 641627 715913 801 785 964 0.12% 0.12% 0.13%
5122008 Lyse Produksjon 5069 5050 5866 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
5242008 Otra Kraft DA 56923 56881 58693 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
5362008 Trondheim Energiverk Nett AS 343559 342763 377544 14 8 15 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
5422008 Vokks Nett AS 60171 60016 66814 0 -1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
5492008 Fortum Distribution AS 347867 347005 384660 21 14 22 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
5662008 BKK Nett AS 988075 985354 1104217 0 -20 2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
5742008 Eidsiva Energi Nett AS 849577 847320 945924 0 -17 2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
5782008 Flesberg Elektrisitetsverk AS 15572 15532 17257 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
5912008 Midt Nett Buskerud AS 62816 62624 71017 0 -1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
5932008 Nesset Kraft AS 16120 16097 17129 -4 -4 -3 -0.02% -0.02% -0.02%
5992008 Sunndal Energi KF 27387 27322 30190 -11 -11 -11 -0.04% -0.04% -0.04%
6112008 Skagerak Nett AS 991521 988905 1103143 0 -20 2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
6132008 Nordvest Nett AS 42721 42615 47222 2 2 2 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
6142008 Energi 1 Follo-Røyken as 107541 107277 118779 6 4 6 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
6152008 EB Nett AS 317050 316142 355805 11 4 12 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
6242008 Agder Energi Nett AS 878854 876324 986833 0 -19 2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
6252008 Voss Energi AS 52924 52757 60012 3 2 3 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
6372008 Narvik Energinett AS 69129 68942 77106 3 2 3 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
6522008 Svorka Produksjon AS 685 682 785 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
6592008 Midt-Telemark Energi AS 47759 47610 54107 -3 -4 -3 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
6692008 Stange Energi Nett AS 50672 50528 56807 6 5 6 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
6752008 Hafslund Nett AS 2388775 2383123 2630015 95 53 100 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
6842008 Ringeriks-Kraft  Produksjon AS 1030 1025 1207 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
6852008 Statkraft Energi AS 469 464 690 0 0 0 0.00% -0.01% 0.00%
6862008 Yara Norge AS 17116 17102 17728 3 3 3 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
6932008 Ringeriks-Kraft Nett AS 84962 84720 95279 0 -2 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
6992008 Nord-Trøndelag Elektrisitetsverk 489263 488123 537931 0 -9 1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
7262008 BE Nett AS 120263 119965 132997 -7 -9 -7 -0.01% -0.01% 0.00%
7432008 Mo Industripark 23170 23100 26130 0 -1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
7532008 Aktieselskapet Saudefaldene 16333 16282 18487 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Sum 15085596 15047119 16727695 681 389 876 0.00% 0.003% 0.01%
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23 Industry changes with project added to Dalane Energi 
ID Company RC1 RC2 RC3 ΔRC1 ΔRC2 ΔRC3 %Δ RC1 %Δ RC2 %Δ RC3
72008 Alta Kraftlag AL 75524 75345 83126 -9 -11 -10 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
92008 Andøy Energi AS 27587 27521 30389 2 1 2 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
102008 Arendals Fossekompani ASA 4271 4260 4734 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
142008 Askøy Energi AS 40055 39928 45474 7 5 6 0.02% 0.01% 0.01%
162008 Austevoll Kraftlag BA 21929 21874 24253 2 2 2 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
182008 Ballangen Energi AS 19666 19616 21805 -5 -6 -5 -0.03% -0.03% -0.02%
222008 Bindal Kraftlag AL 9885 9867 10625 1 1 1 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
232008 Elkem Bjølvefossen AS 2013 2012 2033 0 0 0 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
322008 Fredrikstad Energi Nett AS 119400 119059 133917 19 16 19 0.02% 0.01% 0.01%
342008 Dragefossen Kraftanlegg AS 17618 17577 19359 -1 -2 -1 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
352008 Drangedal Everk KF 19292 19244 21360 -4 -4 -4 -0.02% -0.02% -0.02%
372008 Eidefoss AS 75329 75160 82513 -3 -5 -4 0.00% -0.01% 0.00%
412008 Etne Elektrisitetslag 10170 10152 10945 2 2 2 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
422008 Fauske Lysverk AS 28380 28294 32010 6 5 6 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
432008 Finnås Kraftlag 34049 33955 38046 6 5 6 0.02% 0.01% 0.01%
452008 Fitjar Kraftlag BA 16390 16361 17595 -2 -2 -2 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
462008 Fjelberg Kraftlag 9910 9883 11052 2 2 2 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
522008 Forsand Elverk KF 7321 7301 8192 -2 -2 -2 -0.03% -0.03% -0.03%
532008 Fosenkraft AS 35680 35548 41318 4 3 4 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
552008 Fusa Kraftlag 20769 20708 23354 3 2 3 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
562008 Sunnfjord Energi AS 120221 119860 135627 -81 -85 -82 -0.07% -0.07% -0.06%
622008 Hadeland Energinett AS 81913 81705 90797 -5 -7 -5 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
632008 Trollfjord Kraft AS 39346 39268 42656 0 -1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
652008 Hammerfest Energi Nett AS 60946 60813 66599 3 2 3 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
712008 HelgelandsKraft AS 342052 341207 378029 0 -8 -1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
722008 Hemne kraftlag BA 25555 25494 28138 -5 -5 -5 -0.02% -0.02% -0.02%
822008 Hurum Energiverk AS 27744 27675 30663 5 5 5 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
842008 Høland og Setskog Elverk 26550 26469 29973 5 5 5 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
862008 Istad Nett AS 126890 126534 142019 6 3 6 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
872008 Jondal Energi KF 6321 6306 6942 -2 -2 -2 -0.03% -0.03% -0.03%
882008 Jæren Everk Komm. f. i Hå 35386 35264 40592 4 3 4 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
912008 Klepp Energi AS 30170 30074 34239 5 4 5 0.02% 0.01% 0.01%
932008 Kragerø Energi AS 39830 39732 43969 -17 -18 -17 -0.04% -0.05% -0.04%
952008 Krødsherad Everk KF 8963 8943 9818 1 1 1 0.02% 0.01% 0.01%
962008 Kvam Kraftverk AS 25675 25586 29464 -17 -18 -17 -0.07% -0.07% -0.06%
972008 Kvinnherad Energi AS 35668 35573 39734 -40 -41 -40 -0.11% -0.11% -0.10%
982008 Kvænangen Kraftverk AS 2041 2019 2956 0 0 0 0.00% -0.01% 0.00%
1022008 Lier Everk AS 52498 52389 57125 9 8 9 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
1032008 Luostejok Kraftlag AL 38342 38252 42175 5 4 5 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
1042008 Luster Energiverk AS 20739 20702 22323 -15 -15 -15 -0.07% -0.07% -0.07%
1062008 Lærdal Energi 13751 13728 14726 -6 -6 -6 -0.04% -0.04% -0.04%
1082008 Løvenskiold Fossum Kraft 2416 2405 2867 1 0 1 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
1112008 Malvik Everk AS 22494 22436 24970 5 4 5 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
1162008 Meløy Energi AS 30711 30640 33733 -2 -2 -2 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
1192008 Gauldal Energi AS 28315 28258 30722 2 1 2 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
1212008 Modalen Kraftlag BA 3049 3039 3486 -3 -4 -3 -0.11% -0.12% -0.10%
1322008 Nord-Salten Kraftlag AL 62559 62441 67584 2 1 2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1332008 Nord Troms Kraftlag AS 79023 78856 86151 -3 -5 -4 0.00% -0.01% 0.00%
1352008 Nord-Østerdal Kraftlag AL 59557 59431 64920 0 -1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1362008 Norddal Elverk AS 11037 11013 12076 -15 -15 -15 -0.13% -0.13% -0.12%
1382008 Nordkyn Kraftlag AL 27160 27109 29350 -5 -6 -5 -0.02% -0.02% -0.02%
1462008 Odda Energi AS 27031 26954 30335 -23 -24 -23 -0.09% -0.09% -0.08%
1472008 Evenes Kraftforsyning AS 9931 9913 10676 2 2 2 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
1492008 Oppdal Everk AS 25573 25501 28632 2 1 1 0.01% 0.00% 0.00%
1522008 Opplandskraft DA 9844 9826 10613 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1532008 Orkdal Energi AS 26745 26652 30682 -5 -6 -5 -0.02% -0.02% -0.02%
1562008 Porsa Kraftlag 649 646 778 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1572008 Rakkestad Energiverk AS 24308 24251 26755 -3 -4 -3 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
1612008 Rauland Kraftforsyningslag 23629 23601 24796 4 4 4 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
1622008 Rauma Energi AS 34022 33953 36936 -10 -10 -10 -0.03% -0.03% -0.03%
Revenue Caps with project Differences in RCs %-changes in RCs
 
XL  APPENDIX 
 
ID Company RC1 RC2 RC3 ΔRC1 ΔRC2 ΔRC3 %Δ RC1 %Δ RC2 %Δ RC3
1632008 Kvikne-Rennebu Kraftlag AL 20022 19971 22208 0 -1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1642008 Repvåg Kraftlag AL 50863 50746 55869 2 1 2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1662008 Rissa Kraftlag BA 17876 17834 19669 1 1 1 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
1672008 Norsk Hydro Produksjon AS 7406 7401 7607 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1682008 Rollag Elektrisitetsverk LL 8185 8167 8941 -2 -2 -2 -0.02% -0.02% -0.02%
1712008 Rødøy-Lurøy Kraftverk AS 41309 41233 44533 2 1 2 0.01% 0.00% 0.00%
1732008 Røros Elektrisitetsverk AS 26568 26514 28831 -2 -2 -2 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
1762008 SKS Nett AS 74059 73942 79049 0 -1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1812008 Sandøy Energi AS 6473 6458 7100 0 0 0 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
1832008 Hjartdal Elverk AS 10989 10965 11997 -11 -12 -11 -0.10% -0.11% -0.09%
1842008 Selbu Energiverk AS 17747 17699 19795 -8 -8 -8 -0.04% -0.05% -0.04%
1872008 Sira-Kvina kraftselskap 7410 7395 8047 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1942008 Skjåk Energi 16717 16678 18380 3 3 3 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
1962008 Skånevik Ølen Kraftlag 18788 18731 21209 -1 -2 -1 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
1972008 Sognekraft AS 70599 70446 77080 -12 -14 -13 -0.02% -0.02% -0.02%
2042008 Stranda Energiverk AS 25174 25141 26583 -39 -40 -40 -0.16% -0.16% -0.15%
2052008 Stryn Energi AS 26867 26807 29420 -9 -10 -9 -0.03% -0.04% -0.03%
2062008 Suldal Elverk 28829 28749 32223 -25 -26 -25 -0.09% -0.09% -0.08%
2102008 Sunnhordland Kraftlag AS 146328 145931 163263 8 4 8 0.01% 0.00% 0.00%
2132008 Sykkylven Energi AS 21044 20981 23715 -11 -11 -11 -0.05% -0.05% -0.05%
2142008 Sør-Aurdal Energi BA 17547 17489 20018 -14 -14 -14 -0.08% -0.08% -0.07%
2152008 TrønderEnergi Nett AS 226233 225634 251732 9 3 8 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2182008 Sørfold Kraftlag AL 10846 10832 11453 -4 -4 -4 -0.04% -0.04% -0.03%
2192008 Tafjord Kraftnett AS 194680 194132 218009 25 19 24 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
2232008 Tinn Energi AS 40693 40572 45861 0 -1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2272008 Troms Kraft Nett AS 446615 445494 494329 19 8 17 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2312008 Trøgstad Elverk AS 16242 16204 17850 3 2 3 0.02% 0.01% 0.01%
2332008 Tydal Kommunale Energiverk KF 8764 8751 9303 -6 -7 -7 -0.07% -0.08% -0.07%
2342008 Tysnes Kraftlag PL 21059 21010 23167 2 2 2 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
2352008 Tyssefaldene Aktieselskabet 20743 20708 22211 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2382008 Indre Hardanger Kraftlag AS 36794 36724 39801 -12 -12 -12 -0.03% -0.03% -0.03%
2422008 Uvdal Kraftforsyning AL 9326 9303 10315 2 2 2 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
2482008 Vang Energiverk KF 15166 15127 16844 -4 -4 -4 -0.03% -0.03% -0.02%
2492008 Varanger Kraftnett AS 134244 133914 148289 6 3 5 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2512008 Vest-Telemark Kraftlag AS 88305 88107 96727 -17 -19 -17 -0.02% -0.02% -0.02%
2572008 Dalane Energi IKS 72398 72164 82348 887 881 1048 1.24% 1.24% 1.29%
2622008 Ørskog Energi AS 17887 17843 19764 3 3 3 0.02% 0.01% 0.01%
2642008 Øvre Eiker Nett AS 43206 43091 48090 -14 -15 -14 -0.03% -0.03% -0.03%
2672008 Årdal Energi KF 15928 15879 17992 3 3 3 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
2692008 SFE Nett AS 209166 208623 232267 -102 -107 -102 -0.05% -0.05% -0.04%
2712008 Driva Kraftverk 4219 4219 4247 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2742008 Svorka Energi AS 41666 41568 45865 -5 -6 -5 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
2752008 Hallingdal Kraftnett AS 102429 102191 112549 -5 -8 -6 -0.01% -0.01% 0.00%
2822008 Åbjørakraft Kolsvik Kraftverk 830 825 1039 0 0 0 0.00% -0.01% 0.00%
2872008 Ustekveikja Kraftverk DA 518 515 618 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2882008 Kraftverkene i Orkla 15961 15918 17804 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2952008 Gudbrandsdal Energi AS 74545 74364 82237 4 2 4 0.01% 0.00% 0.00%
3062008 Valdres Energiverk AS 59758 59546 68774 8 6 8 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
3072008 Vinstra Kraftselskap DA 441 441 462 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
3112008 Nordmøre Energiverk AS 162364 161967 179272 14 10 14 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
3432008 Hemsedal Energi KF 21664 21552 26411 1 0 1 0.01% 0.00% 0.00%
3492008 Notodden Energi AS 44719 44604 49603 0 -1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
3542008 Lofotkraft AS 122999 122691 136138 -6 -9 -7 0.00% -0.01% 0.00%
3732008 Nore Energi AS 12182 12151 13503 -7 -7 -7 -0.05% -0.06% -0.05%
4182008 Aurland Energiverk AS 14051 14014 15639 -14 -14 -14 -0.10% -0.10% -0.09%
4332008 Hålogaland Kraft AS 124351 124003 139174 0 -3 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
4472008 E-CO Vannkraft AS 29906 29827 33248 0 -1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
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ID Company RC1 RC2 RC3 ΔRC1 ΔRC2 ΔRC3 %Δ RC1 %Δ RC2 %Δ RC3
4532008 Statoil ASA 1984 1969 2633 0 0 0 0.00% -0.01% 0.00%
4602008 Tussa Nett AS 167521 167048 187691 -88 -93 -89 -0.05% -0.06% -0.05%
4642008 Vesterålskraft Nett AS 73545 73354 81689 -4 -6 -5 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
4842008 TrønderEnegi Kraft 8298 8277 9185 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
4912008 Elkem Energi Bremanger AS 3551 3544 3851 -2 -2 -2 -0.06% -0.07% -0.06%
4952008 Elverum Energiverk Nett AS 49695 49530 56732 3 1 3 0.01% 0.00% 0.00%
5032008 Haugaland Kraft AS 279411 278804 305255 15 9 14 0.01% 0.00% 0.00%
5112008 Lyse Nett AS 642527 640826 714947 0 -17 -2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
5122008 Lyse Produksjon 5069 5050 5866 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
5242008 Otra Kraft DA 56923 56881 58693 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
5362008 Trondheim Energiverk Nett AS 343574 342775 377557 29 21 28 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
5422008 Vokks Nett AS 60175 60019 66817 4 2 3 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
5492008 Fortum Distribution AS 347888 347024 384679 42 33 41 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
5662008 BKK Nett AS 988075 985348 1104210 0 -27 -4 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
5742008 Eidsiva Energi Nett AS 849612 847349 945953 35 12 31 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
5782008 Flesberg Elektrisitetsverk AS 15573 15533 17258 1 1 1 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
5912008 Midt Nett Buskerud AS 62812 62619 71013 -4 -6 -4 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
5932008 Nesset Kraft AS 16117 16093 17126 -7 -7 -7 -0.04% -0.05% -0.04%
5992008 Sunndal Energi KF 27373 27307 30176 -25 -26 -25 -0.09% -0.09% -0.08%
6112008 Skagerak Nett AS 991565 988944 1103181 44 19 41 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
6132008 Nordvest Nett AS 42723 42617 47224 5 4 4 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
6142008 Energi 1 Follo-Røyken as 107553 107289 118790 18 15 17 0.02% 0.01% 0.01%
6152008 EB Nett AS 317061 316151 355814 22 13 20 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
6242008 Agder Energi Nett AS 878811 876275 986785 -43 -68 -46 0.00% -0.01% 0.00%
6252008 Voss Energi AS 52920 52754 60009 0 -2 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
6372008 Narvik Energinett AS 69132 68945 77108 6 5 6 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
6522008 Svorka Produksjon AS 685 682 785 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
6592008 Midt-Telemark Energi AS 47753 47604 54101 -9 -10 -9 -0.02% -0.02% -0.02%
6692008 Stange Energi Nett AS 50675 50531 56810 9 8 9 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
6752008 Hafslund Nett AS 2388870 2383205 2630097 190 135 182 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
6842008 Ringeriks-Kraft  Produksjon AS 1030 1025 1207 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
6852008 Statkraft Energi AS 469 464 690 0 0 0 0.00% -0.01% 0.00%
6862008 Yara Norge AS 17115 17101 17727 3 2 3 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
6932008 Ringeriks-Kraft Nett AS 84967 84725 95283 5 3 5 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
6992008 Nord-Trøndelag Elektrisitetsverk 489285 488142 537950 22 10 20 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
7262008 BE Nett AS 120263 119964 132996 -7 -10 -7 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
7432008 Mo Industripark 23170 23100 26130 0 -1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
7532008 Aktieselskapet Saudefaldene 16333 16282 18487 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Sum 15085684 15047119 16727695 769 389 876 0.01% 0.003% 0.01%
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24 Industry changes with project added to BE Nett, Lyse 
Nett and Dalane Energi 
ID Company RC1 RC2 RC3 ΔRC1 ΔRC2 ΔRC3 %Δ RC1 %Δ RC2 %Δ RC3
72008 Alta Kraftlag AL 75509 75331 83115 -24 -25 -21 -0.03% -0.03% -0.02%
92008 Andøy Energi AS 27590 27524 30393 5 4 6 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
102008 Arendals Fossekompani ASA 4271 4260 4734 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
142008 Askøy Energi AS 40071 39944 45492 22 21 24 0.06% 0.05% 0.05%
162008 Austevoll Kraftlag BA 21933 21879 24259 7 7 8 0.03% 0.03% 0.03%
182008 Ballangen Energi AS 19651 19601 21791 -20 -21 -19 -0.10% -0.11% -0.09%
222008 Bindal Kraftlag AL 9888 9871 10629 5 5 5 0.05% 0.05% 0.05%
232008 Elkem Bjølvefossen AS 2013 2013 2034 1 1 1 0.06% 0.06% 0.06%
322008 Fredrikstad Energi Nett AS 119439 119099 133961 58 55 64 0.05% 0.05% 0.05%
342008 Dragefossen Kraftanlegg AS 17614 17573 19356 -5 -5 -4 -0.03% -0.03% -0.02%
352008 Drangedal Everk KF 19280 19232 21349 -15 -16 -15 -0.08% -0.08% -0.07%
372008 Eidefoss AS 75315 75146 82502 -17 -18 -14 -0.02% -0.02% -0.02%
412008 Etne Elektrisitetslag 10175 10156 10950 7 6 7 0.07% 0.06% 0.06%
422008 Fauske Lysverk AS 28392 28306 32024 18 17 19 0.06% 0.06% 0.06%
432008 Finnås Kraftlag 34059 33965 38057 16 15 17 0.05% 0.04% 0.05%
452008 Fitjar Kraftlag BA 16382 16354 17587 -10 -10 -9 -0.06% -0.06% -0.05%
462008 Fjelberg Kraftlag 9914 9887 11056 6 6 6 0.06% 0.06% 0.06%
522008 Forsand Elverk KF 7316 7296 8187 -7 -7 -7 -0.10% -0.10% -0.08%
532008 Fosenkraft AS 35684 35552 41325 8 7 11 0.02% 0.02% 0.03%
552008 Fusa Kraftlag 20774 20714 23360 8 7 9 0.04% 0.04% 0.04%
562008 Sunnfjord Energi AS 120018 119657 135430 -284 -287 -278 -0.24% -0.24% -0.20%
622008 Hadeland Energinett AS 81899 81690 90786 -20 -21 -16 -0.02% -0.03% -0.02%
632008 Trollfjord Kraft AS 39346 39268 42657 0 -1 1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
652008 Hammerfest Energi Nett AS 60946 60813 66601 3 2 5 0.00% 0.00% 0.01%
712008 HelgelandsKraft AS 342020 341176 378013 -32 -39 -18 -0.01% -0.01% 0.00%
722008 Hemne kraftlag BA 25542 25482 28126 -18 -18 -17 -0.07% -0.07% -0.06%
822008 Hurum Energiverk AS 27754 27686 30675 16 15 17 0.06% 0.05% 0.05%
842008 Høland og Setskog Elverk 26557 26476 29981 12 12 14 0.05% 0.04% 0.05%
862008 Istad Nett AS 126908 126553 142043 24 21 30 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
872008 Jondal Energi KF 6316 6301 6937 -7 -7 -7 -0.11% -0.11% -0.10%
882008 Jæren Everk Komm. f. i Hå 35398 35276 40606 16 15 18 0.05% 0.04% 0.05%
912008 Klepp Energi AS 30183 30087 34254 18 17 19 0.06% 0.06% 0.06%
932008 Kragerø Energi AS 39791 39694 43932 -56 -57 -54 -0.14% -0.14% -0.12%
952008 Krødsherad Everk KF 8966 8946 9821 4 4 4 0.05% 0.04% 0.05%
962008 Kvam Kraftverk AS 25636 25547 29426 -56 -57 -55 -0.22% -0.22% -0.19%
972008 Kvinnherad Energi AS 35569 35474 39636 -139 -139 -137 -0.39% -0.39% -0.34%
982008 Kvænangen Kraftverk AS 2041 2019 2956 0 0 0 0.00% -0.01% 0.01%
1022008 Lier Everk AS 52516 52407 57146 27 26 29 0.05% 0.05% 0.05%
1032008 Luostejok Kraftlag AL 38359 38269 42193 21 21 23 0.06% 0.05% 0.05%
1042008 Luster Energiverk AS 20703 20666 22288 -50 -51 -50 -0.24% -0.24% -0.22%
1062008 Lærdal Energi 13738 13715 14713 -19 -19 -18 -0.14% -0.14% -0.13%
1082008 Løvenskiold Fossum Kraft 2417 2406 2868 2 2 2 0.07% 0.07% 0.07%
1112008 Malvik Everk AS 22504 22446 24981 14 14 15 0.06% 0.06% 0.06%
1162008 Meløy Energi AS 30702 30632 33726 -10 -11 -9 -0.03% -0.04% -0.03%
1192008 Gauldal Energi AS 28315 28258 30723 2 1 3 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
1212008 Modalen Kraftlag BA 3041 3030 3477 -12 -12 -12 -0.39% -0.40% -0.34%
1322008 Nord-Salten Kraftlag AL 62564 62446 67591 7 6 9 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
1332008 Nord Troms Kraftlag AS 79016 78849 86147 -10 -11 -7 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
1352008 Nord-Østerdal Kraftlag AL 59557 59431 64922 0 -1 2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1362008 Norddal Elverk AS 11003 10978 12042 -49 -49 -49 -0.44% -0.45% -0.40%
1382008 Nordkyn Kraftlag AL 27148 27096 29338 -18 -18 -17 -0.07% -0.07% -0.06%
1462008 Odda Energi AS 26972 26895 30277 -83 -83 -81 -0.31% -0.31% -0.27%
1472008 Evenes Kraftforsyning AS 9936 9918 10681 7 7 7 0.07% 0.07% 0.07%
1492008 Oppdal Everk AS 25574 25502 28634 3 2 4 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
1522008 Opplandskraft DA 9844 9826 10613 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1532008 Orkdal Energi AS 26734 26642 30673 -16 -17 -14 -0.06% -0.06% -0.05%
1562008 Porsa Kraftlag 649 646 778 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.01%
1572008 Rakkestad Energiverk AS 24304 24246 26751 -7 -8 -6 -0.03% -0.03% -0.02%
1612008 Rauland Kraftforsyningslag 23637 23609 24805 12 12 13 0.05% 0.05% 0.05%
1622008 Rauma Energi AS 33995 33926 36910 -37 -37 -35 -0.11% -0.11% -0.10%
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1632008 Kvikne-Rennebu Kraftlag AL 20019 19967 22205 -3 -4 -3 -0.02% -0.02% -0.01%
1642008 Repvåg Kraftlag AL 50861 50743 55868 0 -1 2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1662008 Rissa Kraftlag BA 17877 17835 19671 2 2 3 0.01% 0.01% 0.02%
1672008 Norsk Hydro Produksjon AS 7406 7401 7607 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1682008 Rollag Elektrisitetsverk LL 8181 8163 8938 -6 -6 -5 -0.07% -0.07% -0.06%
1712008 Rødøy-Lurøy Kraftverk AS 41306 41231 44533 0 -1 1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1732008 Røros Elektrisitetsverk AS 26563 26510 28828 -6 -7 -5 -0.02% -0.02% -0.02%
1762008 SKS Nett AS 74059 73942 79051 0 -1 2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1812008 Sandøy Energi AS 6473 6458 7101 0 0 1 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
1832008 Hjartdal Elverk AS 10962 10938 11971 -38 -38 -38 -0.35% -0.35% -0.32%
1842008 Selbu Energiverk AS 17730 17682 19779 -25 -25 -24 -0.14% -0.14% -0.12%
1872008 Sira-Kvina kraftselskap 7410 7395 8047 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1942008 Skjåk Energi 16724 16685 18387 10 10 11 0.06% 0.06% 0.06%
1962008 Skånevik Ølen Kraftlag 18784 18728 21206 -5 -5 -4 -0.02% -0.03% -0.02%
1972008 Sognekraft AS 70570 70418 77054 -41 -42 -39 -0.06% -0.06% -0.05%
2042008 Stranda Energiverk AS 25078 25045 26487 -136 -137 -136 -0.54% -0.54% -0.51%
2052008 Stryn Energi AS 26844 26784 29398 -32 -33 -31 -0.12% -0.12% -0.11%
2062008 Suldal Elverk 28768 28689 32163 -86 -87 -85 -0.30% -0.30% -0.26%
2102008 Sunnhordland Kraftlag AS 146345 145948 163287 25 22 32 0.02% 0.01% 0.02%
2132008 Sykkylven Energi AS 21017 20954 23689 -38 -38 -37 -0.18% -0.18% -0.15%
2142008 Sør-Aurdal Energi BA 17513 17455 19985 -48 -48 -47 -0.27% -0.27% -0.23%
2152008 TrønderEnergi Nett AS 226233 225635 251743 9 4 19 0.00% 0.00% 0.01%
2182008 Sørfold Kraftlag AL 10835 10821 11442 -15 -15 -14 -0.14% -0.14% -0.13%
2192008 Tafjord Kraftnett AS 194729 194182 218068 74 70 83 0.04% 0.04% 0.04%
2232008 Tinn Energi AS 40691 40570 45861 -3 -4 -1 -0.01% -0.01% 0.00%
2272008 Troms Kraft Nett AS 446634 445515 494368 38 28 56 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
2312008 Trøgstad Elverk AS 16247 16209 17856 8 8 9 0.05% 0.05% 0.05%
2332008 Tydal Kommunale Energiverk KF 8749 8736 9288 -22 -22 -22 -0.25% -0.25% -0.23%
2342008 Tysnes Kraftlag PL 21063 21013 23171 5 5 6 0.03% 0.02% 0.03%
2352008 Tyssefaldene Aktieselskabet 20744 20709 22213 1 1 2 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
2382008 Indre Hardanger Kraftlag AS 36771 36700 39779 -35 -36 -34 -0.10% -0.10% -0.09%
2422008 Uvdal Kraftforsyning AL 9330 9307 10319 5 5 6 0.06% 0.06% 0.06%
2482008 Vang Energiverk KF 15157 15118 16836 -13 -13 -12 -0.08% -0.09% -0.07%
2492008 Varanger Kraftnett AS 134250 133921 148300 12 9 17 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
2512008 Vest-Telemark Kraftlag AS 88264 88066 96689 -58 -60 -55 -0.07% -0.07% -0.06%
2572008 Dalane Energi IKS 72272 72038 82226 760 755 926 1.06% 1.06% 1.14%
2622008 Ørskog Energi AS 17893 17849 19771 9 9 10 0.05% 0.05% 0.05%
2642008 Øvre Eiker Nett AS 43173 43059 48059 -47 -47 -45 -0.11% -0.11% -0.09%
2672008 Årdal Energi KF 15934 15886 18000 10 10 11 0.06% 0.06% 0.06%
2692008 SFE Nett AS 208920 208379 232032 -347 -351 -338 -0.17% -0.17% -0.15%
2712008 Driva Kraftverk 4219 4219 4247 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2742008 Svorka Energi AS 41646 41548 45847 -26 -26 -24 -0.06% -0.06% -0.05%
2752008 Hallingdal Kraftnett AS 102413 102176 112537 -21 -23 -17 -0.02% -0.02% -0.02%
2822008 Åbjørakraft Kolsvik Kraftverk 830 825 1039 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.01%
2872008 Ustekveikja Kraftverk DA 518 515 618 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.01%
2882008 Kraftverkene i Orkla 15961 15918 17804 0 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2952008 Gudbrandsdal Energi AS 74549 74368 82245 8 7 11 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
3062008 Valdres Energiverk AS 59771 59559 68790 21 19 24 0.03% 0.03% 0.04%
3072008 Vinstra Kraftselskap DA 441 441 462 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
3112008 Nordmøre Energiverk AS 162385 161989 179300 36 32 42 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
3432008 Hemsedal Energi KF 21669 21557 26419 6 5 8 0.03% 0.03% 0.03%
3492008 Notodden Energi AS 44719 44604 49605 0 -1 2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
3542008 Lofotkraft AS 122975 122667 136119 -31 -33 -25 -0.02% -0.03% -0.02%
3732008 Nore Energi AS 12165 12134 13486 -24 -24 -23 -0.19% -0.20% -0.17%
4182008 Aurland Energiverk AS 14018 13981 15607 -47 -47 -46 -0.33% -0.33% -0.29%
4332008 Hålogaland Kraft AS 124339 123991 139168 -12 -15 -6 -0.01% -0.01% 0.00%
4472008 E-CO Vannkraft AS 29906 29827 33250 0 -1 1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
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4532008 Statoil ASA 1984 1969 2633 0 0 0 0.00% -0.01% 0.01%
4602008 Tussa Nett AS 167297 166824 187475 -312 -316 -304 -0.19% -0.19% -0.16%
4642008 Vesterålskraft Nett AS 73524 73333 81671 -26 -27 -23 -0.04% -0.04% -0.03%
4842008 TrønderEnegi Kraft 8298 8277 9186 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
4912008 Elkem Energi Bremanger AS 3546 3539 3846 -7 -7 -7 -0.21% -0.21% -0.19%
4952008 Elverum Energiverk Nett AS 49701 49536 56741 9 8 12 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
5032008 Haugaland Kraft AS 279455 278849 305311 59 54 69 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
5112008 Lyse Nett AS 643235 641533 715848 709 691 899 0.11% 0.11% 0.13%
5122008 Lyse Produksjon 5069 5050 5866 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.01%
5242008 Otra Kraft DA 56923 56881 58694 0 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
5362008 Trondheim Energiverk Nett AS 343631 342834 377629 86 80 100 0.03% 0.02% 0.03%
5422008 Vokks Nett AS 60182 60026 66827 11 9 13 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
5492008 Fortum Distribution AS 347971 347109 384778 125 118 140 0.04% 0.03% 0.04%
5662008 BKK Nett AS 988075 985352 1104260 0 -22 46 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
5742008 Eidsiva Energi Nett AS 849681 847422 946064 104 85 142 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
5782008 Flesberg Elektrisitetsverk AS 15573 15533 17259 1 1 2 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
5912008 Midt Nett Buskerud AS 62795 62603 70999 -21 -23 -18 -0.03% -0.04% -0.03%
5932008 Nesset Kraft AS 16098 16075 17108 -25 -26 -25 -0.16% -0.16% -0.15%
5992008 Sunndal Energi KF 27312 27247 30116 -86 -86 -85 -0.31% -0.32% -0.28%
6112008 Skagerak Nett AS 991698 989081 1103362 178 156 222 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
6132008 Nordvest Nett AS 42732 42627 47235 14 13 16 0.03% 0.03% 0.03%
6142008 Energi 1 Follo-Røyken as 107582 107318 118824 47 45 51 0.04% 0.04% 0.04%
6152008 EB Nett AS 317125 316217 355895 86 79 101 0.03% 0.02% 0.03%
6242008 Agder Energi Nett AS 878682 876150 986702 -172 -192 -129 -0.02% -0.02% -0.01%
6252008 Voss Energi AS 52924 52757 60015 3 2 6 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
6372008 Narvik Energinett AS 69142 68954 77121 16 14 19 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
6522008 Svorka Produksjon AS 685 682 785 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.01%
6592008 Midt-Telemark Energi AS 47733 47584 54083 -29 -30 -27 -0.06% -0.06% -0.05%
6692008 Stange Energi Nett AS 50696 50553 56834 31 30 33 0.06% 0.06% 0.06%
6752008 Hafslund Nett AS 2389440 2383784 2630771 760 714 855 0.03% 0.03% 0.03%
6842008 Ringeriks-Kraft  Produksjon AS 1030 1025 1207 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.01%
6852008 Statkraft Energi AS 469 464 690 0 0 0 0.00% -0.01% 0.01%
6862008 Yara Norge AS 17124 17109 17735 11 11 11 0.06% 0.06% 0.06%
6932008 Ringeriks-Kraft Nett AS 84978 84736 95299 16 14 20 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
6992008 Nord-Trøndelag Elektrisitetsverk489306 488165 537993 43 34 62 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
7262008 BE Nett AS 120928 120626 133828 658 652 825 0.55% 0.54% 0.62%
7432008 Mo Industripark 23170 23100 26131 0 -1 1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
7532008 Aktieselskapet Saudefaldene 16333 16282 18488 0 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
15086410 15047898 16729447 1495 1168 2628 0.01% 0.01% 0.02%Sum
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25 Profitability of the project for BE Nett AS over 30 
years 
year
Revenue Cap 
Efficiency RC 1
Yearly Project 
Revenue
1 110.16% 120,990 720
2 110.18% 120,995 724
3 110.21% 121,006 736
4 110.23% 121,011 740
5 110.25% 121,015 745
6 110.27% 121,020 750
7 110.30% 121,031 761
8 110.32% 121,036 765
9 110.34% 121,040 770
10 110.36% 121,045 774
11 110.39% 121,056 786
12 110.41% 121,060 790
13 110.43% 121,065 795
14 110.45% 121,070 799
15 110.48% 121,081 811
16 110.50% 121,086 815
17 110.52% 121,090 820
18 110.54% 121,095 824
19 110.57% 121,106 836
20 110.59% 121,110 840
21 110.61% 121,115 845
22 110.63% 121,119 849
23 110.66% 121,131 861
24 110.68% 121,135 865
25 110.70% 121,140 870
26 110.72% 121,144 874
27 110.75% 121,156 886
28 110.77% 121,160 890
29 110.79% 121,165 895
30 110.81% 121,169 899
after depreciation 111.17% 121,541 1,271
BE Nett (RC1 w/o project 120,270)
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26 Revenue Caps for Rho 0.5 and 0.6 
ρ = 0,6 ρ = 0,5 ∆
ID Efficiency RC1 RC2 RC3 RC1 RC2 RC3 RC1 RC2 RC3 ∆RC3 ∆RC3/CB
2822008 1,219 0 0 46.77 % 830 825 1,039 895 891 1,105 65 66 66 6.33 % 5.39 % 0.00 %
1082008 3,337 0 0 54.47 % 2,425 2,415 2,877 2,577 2,569 3,030 152 154 154 5.34 % 4.61 % 0.00 %
3072008 572 0 0 61.87 % 441 441 462 463 463 484 22 22 22 4.74 % 3.83 % 0.00 %
982008 2,523 0 0 68.15 % 2,041 2,019 2,956 2,121 2,103 3,040 80 84 84 2.84 % 3.33 % 0.00 %
1972008 85,763 2,091 0 69.43 % 70,418 70,266 76,898 72,975 72,849 79,481 2,557 2,583 2,583 3.36 % 3.01 % 2.44 %
522008 8,695 0 0 73.39 % 7,306 7,286 8,177 7,538 7,521 8,412 231 235 235 2.87 % 2.70 % 0.00 %
1812008 7,544 0 0 73.58 % 6,348 6,334 6,976 6,548 6,535 7,178 199 202 202 2.89 % 2.67 % 0.00 %
1522008 10,643 5,596 0 73.61 % 9,844 9,826 10,613 9,977 9,962 10,749 133 136 136 1.28 % 1.28 % 52.58 %
1112008 26,535 0 0 75.11 % 22,572 22,514 25,048 23,233 23,184 25,718 660 670 670 2.68 % 2.53 % 0.00 %
4182008 16,197 0 0 75.75 % 13,841 13,803 15,428 14,233 14,202 15,827 393 399 399 2.59 % 2.46 % 0.00 %
1472008 11,608 0 0 76.80 % 9,992 9,974 10,737 10,261 10,247 11,009 269 272 272 2.54 % 2.35 % 0.00 %
422008 32,864 0 0 77.75 % 28,476 28,391 32,106 29,208 29,137 32,852 731 745 745 2.32 % 2.27 % 0.00 %
2672008 18,395 0 0 78.18 % 15,986 15,938 18,051 16,388 16,347 18,460 401 409 409 2.27 % 2.23 % 0.00 %
3062008 68,893 0 0 78.23 % 59,895 59,684 68,909 61,394 61,218 70,444 1,500 1,535 1,535 2.23 % 2.23 % 0.00 %
1682008 9,361 0 0 78.66 % 8,163 8,145 8,919 8,362 8,348 9,122 200 203 203 2.27 % 2.17 % 0.00 %
1062008 15,725 0 0 79.05 % 13,748 13,726 14,723 14,078 14,059 15,056 329 333 333 2.26 % 2.12 % 0.00 %
1942008 19,008 0 0 80.44 % 16,778 16,739 18,440 17,149 17,117 18,818 372 378 378 2.05 % 1.99 % 0.00 %
3732008 13,561 0 0 81.69 % 12,071 12,040 13,392 12,320 12,294 13,646 248 253 253 1.89 % 1.87 % 0.00 %
6852008 525 0 0 82.23 % 469 464 690 478 474 700 9 10 10 1.48 % 1.94 % 0.00 %
842008 29,748 0 0 82.47 % 26,619 26,539 30,042 27,141 27,074 30,577 521 535 535 1.78 % 1.80 % 0.00 %
5912008 70,035 0 0 83.13 % 62,946 62,754 71,146 64,128 63,968 72,360 1,181 1,213 1,213 1.71 % 1.73 % 0.00 %
342008 19,475 0 0 83.94 % 17,599 17,558 19,340 17,912 17,878 19,659 313 320 320 1.65 % 1.64 % 0.00 %
5992008 29,766 0 0 84.34 % 26,971 26,906 29,774 27,437 27,383 30,250 466 477 477 1.60 % 1.60 % 0.00 %
2232008 44,839 0 0 84.77 % 40,742 40,621 45,909 41,425 41,324 46,612 683 703 703 1.53 % 1.57 % 0.00 %
462008 10,940 0 523 84.83 % 9,944 9,917 11,086 10,110 10,087 11,256 166 170 170 1.54 % 1.56 % 0.00 %
4472008 32,846 67 0 85.05 % 29,906 29,827 33,248 30,396 30,331 33,751 490 503 503 1.51 % 1.53 % 0.20 %
1832008 11,806 0 0 85.99 % 10,814 10,790 11,822 10,979 10,960 11,992 165 169 169 1.43 % 1.43 % 0.00 %
2142008 18,866 0 0 86.34 % 17,320 17,262 19,790 17,577 17,529 20,057 258 267 267 1.35 % 1.42 % 0.00 %
3542008 132,965 6,094 0 86.58 % 122,749 122,441 135,886 124,451 124,195 137,640 1,703 1,754 1,754 1.29 % 1.32 % 4.58 %
2482008 16,386 0 0 87.05 % 15,113 15,074 16,791 15,325 15,293 17,010 212 219 219 1.30 % 1.33 % 0.00 %
562008 128,275 2,053 0 87.38 % 118,719 118,359 134,123 120,312 120,012 135,776 1,593 1,653 1,653 1.23 % 1.29 % 1.60 %
412008 11,050 0 0 87.58 % 10,227 10,209 11,002 10,364 10,349 11,142 137 140 140 1.27 % 1.27 % 0.00 %
5032008 301,518 6,393 0 87.69 % 279,722 279,117 305,563 283,354 282,850 309,297 3,633 3,734 3,734 1.22 % 1.24 % 2.12 %
2192008 209,506 12,286 0 87.77 % 195,066 194,520 218,392 197,473 197,018 220,890 2,407 2,498 2,498 1.14 % 1.19 % 5.86 %
6112008 1,063,706 91,826 0 87.83 % 992,764 990,151 1,104,366 1,004,587 1,002,410 1,116,625 11,824 12,259 12,259 1.11 % 1.15 % 8.63 %
4912008 3,813 0 0 88.06 % 3,540 3,533 3,840 3,586 3,580 3,886 46 47 47 1.22 % 1.22 % 0.00 %
1842008 18,993 0 0 88.46 % 17,678 17,630 19,726 17,898 17,858 19,953 219 227 227 1.15 % 1.20 % 0.00 %
2132008 22,424 0 0 88.50 % 20,877 20,814 23,548 21,135 21,083 23,816 258 268 268 1.14 % 1.20 % 0.00 %
6242008 938,611 48,026 0 88.67 % 878,211 875,683 986,171 888,277 886,171 996,659 10,067 10,488 10,488 1.06 % 1.12 % 5.12 %
222008 10,609 0 0 88.76 % 9,893 9,876 10,634 10,013 9,998 10,756 119 122 122 1.15 % 1.15 % 0.00 %
4642008 78,404 2,463 0 89.00 % 73,391 73,200 81,534 74,226 74,067 82,401 835 867 867 1.06 % 1.11 % 3.14 %
872008 6,729 0 0 89.24 % 6,294 6,280 6,915 6,367 6,355 6,990 72 75 75 1.08 % 1.11 % 0.00 %
5662008 1,051,187 42,199 0 89.73 % 989,129 986,410 1,105,250 999,472 997,206 1,116,046 10,343 10,796 10,796 0.98 % 1.03 % 4.01 %
722008 27,117 0 0 89.84 % 25,464 25,404 28,046 25,740 25,689 28,332 276 286 286 1.02 % 1.05 % 0.00 %
1662008 18,993 0 0 90.34 % 17,892 17,850 19,685 18,075 18,040 19,876 183 190 190 0.97 % 1.00 % 0.00 %
2642008 45,629 0 0 90.39 % 42,998 42,884 47,881 43,437 43,341 48,339 438 458 458 0.96 % 1.00 % 0.00 %
4532008 2,094 0 0 91.22 % 1,984 1,969 2,632 2,002 1,990 2,653 18 21 21 0.79 % 1.00 % 0.00 %
2422008 9,867 0 0 91.34 % 9,355 9,331 10,343 9,440 9,421 10,433 85 89 89 0.86 % 0.91 % 0.00 %
4602008 174,548 3,419 0 91.53 % 165,863 165,391 186,030 167,310 166,917 187,556 1,447 1,526 1,526 0.82 % 0.87 % 1.96 %
552008 21,885 0 0 91.95 % 20,828 20,767 23,413 21,004 20,954 23,599 176 186 186 0.80 % 0.85 % 0.00 %
2572008 74,989 0 0 92.01 % 71,394 71,165 81,182 71,994 71,803 81,819 599 637 637 0.79 % 0.85 % 0.00 %
2152008 236,520 15,538 0 92.13 % 226,127 225,531 251,623 227,860 227,362 253,455 1,732 1,832 1,832 0.73 % 0.77 % 6.57 %
6932008 89,184 0 0 92.34 % 85,085 84,844 95,400 85,768 85,567 96,123 683 723 723 0.76 % 0.81 % 0.00 %
652008 63,575 1,504 0 92.97 % 60,957 60,825 66,609 61,394 61,283 67,068 436 458 458 0.69 % 0.72 % 2.37 %
1382008 28,122 2,523 0 93.20 % 27,078 27,027 29,267 27,252 27,209 29,450 174 183 183 0.62 % 0.65 % 8.97 %
72008 78,800 0 0 93.32 % 75,642 75,464 83,243 76,168 76,020 83,799 526 556 556 0.67 % 0.71 % 0.00 %
822008 28,960 0 0 93.49 % 27,829 27,761 30,748 28,018 27,961 30,948 189 200 200 0.65 % 0.69 % 0.00 %
1642008 52,458 2,210 0 94.50 % 50,801 50,684 55,806 51,077 50,980 56,102 276 296 296 0.53 % 0.56 % 4.21 %
452008 16,503 0 0 95.43 % 16,050 16,022 17,255 16,126 16,102 17,335 75 80 80 0.46 % 0.49 % 0.00 %
2692008 212,682 8,393 0 95.48 % 207,135 206,595 230,234 208,060 207,609 231,249 924 1,014 1,014 0.44 % 0.48 % 3.95 %
2742008 42,670 0 0 95.87 % 41,613 41,514 45,811 41,789 41,707 46,004 176 193 193 0.42 % 0.45 % 0.00 %
352008 19,702 0 0 95.88 % 19,215 19,167 21,283 19,297 19,256 21,372 81 89 89 0.42 % 0.45 % 0.00 %
932008 40,443 0 0 95.97 % 39,466 39,369 43,605 39,629 39,548 43,784 163 179 179 0.41 % 0.44 % 0.00 %
712008 348,587 25,389 0 96.33 % 341,479 340,637 377,452 342,664 341,962 378,777 1,185 1,325 1,325 0.35 % 0.38 % 7.28 %
1362008 11,045 0 0 96.36 % 10,803 10,779 11,842 10,843 10,823 11,886 40 44 44 0.37 % 0.40 % 0.00 %
6372008 70,656 2,062 0 96.52 % 69,225 69,038 77,200 69,463 69,308 77,470 239 270 270 0.35 % 0.38 % 2.92 %
1962008 19,177 0 0 96.54 % 18,779 18,722 21,199 18,845 18,798 21,275 66 76 76 0.36 % 0.40 % 0.00 %
6592008 48,635 0 853 96.77 % 47,692 47,543 54,039 47,849 47,725 54,220 157 182 182 0.34 % 0.37 % 0.00 %
2952008 76,023 1,023 0 96.86 % 74,609 74,429 82,301 74,845 74,694 82,567 236 266 266 0.32 % 0.35 % 1.35 %
1032008 39,331 0 0 97.08 % 38,642 38,552 42,474 38,757 38,682 42,604 115 130 130 0.31 % 0.33 % 0.00 %
6252008 54,029 0 0 97.42 % 53,193 53,027 60,280 53,332 53,194 60,447 139 167 167 0.28 % 0.31 % 0.00 %
1572008 24,639 0 0 97.79 % 24,313 24,255 26,759 24,367 24,319 26,823 54 64 64 0.24 % 0.26 % 0.00 %
4952008 50,341 0 0 98.31 % 49,831 49,666 56,867 49,916 49,779 56,979 85 113 113 0.20 % 0.22 % 0.00 %
6692008 51,321 0 0 98.78 % 50,946 50,802 57,080 51,008 50,889 57,166 63 87 87 0.15 % 0.17 % 0.00 %
2752008 102,928 1,449 0 99.05 % 102,350 102,113 112,469 102,447 102,249 112,605 96 136 136 0.12 % 0.13 % 1.41 %
622008 82,363 0 0 99.36 % 82,047 81,839 90,929 82,099 81,926 91,017 53 87 87 0.10 % 0.11 % 0.00 %
3492008 44,719 0 0 100.00 % 44,719 44,604 49,603 44,719 44,624 49,622 0 19 19 0.04 % 0.04 % 0.00 %
5122008 5,069 0 0 100.00 % 5,069 5,050 5,866 5,069 5,053 5,869 0 3 3 0.05 % 0.06 % 0.00 %
6522008 685 0 145 100.00 % 685 682 785 685 683 786 0 0 0 0.05 % 0.06 % 0.00 %
7432008 23,170 0 0 100.00 % 23,170 23,100 26,130 23,170 23,112 26,141 0 12 12 0.04 % 0.05 % 0.00 %
5492008 348,243 0 0 100.38 % 349,037 348,176 385,824 348,905 348,187 385,835 -132 11 11 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 %
962008 25,351 0 939 100.41 % 25,414 25,325 29,202 25,403 25,329 29,206 -10 4 4 0.02 % 0.02 % 0.00 %
5422008 59,844 0 0 101.22 % 60,282 60,127 66,924 60,209 60,080 66,877 -73 -47 -47 -0.07 % -0.08 % 0.00 %
2062008 28,196 0 431 101.73 % 28,489 28,410 31,882 28,440 28,374 31,847 -49 -36 -36 -0.11 % -0.13 % 0.00 %
2182008 10,665 0 0 101.76 % 10,778 10,763 11,385 10,759 10,747 11,368 -19 -16 -16 -0.14 % -0.15 % 0.00 %
5782008 15,405 0 189 101.91 % 15,582 15,542 17,267 15,552 15,520 17,245 -29 -23 -23 -0.13 % -0.15 % 0.00 %
2492008 132,740 3,194 0 102.07 % 134,348 134,019 148,391 134,080 133,806 148,178 -268 -213 -213 -0.14 % -0.16 % 2.41 %
2102008 144,464 10,778 0 102.39 % 146,375 145,979 163,308 146,057 145,727 163,055 -319 -252 -252 -0.15 % -0.17 % 7.46 %
1532008 26,300 0 0 102.44 % 26,685 26,593 30,622 26,621 26,544 30,573 -64 -49 -49 -0.16 % -0.19 % 0.00 %
532008 35,128 0 0 102.57 % 35,669 35,538 41,307 35,579 35,469 41,239 -90 -68 -68 -0.17 % -0.19 % 0.00 %
3432008 21,352 0 0 103.20 % 21,762 21,651 26,510 21,694 21,601 26,460 -68 -50 -50 -0.19 % -0.23 % 0.00 %
Extra 
Cost/CB
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ρ = 0,6 ρ = 0,5 ∆
ID Efficiency RC1 RC2 RC3 RC1 RC2 RC3 RC1 RC2 RC3 ∆RC3 ∆RC3/CB
1492008 25,048 0 0 103.61 % 25,591 25,519 28,649 25,500 25,440 28,571 -90 -78 -78 -0.27 % -0.31 % 0.00 %
2512008 86,218 4,827 0 103.75 % 88,051 87,854 96,472 87,746 87,581 96,199 -305 -273 -273 -0.28 % -0.32 % 5.60 %
1672008 7,240 0 0 103.82 % 7,406 7,401 7,607 7,378 7,374 7,580 -28 -27 -27 -0.35 % -0.37 % 0.00 %
1462008 25,970 0 0 104.48 % 26,668 26,591 29,971 26,552 26,487 29,868 -116 -103 -103 -0.35 % -0.40 % 0.00 %
3112008 158,414 8,497 0 104.57 % 162,528 162,132 179,433 161,842 161,512 178,814 -686 -620 -620 -0.35 % -0.39 % 5.36 %
2352008 20,268 2,860 0 104.69 % 20,758 20,723 22,226 20,676 20,647 22,150 -82 -76 -76 -0.34 % -0.37 % 14.11 %
6152008 308,625 29,135 0 105.36 % 317,620 316,713 356,368 316,121 315,365 355,020 -1,499 -1,348 -1,348 -0.38 % -0.44 % 9.44 %
1732008 25,674 0 0 105.88 % 26,580 26,527 28,843 26,429 26,385 28,701 -151 -142 -142 -0.49 % -0.55 % 0.00 %
6752008 2,311,090 107,342 0 106.19 % 2,392,956 2,387,308 2,634,154 2,379,312 2,374,605 2,621,451 -13,644 -12,703 -12,703 -0.48 % -0.55 % 4.64 %
1192008 27,315 0 0 106.20 % 28,331 28,275 30,738 28,162 28,115 30,578 -169 -160 -160 -0.52 % -0.59 % 0.00 %
4332008 119,702 2,424 0 106.45 % 124,232 123,885 139,053 123,477 123,188 138,356 -755 -697 -697 -0.50 % -0.58 % 2.03 %
1022008 50,504 0 0 107.06 % 52,643 52,535 57,270 52,287 52,196 56,932 -357 -339 -339 -0.59 % -0.67 % 0.00 %
882008 34,103 0 0 107.29 % 35,595 35,473 40,800 35,346 35,245 40,571 -249 -228 -228 -0.56 % -0.67 % 0.00 %
2052008 25,496 0 0 108.22 % 26,754 26,694 29,306 26,544 26,494 29,106 -210 -200 -200 -0.68 % -0.78 % 0.00 %
432008 32,434 0 0 108.45 % 34,078 33,985 38,075 33,804 33,726 37,816 -274 -258 -258 -0.68 % -0.80 % 0.00 %
1622008 32,140 0 0 108.87 % 33,850 33,782 36,764 33,565 33,508 36,490 -285 -274 -274 -0.74 % -0.85 % 0.00 %
7262008 113,649 0 0 108.97 % 119,766 119,467 132,497 118,746 118,498 131,527 -1,019 -970 -970 -0.73 % -0.85 % 0.00 %
862008 120,512 3,678 0 109.06 % 126,866 126,511 141,993 125,807 125,511 140,993 -1,059 -1,000 -1,000 -0.70 % -0.83 % 3.05 %
1632008 18,931 0 0 109.53 % 20,013 19,962 22,198 19,833 19,790 22,027 -180 -172 -172 -0.77 % -0.91 % 0.00 %
972008 33,014 0 0 110.03 % 35,001 34,905 39,066 34,669 34,590 38,750 -331 -315 -315 -0.81 % -0.95 % 0.00 %
232008 1,905 0 0 110.15 % 2,021 2,021 2,042 2,002 2,001 2,022 -19 -19 -19 -0.94 % -1.01 % 0.00 %
1612008 22,315 0 0 110.55 % 23,728 23,700 24,895 23,492 23,469 24,664 -235 -231 -231 -0.93 % -1.03 % 0.00 %
5742008 801,796 55,332 0 110.87 % 850,440 848,184 946,770 842,333 840,453 939,039 -8,107 -7,731 -7,731 -0.82 % -0.96 % 6.90 %
5112008 603,244 32,862 0 111.58 % 642,805 641,109 715,216 636,211 634,799 708,905 -6,593 -6,311 -6,311 -0.88 % -1.05 % 5.45 %
6992008 458,283 10,551 166 111.61 % 489,457 488,318 538,117 484,261 483,312 533,111 -5,196 -5,006 -5,006 -0.93 % -1.09 % 2.30 %
1162008 28,500 0 0 112.28 % 30,600 30,529 33,622 30,250 30,191 33,284 -350 -338 -338 -1.01 % -1.19 % 0.00 %
2272008 416,671 25,771 0 112.84 % 446,765 445,648 494,473 441,749 440,819 489,644 -5,016 -4,829 -4,829 -0.98 % -1.16 % 6.18 %
2622008 16,586 0 314 113.56 % 17,935 17,892 19,813 17,711 17,674 19,595 -225 -218 -218 -1.10 % -1.31 % 0.00 %
1332008 72,942 1,878 0 114.01 % 78,916 78,749 86,043 77,920 77,781 85,075 -996 -968 -968 -1.12 % -1.33 % 2.57 %
1352008 54,866 0 0 114.32 % 59,580 59,454 64,942 58,794 58,690 64,177 -786 -765 -765 -1.18 % -1.39 % 0.00 %
142008 36,984 0 0 114.80 % 40,268 40,141 45,687 39,721 39,615 45,160 -547 -526 -526 -1.15 % -1.42 % 0.00 %
1762008 69,572 19,286 0 115.13 % 74,059 73,943 79,049 73,312 73,214 78,320 -748 -728 -728 -0.92 % -1.05 % 27.72 %
5932008 14,637 0 0 115.47 % 15,996 15,972 17,004 15,769 15,750 16,782 -226 -222 -222 -1.31 % -1.52 % 0.00 %
2312008 14,831 0 1,153 116.42 % 16,292 16,255 17,901 16,049 16,017 17,664 -244 -237 -237 -1.33 % -1.60 % 0.00 %
1042008 18,641 0 0 116.66 % 20,504 20,467 22,088 20,193 20,163 21,783 -311 -304 -304 -1.38 % -1.63 % 0.00 %
6142008 97,971 0 0 116.73 % 107,805 107,542 119,042 106,166 105,947 117,446 -1,639 -1,595 -1,595 -1.34 % -1.63 % 0.00 %
182008 17,745 0 0 117.16 % 19,572 19,521 21,710 19,267 19,225 21,414 -304 -296 -296 -1.36 % -1.67 % 0.00 %
6132008 38,693 0 0 117.45 % 42,744 42,638 47,245 42,069 41,981 46,587 -675 -658 -658 -1.39 % -1.70 % 0.00 %
1322008 57,018 4,342 0 117.50 % 62,549 62,432 67,574 61,628 61,530 66,672 -922 -902 -902 -1.34 % -1.58 % 7.61 %
1212008 2,701 0 1,567 117.88 % 2,991 2,981 3,428 2,942 2,934 3,381 -48 -47 -47 -1.36 % -1.72 % 0.00 %
322008 107,628 0 366 118.84 % 119,794 119,454 134,309 117,767 117,483 132,338 -2,028 -1,971 -1,971 -1.47 % -1.83 % 0.00 %
162008 19,580 0 0 119.02 % 21,815 21,760 24,139 21,442 21,397 23,776 -372 -363 -363 -1.51 % -1.86 % 0.00 %
102008 3,832 0 0 119.11 % 4,271 4,260 4,734 4,198 4,189 4,662 -73 -71 -71 -1.51 % -1.86 % 0.00 %
2712008 4,049 2,558 0 119.11 % 4,219 4,219 4,247 4,191 4,190 4,219 -28 -28 -28 -0.67 % -0.70 % 63.19 %
2882008 14,726 3,954 19 119.11 % 15,961 15,918 17,803 15,755 15,719 17,605 -206 -199 -199 -1.12 % -1.35 % 26.85 %
4842008 7,688 2,377 0 119.11 % 8,298 8,277 9,185 8,196 8,179 9,087 -102 -98 -98 -1.07 % -1.28 % 30.91 %
5242008 55,480 42,894 0 119.11 % 56,923 56,881 58,693 56,682 56,648 58,459 -241 -234 -234 -0.40 % -0.42 % 77.31 %
1712008 36,680 0 0 119.25 % 40,917 40,841 44,141 40,211 40,148 43,448 -706 -694 -694 -1.57 % -1.89 % 0.00 %
2332008 7,724 0 0 120.22 % 8,661 8,648 9,201 8,505 8,494 9,046 -156 -154 -154 -1.67 % -1.99 % 0.00 %
372008 67,372 2,335 2,339 120.24 % 75,271 75,102 82,454 73,954 73,814 81,165 -1,316 -1,288 -1,288 -1.56 % -1.91 % 3.47 %
2382008 32,687 0 0 120.51 % 36,710 36,639 39,717 36,039 35,981 39,058 -670 -659 -659 -1.66 % -2.02 % 0.00 %
912008 26,762 0 0 122.40 % 30,359 30,264 34,428 29,760 29,680 33,845 -599 -584 -584 -1.70 % -2.18 % 0.00 %
92008 24,254 1,274 0 124.37 % 27,615 27,550 30,417 27,055 27,000 29,868 -560 -549 -549 -1.81 % -2.26 % 5.25 %
2042008 21,236 0 0 125.69 % 24,509 24,476 25,918 23,964 23,936 25,377 -546 -540 -540 -2.08 % -2.54 % 0.00 %
1562008 561 0 0 126.11 % 649 646 778 634 632 764 -15 -14 -14 -1.82 % -2.52 % 0.00 %
632008 34,126 0 919 126.45 % 39,542 39,465 42,852 38,639 38,575 41,962 -903 -890 -890 -2.08 % -2.61 % 0.00 %
5362008 298,177 12,944 0 126.81 % 344,064 343,268 378,043 336,416 335,753 370,528 -7,648 -7,515 -7,515 -1.99 % -2.52 % 4.34 %
7532008 14,456 3,301 0 128.03 % 16,333 16,282 18,487 16,020 15,978 18,183 -313 -304 -304 -1.65 % -2.10 % 22.83 %
2342008 18,019 0 0 128.41 % 21,091 21,041 23,198 20,579 20,538 22,694 -512 -504 -504 -2.17 % -2.80 % 0.00 %
952008 7,644 0 0 129.26 % 8,986 8,966 9,840 8,762 8,746 9,620 -224 -220 -220 -2.24 % -2.88 % 0.00 %
2872008 434 0 349 132.05 % 518 515 618 504 502 605 -14 -14 -14 -2.19 % -3.11 % 0.00 %
6862008 14,320 0 0 134.50 % 17,285 17,270 17,896 16,791 16,779 17,404 -494 -492 -492 -2.75 % -3.43 % 0.00 %
1872008 5,786 0 0 146.77 % 7,410 7,395 8,046 7,139 7,126 7,778 -271 -268 -268 -3.33 % -4.63 % 0.00 %
6842008 643 200 0 245.07 % 1,030 1,025 1,207 965 962 1,143 -64 -64 -64 -5.28 % -9.90 % 31.02 %
Sum 15,046,730 677,200 10,271 15,085,168 15,046,730 16,726,819 15,078,762 15,046,730 16,726,819 -6,406.311 0.000 0.000
Cost Base 
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27 Coefficient changes when adding 5 MW increments to 
BE Nett AS 
Constant Interfaces Islands DG
Base 4.45900700 -0.00473540 -1.26697400 -0.72677830
5MW 4.45879700 -0.00473780 -1.26592300 -0.71787210
10MW 4.45857800 -0.00474030 -1.26484600 -0.70858810
15MW 4.45835000 -0.00474280 -1.26374800 -0.69894560
20MW 4.45811400 -0.00474550 -1.26262900 -0.68896500
25MW 4.45787000 -0.00474810 -1.26149200 -0.67866730
30MW 4.45761800 -0.00475090 -1.26034000 -0.66807450
35MW 4.45736000 -0.00475370 -1.25917400 -0.65720900
40MW 4.45709500 -0.00475650 -1.25799800 -0.64609380
45MW 4.45682500 -0.00475940 -1.25681200 -0.63475200
50MW 4.45654900 -0.00476230 -1.25562000 -0.62320710
55MW 4.45626900 -0.00476520 -1.25442400 -0.61148240
60MW 4.45598500 -0.00476810 -1.25322600 -0.59960120
65MW 4.45569700 -0.00477110 -1.25202700 -0.58758670
70MW 4.45540700 -0.00477410 -1.25083100 -0.57546160
75MW 4.45511400 -0.00477700 -1.24963800 -0.56324810
80MW 4.45481900 -0.00478000 -1.24845100 -0.55096810
85MW 4.45452300 -0.00478300 -1.24727200 -0.53864260
90MW 4.45422600 -0.00478590 -1.24610100 -0.52629210
95MW 4.45392900 -0.00478890 -1.24494100 -0.51393630
100MW 4.45363200 -0.00479180 -1.24379300 -0.50159390  
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28 EFC for industry when BE Nett adds DG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Company 0 MW 35 MW 65 MW 100 MW
Fauske Lysverk AS 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 %
Hurum Energiverk AS 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 %
Krødsherad Everk KF 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 %
Løvenskiold Fossum Kraft 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 %
Malvik Everk AS 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 %
Ørskog Energi AS 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 %
Uvdal Kraftforsyning AL -0.01 % -0.01 % -0.01 % -0.01 %
Lier Everk AS -0.01 % -0.01 % -0.01 % -0.01 %
Hafslund Nett AS -0.16 % -0.15 % -0.14 % -0.13 %
Energi 1 Follo-Røyken as -0.17 % -0.16 % -0.16 % -0.15 %
Høland og Setskog Elverk -0.20 % -0.18 % -0.16 % -0.14 %
Trondheim Energiverk Nett AS -0.31 % -0.28 % -0.25 % -0.21 %
Fjelberg Kraftlag -0.37 % -0.37 % -0.37 % -0.37 %
Andøy Energi AS -0.40 % -0.36 % -0.32 % -0.27 %
Valdres Energiverk AS -0.41 % -0.38 % -0.34 % -0.30 %
Narvik Energinett AS -0.41 % -0.37 % -0.33 % -0.28 %
Tysnes Kraftlag PL -0.44 % -0.40 % -0.36 % -0.31 %
Skjåk Energi -0.46 % -0.46 % -0.46 % -0.46 %
Skagerak Nett AS -0.47 % -0.42 % -0.38 % -0.32 %
Årdal Energi KF -0.49 % -0.49 % -0.49 % -0.49 %
Eidsiva Energi Nett AS -0.52 % -0.47 % -0.42 % -0.35 %
Tafjord Kraftnett AS -0.53 % -0.53 % -0.52 % -0.52 %
Varanger Kraftnett AS -0.63 % -0.56 % -0.50 % -0.43 %
Gudbrandsdal Energi AS -0.68 % -0.61 % -0.54 % -0.46 %
Haugaland Kraft AS -0.71 % -0.66 % -0.62 % -0.56 %
Rissa Kraftlag BA -0.71 % -0.64 % -0.57 % -0.49 %
Ringeriks-Kraft Nett AS -0.77 % -0.71 % -0.65 % -0.58 %
Oppdal Everk AS -0.77 % -0.70 % -0.62 % -0.53 %
Nordmøre Energiverk AS -0.78 % -0.75 % -0.71 % -0.66 %
Gauldal Energi AS -0.80 % -0.72 % -0.65 % -0.55 %
EB Nett AS -0.84 % -0.83 % -0.82 % -0.82 %
Flesberg Elektrisitetsverk AS -0.95 % -0.87 % -0.79 % -0.70 %
Trøgstad Elverk AS -0.96 % -0.96 % -0.96 % -0.96 %
Nord-Trøndelag Elektrisitetsverk -0.96 % -0.89 % -0.82 % -0.73 %
Troms Kraft Nett AS -0.99 % -0.92 % -0.86 % -0.78 %
Hammerfest Energi Nett AS -1.05 % -0.97 % -0.90 % -0.81 %
Nord-Østerdal Kraftlag AL -1.21 % -1.12 % -1.03 % -0.92 %
Bindal Kraftlag AL -1.25 % -1.24 % -1.23 % -1.22 %
Agder Energi Nett AS -1.33 % -1.21 % -1.09 % -0.93 %
Dragefossen Kraftanlegg AS -1.35 % -1.22 % -1.09 % -0.93 %
Eidefoss AS -1.37 % -1.24 % -1.10 % -0.94 %
Hallingdal Kraftnett AS -1.40 % -1.27 % -1.14 % -0.98 %
Nord-Salten Kraftlag AL -1.48 % -1.42 % -1.36 % -1.29 %
Vokks Nett AS -1.50 % -1.45 % -1.39 % -1.33 %
Fosenkraft AS -1.53 % -1.48 % -1.42 % -1.35 %
Kvikne-Rennebu Kraftlag AL -1.53 % -1.42 % -1.30 % -1.15 %
Istad Nett AS -1.58 % -1.53 % -1.48 % -1.41 %
TrønderEnergi Nett AS -1.62 % -1.54 % -1.47 % -1.37 %
Hålogaland Kraft AS -1.67 % -1.56 % -1.45 % -1.32 %
Orkdal Energi AS -1.82 % -1.64 % -1.47 % -1.25 %
Fusa Kraftlag -1.83 % -1.80 % -1.77 % -1.73 %
Rollag Elektrisitetsverk LL -1.85 % -1.67 % -1.49 % -1.27 %
Skånevik Ølen Kraftlag -1.92 % -1.80 % -1.67 % -1.52 %
Nordvest Nett AS -1.92 % -1.89 % -1.87 % -1.83 %
Sognekraft AS -1.93 % -1.74 % -1.56 % -1.33 %
Vesterålskraft Nett AS -1.93 % -1.78 % -1.63 % -1.45 %
Repvåg Kraftlag AL -1.99 % -1.90 % -1.81 % -1.69 %
Finnås Kraftlag -2.09 % -2.08 % -2.07 % -2.06 %
Nord Troms Kraftlag AS -2.16 % -2.05 % -1.94 % -1.80 %
Vang Energiverk KF -2.16 % -1.95 % -1.74 % -1.49 %
Lofotkraft AS -2.27 % -2.14 % -2.00 % -1.84 %
HelgelandsKraft AS -2.29 % -2.18 % -2.07 % -1.94 %
Vest-Telemark Kraftlag AS -2.33 % -2.11 % -1.89 % -1.61 %
Nordkyn Kraftlag AL -2.34 % -2.11 % -1.89 % -1.61 %
Hemne kraftlag BA -2.39 % -2.20 % -2.01 % -1.79 %
EFC when BE Nett adds DG:
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Company 0 MW 35 MW 65 MW 100 MW
Øvre Eiker Nett AS -2.60 % -2.35 % -2.10 % -1.79 %
Sunnhordland Kraftlag AS -2.88 % -2.88 % -2.87 % -2.86 %
Rauma Energi AS -2.90 % -2.63 % -2.35 % -2.01 %
Elkem Bjølvefossen AS -2.95 % -2.96 % -2.96 % -2.97 %
Sørfold Kraftlag AL -3.24 % -2.93 % -2.62 % -2.24 %
Tinn Energi AS -3.24 % -3.15 % -3.05 % -2.93 %
BE Nett AS -3.32 % -3.17 % -3.02 % -2.83 %
Elverum Energiverk Nett AS -3.51 % -3.46 % -3.40 % -3.33 %
Fortum Distribution AS -3.55 % -3.52 % -3.48 % -3.44 %
Røros Elektrisitetsverk AS -3.79 % -3.67 % -3.55 % -3.40 %
Nore Energi AS -3.86 % -3.49 % -3.13 % -2.67 %
BKK Nett AS -3.88 % -3.79 % -3.71 % -3.60 %
Fredrikstad Energi Nett AS -3.89 % -3.89 % -3.89 % -3.89 %
Nesset Kraft AS -3.89 % -3.52 % -3.15 % -2.69 %
Rakkestad Energiverk AS -3.93 % -3.80 % -3.66 % -3.50 %
Jondal Energi KF -4.26 % -4.01 % -3.76 % -3.45 %
Meløy Energi AS -4.38 % -4.23 % -4.08 % -3.89 %
Evenes Kraftforsyning AS -4.48 % -4.49 % -4.49 % -4.50 %
Stange Energi Nett AS -4.48 % -4.49 % -4.50 % -4.51 %
Sykkylven Energi AS -4.50 % -4.14 % -3.79 % -3.35 %
Etne Elektrisitetslag -4.53 % -4.54 % -4.54 % -4.54 %
Kvam Kraftverk AS -4.84 % -4.40 % -3.95 % -3.41 %
Svorka Energi AS -4.88 % -4.70 % -4.52 % -4.29 %
Lyse Nett AS -5.17 % -5.09 % -5.02 % -4.93 %
Sør-Aurdal Energi BA -5.24 % -4.75 % -4.25 % -3.63 %
Austevoll Kraftlag BA -5.25 % -5.21 % -5.17 % -5.12 %
Rauland Kraftforsyningslag -5.44 % -5.44 % -5.45 % -5.45 %
Askøy Energi AS -5.47 % -5.48 % -5.49 % -5.50 %
Stryn Energi AS -5.67 % -5.38 % -5.10 % -4.74 %
Tydal Kommunale Energiverk KF -5.70 % -5.16 % -4.62 % -3.95 %
Tussa Nett AS -5.73 % -5.27 % -4.80 % -4.22 %
Sunndal Energi KF -5.75 % -5.21 % -4.66 % -3.99 %
Luster Energiverk AS -5.85 % -5.33 % -4.81 % -4.17 %
Midt-Telemark Energi AS -6.14 % -5.96 % -5.77 % -5.54 %
Drangedal Everk KF -6.17 % -5.96 % -5.74 % -5.48 %
Tyssefaldene Aktieselskabet -6.26 % -6.27 % -6.28 % -6.29 %
Forsand Elverk KF -6.60 % -6.38 % -6.16 % -5.89 %
Hadeland Energinett AS -6.66 % -6.54 % -6.41 % -6.26 %
Aurland Energiverk AS -6.73 % -6.19 % -5.64 % -4.97 %
Hemsedal Energi KF -6.86 % -6.82 % -6.78 % -6.73 %
Sunnfjord Energi AS -6.99 % -6.43 % -5.87 % -5.18 %
Alta Kraftlag AL -7.22 % -7.08 % -6.95 % -6.78 %
Ballangen Energi AS -7.27 % -7.00 % -6.73 % -6.40 %
Hjartdal Elverk AS -7.94 % -7.33 % -6.72 % -5.97 %
Rødøy-Lurøy Kraftverk AS -7.98 % -7.88 % -7.79 % -7.68 %
Midt Nett Buskerud AS -8.04 % -7.91 % -7.78 % -7.61 %
Indre Hardanger Kraftlag AS -8.08 % -7.82 % -7.55 % -7.23 %
Klepp Energi AS -8.15 % -8.17 % -8.18 % -8.20 %
Selbu Energiverk AS -8.38 % -8.08 % -7.79 % -7.42 %
SFE Nett AS -8.39 % -7.91 % -7.43 % -6.83 %
Jæren Everk Komm. f. i  Hå -8.54 % -8.53 % -8.51 % -8.49 %
Modalen Kraftlag BA -8.65 % -7.85 % -7.04 % -6.04 %
Norddal Elverk AS -9.26 % -8.46 % -7.65 % -6.65 %
Odda Energi AS -9.41 % -8.81 % -8.21 % -7.46 %
Kvinnherad Energi AS -10.06 % -9.30 % -8.54 % -7.58 %
Dalane Energi IKS -10.22 % -9.97 % -9.72 % -9.41 %
Luostejok Kraftlag AL -11.60 % -11.59 % -11.58 % -11.57 %
Voss Energi AS -11.66 % -11.58 % -11.49 % -11.38 %
Sandøy Energi AS -12.09 % -12.00 % -11.92 % -11.82 %
Stranda Energiverk AS -13.20 % -12.08 % -10.95 % -9.53 %
Suldal Elverk -13.62 % -13.04 % -12.47 % -11.75 %
Trollfjord Kraft AS -13.75 % -13.67 % -13.58 % -13.46 %
Fitjar Kraftlag BA -13.83 % -13.63 % -13.43 % -13.20 %
Lærdal Energi -15.49 % -15.21 % -14.93 % -14.58 %
Kragerø Energi AS -17.31 % -16.99 % -16.67 % -16.27 %
Elkem Energi Bremanger AS -18.90 % -18.51 % -18.11 % -17.62 %
Yara Norge AS -19.71 % -19.74 % -19.78 % -19.81 %
EFC when BE Nett adds DG:
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29 EFC when Industry adds DG (DG Companies) 
ID Company Original 5MW 10MW 15MW 20MW 25MW 30MW 35MW 40MW 45MW 50MW
6752008 Hafslund Nett AS -0.16 % -0.14 % -0.13 % -0.12 % -0.11 % -0.11 % -0.11 % -0.11 % -0.10 % -0.10 % -0.10 %
5362008 Trondheim Energiverk Nett AS -0.31 % -0.25 % -0.19 % -0.16 % -0.15 % -0.14 % -0.13 % -0.13 % -0.12 % -0.12 % -0.12 %
92008 Andøy Energi AS -0.40 % -0.32 % -0.25 % -0.21 % -0.19 % -0.18 % -0.17 % -0.16 % -0.16 % -0.15 % -0.15 %
3062008 Valdres Energiverk AS -0.41 % -0.35 % -0.28 % -0.25 % -0.23 % -0.23 % -0.22 % -0.21 % -0.21 % -0.21 % -0.20 %
6372008 Narvik Energinett AS -0.41 % -0.34 % -0.26 % -0.22 % -0.20 % -0.18 % -0.18 % -0.17 % -0.16 % -0.16 % -0.16 %
6112008 Skagerak Nett AS -0.47 % -0.38 % -0.29 % -0.25 % -0.22 % -0.21 % -0.20 % -0.19 % -0.19 % -0.18 % -0.18 %
5742008 Eidsiva Energi Nett AS -0.52 % -0.42 % -0.32 % -0.27 % -0.25 % -0.23 % -0.22 % -0.21 % -0.21 % -0.20 % -0.20 %
2492008 Varanger Kraftnett AS -0.63 % -0.51 % -0.39 % -0.33 % -0.30 % -0.28 % -0.27 % -0.26 % -0.25 % -0.24 % -0.24 %
2952008 Gudbrandsdal Energi AS -0.68 % -0.55 % -0.42 % -0.36 % -0.32 % -0.30 % -0.29 % -0.28 % -0.27 % -0.26 % -0.26 %
5032008 Haugaland Kraft AS -0.71 % -0.63 % -0.54 % -0.50 % -0.47 % -0.46 % -0.45 % -0.44 % -0.43 % -0.43 % -0.42 %
1662008 Rissa Kraftlag BA -0.71 % -0.58 % -0.44 % -0.38 % -0.34 % -0.32 % -0.30 % -0.29 % -0.28 % -0.27 % -0.27 %
6932008 Ringeriks-Kraft Nett AS -0.77 % -0.66 % -0.54 % -0.49 % -0.46 % -0.44 % -0.43 % -0.42 % -0.42 % -0.41 % -0.41 %
1492008 Oppdal Everk AS -0.77 % -0.63 % -0.48 % -0.41 % -0.37 % -0.35 % -0.33 % -0.32 % -0.31 % -0.30 % -0.29 %
3112008 Nordmøre Energiverk AS -0.78 % -0.72 % -0.65 % -0.61 % -0.59 % -0.58 % -0.57 % -0.57 % -0.56 % -0.56 % -0.55 %
1192008 Gauldal Energi AS -0.80 % -0.66 % -0.50 % -0.43 % -0.38 % -0.36 % -0.34 % -0.33 % -0.32 % -0.31 % -0.30 %
6152008 EB Nett AS -0.84 % -0.82 % -0.80 % -0.79 % -0.79 % -0.80 % -0.80 % -0.80 % -0.80 % -0.80 % -0.81 %
5782008 Flesberg Elektrisitetsverk AS -0.95 % -0.80 % -0.64 % -0.56 % -0.52 % -0.50 % -0.48 % -0.47 % -0.46 % -0.45 % -0.44 %
6992008 Nord-Trøndelag Elektrisitetsverk -0.96 % -0.83 % -0.69 % -0.62 % -0.58 % -0.56 % -0.55 % -0.53 % -0.52 % -0.51 % -0.51 %
2272008 Troms Kraft Nett AS -0.99 % -0.87 % -0.75 % -0.69 % -0.65 % -0.63 % -0.62 % -0.61 % -0.60 % -0.59 % -0.58 %
652008 Hammerfest Energi Nett AS -1.05 % -0.91 % -0.76 % -0.69 % -0.65 % -0.63 % -0.61 % -0.60 % -0.58 % -0.57 % -0.57 %
1352008 Nord-Østerdal Kraftlag AL -1.21 % -1.04 % -0.86 % -0.77 % -0.73 % -0.70 % -0.68 % -0.67 % -0.66 % -0.65 % -0.64 %
6242008 Agder Energi Nett AS -1.33 % -1.10 % -0.86 % -0.74 % -0.67 % -0.63 % -0.60 % -0.58 % -0.57 % -0.55 % -0.54 %
342008 Dragefossen Kraftanlegg AS -1.35 % -1.11 % -0.85 % -0.72 % -0.65 % -0.61 % -0.58 % -0.56 % -0.54 % -0.53 % -0.51 %
372008 Eidefoss AS -1.37 % -1.12 % -0.86 % -0.73 % -0.66 % -0.61 % -0.59 % -0.56 % -0.55 % -0.53 % -0.52 %
2752008 Hallingdal Kraftnett AS -1.40 % -1.16 % -0.90 % -0.77 % -0.70 % -0.66 % -0.64 % -0.61 % -0.60 % -0.58 % -0.57 %
1322008 Nord-Salten Kraftlag AL -1.48 % -1.38 % -1.27 % -1.21 % -1.18 % -1.16 % -1.14 % -1.13 % -1.12 % -1.11 % -1.10 %
5422008 Vokks Nett AS -1.50 % -1.39 % -1.28 % -1.23 % -1.20 % -1.19 % -1.18 % -1.18 % -1.18 % -1.17 % -1.17 %
532008 Fosenkraft AS -1.53 % -1.44 % -1.34 % -1.29 % -1.25 % -1.23 % -1.22 % -1.21 % -1.20 % -1.19 % -1.18 %
1632008 Kvikne-Rennebu Kraftlag AL -1.53 % -1.31 % -1.07 % -0.96 % -0.89 % -0.86 % -0.83 % -0.82 % -0.80 % -0.79 % -0.78 %
862008 Istad Nett AS -1.58 % -1.50 % -1.41 % -1.36 % -1.33 % -1.32 % -1.30 % -1.29 % -1.28 % -1.27 % -1.26 %
2152008 TrønderEnergi Nett AS -1.62 % -1.49 % -1.34 % -1.27 % -1.22 % -1.20 % -1.18 % -1.16 % -1.15 % -1.14 % -1.13 %
4332008 Hålogaland Kraft AS -1.67 % -1.48 % -1.26 % -1.16 % -1.10 % -1.06 % -1.04 % -1.02 % -1.00 % -0.99 % -0.97 %
1532008 Orkdal Energi AS -1.82 % -1.49 % -1.14 % -0.97 % -0.87 % -0.82 % -0.78 % -0.75 % -0.73 % -0.71 % -0.69 %
1682008 Rollag Elektrisitetsverk LL -1.85 % -1.51 % -1.16 % -0.98 % -0.89 % -0.83 % -0.79 % -0.76 % -0.74 % -0.72 % -0.70 %
1962008 Skånevik Ølen Kraftlag -1.92 % -1.68 % -1.43 % -1.31 % -1.24 % -1.21 % -1.18 % -1.16 % -1.15 % -1.14 % -1.13 %
6132008 Nordvest Nett AS -1.92 % -1.88 % -1.84 % -1.81 % -1.80 % -1.79 % -1.78 % -1.78 % -1.77 % -1.77 % -1.76 %
1972008 Sognekraft AS -1.93 % -1.58 % -1.21 % -1.03 % -0.93 % -0.87 % -0.83 % -0.80 % -0.77 % -0.75 % -0.74 %
4642008 Vesterålskraft Nett AS -1.93 % -1.66 % -1.36 % -1.22 % -1.14 % -1.09 % -1.06 % -1.03 % -1.01 % -0.99 % -0.97 %
1642008 Repvåg Kraftlag AL -1.99 % -1.84 % -1.66 % -1.57 % -1.52 % -1.49 % -1.46 % -1.44 % -1.43 % -1.41 % -1.40 %
1332008 Nord Troms Kraftlag AS -2.16 % -1.97 % -1.76 % -1.65 % -1.59 % -1.55 % -1.53 % -1.51 % -1.49 % -1.47 % -1.46 %
2482008 Vang Energiverk KF -2.16 % -1.77 % -1.35 % -1.15 % -1.04 % -0.97 % -0.93 % -0.89 % -0.86 % -0.84 % -0.82 %
3542008 Lofotkraft AS -2.27 % -2.04 % -1.78 % -1.65 % -1.58 % -1.53 % -1.50 % -1.48 % -1.46 % -1.44 % -1.42 %
712008 HelgelandsKraft AS -2.29 % -2.10 % -1.90 % -1.79 % -1.73 % -1.69 % -1.67 % -1.65 % -1.63 % -1.61 % -1.59 %
2512008 Vest-Telemark Kraftlag AS -2.33 % -1.91 % -1.47 % -1.25 % -1.13 % -1.06 % -1.02 % -0.98 % -0.95 % -0.92 % -0.90 %
1382008 Nordkyn Kraftlag AL -2.34 % -1.91 % -1.47 % -1.25 % -1.12 % -1.05 % -1.01 % -0.97 % -0.94 % -0.91 % -0.89 %
722008 Hemne kraftlag BA -2.39 % -2.04 % -1.68 % -1.50 % -1.40 % -1.34 % -1.30 % -1.26 % -1.24 % -1.21 % -1.19 %
2642008 Øvre Eiker Nett AS -2.60 % -2.12 % -1.63 % -1.39 % -1.25 % -1.17 % -1.12 % -1.08 % -1.04 % -1.01 % -0.99 %
1622008 Rauma Energi AS -2.90 % -2.38 % -1.83 % -1.56 % -1.41 % -1.33 % -1.27 % -1.22 % -1.18 % -1.15 % -1.12 %
2182008 Sørfold Kraftlag AL -3.24 % -2.65 % -2.04 % -1.73 % -1.56 % -1.47 % -1.40 % -1.34 % -1.30 % -1.27 % -1.24 %
2232008 Tinn Energi AS -3.24 % -3.03 % -2.83 % -2.74 % -2.70 % -2.68 % -2.66 % -2.66 % -2.65 % -2.65 % -2.65 %
7262008 BE Nett AS -3.32 % -3.06 % -2.77 % -2.63 % -2.54 % -2.49 % -2.45 % -2.42 % -2.39 % -2.37 % -2.35 %
4952008 Elverum Energiverk Nett AS -3.51 % -3.37 % -3.26 % -3.21 % -3.19 % -3.18 % -3.19 % -3.19 % -3.19 % -3.20 % -3.21 %
5492008 Fortum Distribution AS -3.55 % -3.45 % -3.37 % -3.33 % -3.33 % -3.33 % -3.34 % -3.34 % -3.35 % -3.36 % -3.37 %
1732008 Røros Elektrisitetsverk AS -3.79 % -3.53 % -3.28 % -3.17 % -3.11 % -3.08 % -3.07 % -3.06 % -3.05 % -3.05 % -3.05 %
3732008 Nore Energi AS -3.86 % -3.17 % -2.43 % -2.07 % -1.86 % -1.75 % -1.67 % -1.61 % -1.55 % -1.51 % -1.48 %
5662008 BKK Nett AS -3.88 % -3.69 % -3.51 % -3.43 % -3.39 % -3.38 % -3.37 % -3.37 % -3.37 % -3.37 % -3.37 %
5932008 Nesset Kraft AS -3.89 % -3.19 % -2.45 % -2.09 % -1.88 % -1.76 % -1.68 % -1.62 % -1.57 % -1.52 % -1.49 %
1572008 Rakkestad Energiverk AS -3.93 % -3.65 % -3.38 % -3.25 % -3.19 % -3.16 % -3.14 % -3.13 % -3.12 % -3.12 % -3.12 %
872008 Jondal Energi KF -4.26 % -3.77 % -3.26 % -3.01 % -2.88 % -2.81 % -2.76 % -2.73 % -2.70 % -2.68 % -2.66 %
1162008 Meløy Energi AS -4.38 % -4.11 % -3.82 % -3.68 % -3.60 % -3.55 % -3.52 % -3.49 % -3.47 % -3.45 % -3.43 %
2132008 Sykkylven Energi AS -4.50 % -3.82 % -3.11 % -2.76 % -2.56 % -2.46 % -2.38 % -2.32 % -2.28 % -2.24 % -2.21 %
962008 Kvam Kraftverk AS -4.84 % -4.00 % -3.12 % -2.68 % -2.43 % -2.30 % -2.20 % -2.12 % -2.06 % -2.01 % -1.97 %
2742008 Svorka Energi AS -4.88 % -4.50 % -4.13 % -3.95 % -3.86 % -3.82 % -3.79 % -3.77 % -3.76 % -3.75 % -3.75 %
5112008 Lyse Nett AS -5.17 % -5.01 % -4.85 % -4.78 % -4.75 % -4.74 % -4.74 % -4.74 % -4.74 % -4.74 % -4.74 %
2142008 Sør-Aurdal Energi BA -5.24 % -4.30 % -3.31 % -2.82 % -2.54 % -2.39 % -2.28 % -2.19 % -2.12 % -2.06 % -2.02 %
2052008 Stryn Energi AS -5.67 % -5.10 % -4.52 % -4.24 % -4.10 % -4.02 % -3.97 % -3.93 % -3.90 % -3.88 % -3.87 %
2332008 Tydal Kommunale Energiverk KF -5.70 % -4.68 % -3.61 % -3.07 % -2.77 % -2.60 % -2.48 % -2.38 % -2.31 % -2.25 % -2.20 %
4602008 Tussa Nett AS -5.73 % -4.86 % -3.94 % -3.48 % -3.22 % -3.08 % -2.97 % -2.89 % -2.82 % -2.76 % -2.71 %
5992008 Sunndal Energi KF -5.75 % -4.72 % -3.64 % -3.10 % -2.79 % -2.62 % -2.50 % -2.40 % -2.33 % -2.27 % -2.22 %
1042008 Luster Energiverk AS -5.85 % -4.87 % -3.83 % -3.31 % -3.02 % -2.86 % -2.75 % -2.66 % -2.59 % -2.53 % -2.48 %
EFC When Industry adds DG:
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ID Selskap Original 5MW 10MW 15MW 20MW 25MW 30MW 35MW 40MW 45MW 50MW
6592008 Midt-Telemark Energi AS -6.14 % -5.75 % -5.37 % -5.19 % -5.10 % -5.06 % -5.03 % -5.02 % -5.01 % -5.00 % -5.00 %
352008 Drangedal Everk KF -6.17 % -5.75 % -5.32 % -5.11 % -5.01 % -4.95 % -4.91 % -4.88 % -4.86 % -4.85 % -4.83 %
522008 Forsand Elverk KF -6.60 % -6.13 % -5.69 % -5.47 % -5.37 % -5.32 % -5.29 % -5.27 % -5.26 % -5.25 % -5.25 %
622008 Hadeland Energinett AS -6.66 % -6.36 % -6.10 % -5.98 % -5.94 % -5.92 % -5.92 % -5.92 % -5.93 % -5.94 % -5.94 %
4182008 Aurland Energiverk AS -6.73 % -5.69 % -4.60 % -4.06 % -3.76 % -3.60 % -3.48 % -3.39 % -3.32 % -3.26 % -3.21 %
3432008 Hemsedal Energi KF -6.86 % -6.71 % -6.61 % -6.57 % -6.58 % -6.59 % -6.61 % -6.63 % -6.65 % -6.68 % -6.69 %
562008 Sunnfjord Energi AS -6.99 % -5.95 % -4.84 % -4.29 % -3.97 % -3.80 % -3.67 % -3.57 % -3.49 % -3.42 % -3.36 %
72008 Alta Kraftlag AL -7.22 % -6.89 % -6.61 % -6.48 % -6.43 % -6.41 % -6.41 % -6.41 % -6.42 % -6.42 % -6.43 %
182008 Ballangen Energi AS -7.27 % -6.74 % -6.20 % -5.94 % -5.81 % -5.73 % -5.69 % -5.65 % -5.62 % -5.60 % -5.58 %
1832008 Hjartdal Elverk AS -7.94 % -6.77 % -5.55 % -4.95 % -4.61 % -4.42 % -4.29 % -4.19 % -4.11 % -4.05 % -4.00 %
1712008 Rødøy-Lurøy Kraftverk AS -7.98 % -7.93 % -7.80 % -7.71 % -7.66 % -7.62 % -7.58 % -7.55 % -7.51 % -7.46 % -7.42 %
5912008 Midt Nett Buskerud AS -8.04 % -7.72 % -7.43 % -7.31 % -7.26 % -7.25 % -7.25 % -7.26 % -7.26 % -7.28 % -7.29 %
2382008 Indre Hardanger Kraftlag AS -8.08 % -7.52 % -6.98 % -6.73 % -6.60 % -6.54 % -6.51 % -6.49 % -6.47 % -6.47 % -6.46 %
1842008 Selbu Energiverk AS -8.38 % -7.76 % -7.16 % -6.87 % -6.73 % -6.65 % -6.61 % -6.59 % -6.57 % -6.55 % -6.54 %
2692008 SFE Nett AS -8.39 % -7.50 % -6.56 % -6.08 % -5.82 % -5.67 % -5.56 % -5.48 % -5.41 % -5.35 % -5.30 %
882008 Jæren Everk Komm. f. i Hå -8.54 % -8.42 % -8.36 % -8.34 % -8.37 % -8.40 % -8.43 % -8.46 % -8.50 % -8.53 % -8.55 %
1212008 Modalen Kraftlag BA -8.65 % -7.13 % -5.51 % -4.70 % -4.24 % -3.98 % -3.80 % -3.66 % -3.54 % -3.45 % -3.37 %
1362008 Norddal Elverk AS -9.26 % -7.73 % -6.12 % -5.31 % -4.86 % -4.61 % -4.43 % -4.29 % -4.18 % -4.09 % -4.01 %
1462008 Odda Energi AS -9.41 % -8.24 % -7.03 % -6.43 % -6.10 % -5.92 % -5.80 % -5.71 % -5.63 % -5.58 % -5.53 %
972008 Kvinnherad Energi AS -10.06 % -8.61 % -7.07 % -6.31 % -5.88 % -5.64 % -5.47 % -5.34 % -5.24 % -5.15 % -5.08 %
2572008 Dalane Energi IKS -10.22 % -9.66 % -9.14 % -8.90 % -8.79 % -8.74 % -8.72 % -8.71 % -8.71 % -8.71 % -8.71 %
1032008 Luostejok Kraftlag AL -11.60 % -11.46 % -11.41 % -11.40 % -11.44 % -11.48 % -11.53 % -11.58 % -11.62 % -11.66 % -11.70 %
6252008 Voss Energi AS -11.66 % -11.38 % -11.19 % -11.10 % -11.10 % -11.12 % -11.15 % -11.18 % -11.21 % -11.24 % -11.27 %
2042008 Stranda Energiverk AS -13.20 % -11.06 % -8.78 % -7.63 % -6.97 % -6.61 % -6.35 % -6.15 % -5.99 % -5.86 % -5.75 %
2062008 Suldal Elverk -13.62 % -12.46 % -11.30 % -10.73 % -10.43 % -10.27 % -10.18 % -10.11 % -10.05 % -10.01 % -9.98 %
632008 Trollfjord Kraft AS -13.75 % -13.45 % -13.24 % -13.15 % -13.16 % -13.18 % -13.22 % -13.26 % -13.29 % -13.33 % -13.37 %
452008 Fitjar Kraftlag BA -13.83 % -13.65 % -13.35 % -13.17 % -13.06 % -12.97 % -12.91 % -12.84 % -12.77 % -12.70 % -12.62 %
1062008 Lærdal Energi -15.49 % -14.83 % -14.24 % -13.97 % -13.87 % -13.82 % -13.82 % -13.82 % -13.83 % -13.85 % -13.86 %
932008 Kragerø Energi AS -17.31 % -16.68 % -16.04 % -15.73 % -15.59 % -15.51 % -15.47 % -15.44 % -15.42 % -15.40 % -15.38 %
4912008 Elkem Energi Bremanger AS -18.90 % -18.01 % -17.18 % -16.79 % -16.63 % -16.56 % -16.54 % -16.53 % -16.53 % -16.54 % -16.55 %
EFC When Industry adds DG:
 
30 EFC when Industry adds DG (Non-DG Companies) 
ID Selskap Original 5MW 10MW 15MW 20MW 25MW 30MW 35MW 40MW 45MW 50MW
422008 Fauske Lysverk AS 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 %
822008 Hurum Energiverk AS 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 %
952008 Krødsherad Everk KF 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 %
1082008 Løvenskiold Fossum Kraft 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 %
1112008 Malvik Everk AS 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 %
2622008 Ørskog Energi AS 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 %
2422008 Uvdal Kraftforsyning AL -0.01 % -0.01 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 %
1022008 Lier Everk AS -0.01 % -0.01 % -0.01 % -0.01 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 %
6142008 Energi 1 Follo-Røyken as -0.17 % -0.16 % -0.15 % -0.14 % -0.14 % -0.14 % -0.14 % -0.14 % -0.13 % -0.13 % -0.13 %
842008 Høland og Setskog Elverk -0.20 % -0.17 % -0.13 % -0.11 % -0.10 % -0.09 % -0.09 % -0.08 % -0.08 % -0.08 % -0.08 %
462008 Fjelberg Kraftlag -0.37 % -0.36 % -0.36 % -0.37 % -0.37 % -0.37 % -0.37 % -0.37 % -0.37 % -0.38 % -0.38 %
2342008 Tysnes Kraftlag PL -0.44 % -0.36 % -0.28 % -0.24 % -0.22 % -0.21 % -0.20 % -0.19 % -0.19 % -0.18 % -0.18 %
1942008 Skjåk Energi -0.46 % -0.46 % -0.46 % -0.46 % -0.46 % -0.46 % -0.47 % -0.47 % -0.47 % -0.47 % -0.47 %
2672008 Årdal Energi KF -0.49 % -0.48 % -0.48 % -0.48 % -0.49 % -0.49 % -0.49 % -0.49 % -0.50 % -0.50 % -0.50 %
2192008 Tafjord Kraftnett AS -0.53 % -0.52 % -0.52 % -0.51 % -0.51 % -0.51 % -0.51 % -0.51 % -0.51 % -0.52 % -0.52 %
2312008 Trøgstad Elverk AS -0.96 % -0.95 % -0.95 % -0.95 % -0.96 % -0.96 % -0.97 % -0.97 % -0.98 % -0.98 % -0.98 %
222008 Bindal Kraftlag AL -1.25 % -1.25 % -1.24 % -1.23 % -1.23 % -1.22 % -1.22 % -1.21 % -1.21 % -1.20 % -1.19 %
552008 Fusa Kraftlag -1.83 % -1.76 % -1.69 % -1.66 % -1.65 % -1.65 % -1.65 % -1.65 % -1.65 % -1.65 % -1.66 %
432008 Finnås Kraftlag -2.09 % -2.09 % -2.08 % -2.07 % -2.07 % -2.07 % -2.06 % -2.06 % -2.06 % -2.05 % -2.05 %
2102008 Sunnhordland Kraftlag AS -2.88 % -2.88 % -2.87 % -2.86 % -2.86 % -2.86 % -2.86 % -2.86 % -2.86 % -2.86 % -2.85 %
232008 Elkem Bjølvefossen AS -2.95 % -2.93 % -2.93 % -2.94 % -2.95 % -2.97 % -2.98 % -3.00 % -3.01 % -3.02 % -3.03 %
322008 Fredrikstad Energi Nett AS -3.89 % -3.86 % -3.86 % -3.86 % -3.88 % -3.89 % -3.91 % -3.92 % -3.93 % -3.94 % -3.95 %
1472008 Evenes Kraftforsyning AS -4.48 % -4.44 % -4.45 % -4.45 % -4.48 % -4.50 % -4.52 % -4.55 % -4.56 % -4.58 % -4.60 %
6692008 Stange Energi Nett AS -4.48 % -4.45 % -4.45 % -4.46 % -4.48 % -4.50 % -4.53 % -4.55 % -4.57 % -4.59 % -4.60 %
412008 Etne Elektrisitetslag -4.53 % -4.49 % -4.48 % -4.49 % -4.51 % -4.53 % -4.55 % -4.57 % -4.59 % -4.61 % -4.63 %
162008 Austevoll Kraftlag BA -5.25 % -5.26 % -5.22 % -5.18 % -5.16 % -5.14 % -5.12 % -5.09 % -5.07 % -5.04 % -5.01 %
1612008 Rauland Kraftforsyningslag -5.44 % -5.40 % -5.40 % -5.40 % -5.43 % -5.45 % -5.47 % -5.49 % -5.51 % -5.53 % -5.54 %
142008 Askøy Energi AS -5.47 % -5.43 % -5.43 % -5.44 % -5.47 % -5.50 % -5.53 % -5.55 % -5.58 % -5.60 % -5.62 %
2352008 Tyssefaldene Aktieselskabet -6.26 % -6.21 % -6.21 % -6.22 % -6.26 % -6.29 % -6.32 % -6.35 % -6.38 % -6.40 % -6.43 %
912008 Klepp Energi AS -8.15 % -8.09 % -8.09 % -8.11 % -8.16 % -8.19 % -8.23 % -8.27 % -8.31 % -8.34 % -8.37 %
1812008 Sandøy Energi AS -12.09 % -12.12 % -12.03 % -11.96 % -11.91 % -11.86 % -11.82 % -11.77 % -11.72 % -11.66 % -11.60 %
6862008 Yara Norge AS -19.71 % -19.57 % -19.58 % -19.61 % -19.71 % -19.79 % -19.88 % -19.97 % -20.05 % -20.12 % -20.19 %
EFC When Industry adds DG:
 
APPENDIX  LIII 
 
31 DEA Efficiency as Industry adds DG (DG Companies) 
ID Selskap Orig 5MW 10MW 15MW 20MW 25MW 30MW 35MW 40MW 45MW 50MW
1062008 Lærdal Energi 50.61 % 50.27 % 49.95 % 49.64 % 49.30 % 48.91 % 48.38 % 47.86 % 47.35 % 46.86 % 46.38 %
522008 Forsand Elverk KF 54.08 % 52.77 % 51.54 % 50.36 % 49.25 % 48.20 % 47.20 % 46.24 % 45.33 % 44.47 % 43.64 %
1972008 Sognekraft AS 55.12 % 55.27 % 55.42 % 55.56 % 55.66 % 55.66 % 55.64 % 55.62 % 55.56 % 55.50 % 55.44 %
4912008 Elkem Energi Bremanger AS 56.70 % 53.18 % 50.08 % 47.34 % 44.90 % 42.70 % 40.69 % 38.85 % 37.17 % 35.63 % 34.22 %
4182008 Aurland Energiverk AS 58.29 % 57.54 % 56.83 % 56.13 % 55.46 % 54.80 % 54.17 % 53.55 % 52.96 % 52.38 % 51.81 %
5912008 Midt Nett Buskerud AS 61.74 % 61.70 % 61.63 % 61.52 % 61.39 % 61.25 % 61.12 % 60.99 % 60.85 % 60.72 % 60.59 %
1682008 Rollag Elektrisitetsverk LL 64.20 % 62.82 % 61.50 % 60.24 % 59.03 % 57.87 % 56.75 % 55.68 % 54.65 % 53.66 % 52.71 %
3062008 Valdres Energiverk AS 64.43 % 64.27 % 64.10 % 63.94 % 63.78 % 63.62 % 63.46 % 63.30 % 63.14 % 62.98 % 62.83 %
3732008 Nore Energi AS 66.23 % 65.36 % 64.51 % 63.68 % 62.88 % 62.11 % 61.36 % 60.63 % 59.93 % 59.24 % 58.57 %
932008 Kragerø Energi AS 67.19 % 66.82 % 66.46 % 66.10 % 65.75 % 65.40 % 65.06 % 64.71 % 64.38 % 64.04 % 63.71 %
1832008 Hjartdal Elverk AS 67.64 % 67.12 % 66.61 % 66.12 % 65.66 % 64.50 % 63.36 % 62.26 % 61.20 % 60.17 % 59.18 %
1842008 Selbu Energiverk AS 67.71 % 67.23 % 66.77 % 66.31 % 65.87 % 65.42 % 64.80 % 64.20 % 63.61 % 63.03 % 62.47 %
5992008 Sunndal Energi KF 67.94 % 68.09 % 68.19 % 68.27 % 68.34 % 68.40 % 68.47 % 68.45 % 68.10 % 67.69 % 67.30 %
3542008 Lofotkraft AS 68.29 % 68.98 % 69.66 % 70.24 % 70.83 % 71.41 % 71.99 % 72.57 % 73.14 % 73.72 % 74.28 %
2232008 Tinn Energi AS 68.31 % 68.35 % 68.39 % 68.43 % 68.47 % 68.50 % 68.54 % 68.57 % 68.23 % 67.90 % 67.58 %
4642008 Vesterålskraft Nett AS 68.40 % 69.11 % 69.82 % 70.52 % 71.22 % 71.91 % 72.59 % 73.14 % 73.62 % 74.06 % 74.48 %
1382008 Nordkyn Kraftlag AL 68.88 % 69.32 % 69.09 % 68.87 % 68.65 % 68.44 % 68.24 % 68.04 % 67.84 % 67.65 % 67.46 %
2572008 Dalane Energi IKS 69.01 % 69.24 % 69.48 % 69.71 % 69.94 % 70.16 % 70.11 % 70.03 % 69.95 % 69.87 % 69.78 %
1642008 Repvåg Kraftlag AL 69.28 % 70.24 % 70.47 % 70.70 % 70.92 % 71.14 % 71.36 % 71.57 % 71.78 % 71.99 % 72.20 %
342008 Dragefossen Kraftanlegg AS 69.72 % 69.36 % 69.01 % 68.67 % 68.34 % 67.97 % 67.40 % 66.83 % 66.28 % 65.72 % 65.17 %
2142008 Sør-Aurdal Energi BA 70.19 % 69.41 % 68.64 % 67.89 % 67.16 % 66.45 % 65.75 % 65.07 % 64.40 % 63.75 % 63.11 %
1032008 Luostejok Kraftlag AL 71.15 % 71.02 % 70.89 % 70.76 % 70.64 % 70.51 % 70.39 % 70.27 % 70.15 % 70.03 % 69.92 %
5032008 Haugaland Kraft AS 71.83 % 71.95 % 72.07 % 72.19 % 72.31 % 72.43 % 72.54 % 72.62 % 72.70 % 72.77 % 72.85 %
2692008 SFE Nett AS 71.84 % 72.15 % 72.47 % 72.78 % 73.08 % 73.33 % 73.58 % 73.83 % 74.08 % 74.33 % 74.58 %
6252008 Voss Energi AS 71.88 % 71.90 % 71.92 % 71.94 % 71.92 % 71.86 % 71.73 % 71.59 % 71.40 % 71.17 % 70.94 %
452008 Fitjar Kraftlag BA 72.01 % 71.47 % 70.95 % 70.44 % 69.88 % 69.24 % 68.60 % 67.98 % 67.37 % 66.77 % 66.16 %
2132008 Sykkylven Energi AS 72.28 % 71.79 % 71.28 % 70.78 % 70.13 % 69.49 % 68.85 % 68.22 % 67.56 % 66.91 % 66.28 %
2482008 Vang Energiverk KF 72.43 % 71.94 % 71.27 % 70.62 % 69.96 % 69.29 % 68.62 % 67.98 % 67.35 % 66.74 % 66.15 %
872008 Jondal Energi KF 72.64 % 70.25 % 68.02 % 65.94 % 64.00 % 62.17 % 60.46 % 58.85 % 57.32 % 55.89 % 54.53 %
72008 Alta Kraftlag AL 72.83 % 73.13 % 73.43 % 73.72 % 74.02 % 74.31 % 74.60 % 74.89 % 75.14 % 75.28 % 75.28 %
6112008 Skagerak Nett AS 73.02 % 73.02 % 73.02 % 73.02 % 73.02 % 73.01 % 73.00 % 72.99 % 72.98 % 72.98 % 72.97 %
722008 Hemne kraftlag BA 75.00 % 74.94 % 74.88 % 74.82 % 74.76 % 74.70 % 74.65 % 74.59 % 74.37 % 74.09 % 73.83 %
6242008 Agder Energi Nett AS 75.30 % 75.34 % 75.38 % 75.42 % 75.46 % 75.50 % 75.54 % 75.55 % 75.57 % 75.59 % 75.61 %
2642008 Øvre Eiker Nett AS 75.56 % 75.14 % 74.72 % 74.30 % 73.89 % 73.49 % 73.09 % 72.69 % 72.30 % 71.91 % 71.52 %
5662008 BKK Nett AS 75.91 % 76.04 % 76.18 % 76.31 % 76.44 % 76.57 % 76.70 % 76.82 % 76.94 % 77.06 % 77.18 %
1662008 Rissa Kraftlag BA 76.44 % 75.54 % 74.66 % 73.81 % 72.98 % 72.17 % 71.38 % 70.61 % 69.86 % 69.12 % 68.41 %
562008 Sunnfjord Energi AS 76.59 % 76.89 % 77.15 % 77.37 % 77.56 % 77.74 % 77.75 % 77.73 % 77.69 % 77.64 % 77.59 %
2062008 Suldal Elverk 77.23 % 77.29 % 77.34 % 77.39 % 77.44 % 77.49 % 77.54 % 77.59 % 77.63 % 77.58 % 77.41 %
352008 Drangedal Everk KF 77.35 % 76.63 % 75.92 % 75.23 % 74.55 % 73.88 % 73.19 % 72.52 % 71.86 % 71.22 % 70.59 %
4602008 Tussa Nett AS 77.46 % 77.75 % 78.03 % 78.32 % 78.51 % 78.49 % 78.46 % 78.44 % 78.42 % 78.39 % 78.37 %
1362008 Norddal Elverk AS 77.81 % 78.27 % 77.34 % 76.46 % 75.61 % 74.80 % 74.02 % 73.27 % 72.55 % 71.77 % 70.71 %
6592008 Midt-Telemark Energi AS 77.83 % 77.50 % 77.18 % 76.86 % 76.50 % 76.15 % 75.79 % 75.45 % 75.10 % 74.76 % 74.42 %
6372008 Narvik Energinett AS 77.91 % 77.97 % 78.03 % 78.09 % 78.14 % 78.20 % 78.14 % 77.85 % 77.56 % 77.28 % 77.00 %
2152008 TrønderEnergi Nett AS 77.99 % 78.42 % 78.79 % 79.13 % 79.46 % 79.80 % 79.93 % 80.04 % 80.15 % 80.27 % 80.38 %
2742008 Svorka Energi AS 78.18 % 78.08 % 77.98 % 77.89 % 77.79 % 77.70 % 77.60 % 77.51 % 77.37 % 77.19 % 77.02 %
6932008 Ringeriks-Kraft Nett AS 78.30 % 78.10 % 77.90 % 77.70 % 77.50 % 77.30 % 77.11 % 76.91 % 76.72 % 76.52 % 76.33 %
622008 Hadeland Energinett AS 79.40 % 79.17 % 78.94 % 78.71 % 78.48 % 78.26 % 78.03 % 77.81 % 77.58 % 77.36 % 77.14 %
712008 HelgelandsKraft AS 79.92 % 80.73 % 81.53 % 82.33 % 83.11 % 83.84 % 84.57 % 85.25 % 85.81 % 86.33 % 86.57 %
2952008 Gudbrandsdal Energi AS 80.49 % 80.41 % 80.33 % 80.25 % 80.16 % 80.08 % 80.00 % 79.78 % 79.53 % 79.28 % 79.04 %
1572008 Rakkestad Energiverk AS 80.81 % 80.05 % 79.30 % 78.57 % 77.86 % 77.16 % 76.47 % 75.79 % 75.13 % 74.47 % 73.83 %
4952008 Elverum Energiverk Nett AS 81.30 % 81.19 % 81.08 % 80.97 % 80.87 % 80.75 % 80.47 % 80.17 % 79.87 % 79.58 % 79.29 %
1962008 Skånevik Ølen Kraftlag 81.67 % 80.85 % 79.98 % 79.14 % 78.32 % 77.43 % 76.56 % 75.71 % 74.89 % 74.08 % 73.29 %
2492008 Varanger Kraftnett AS 82.29 % 82.97 % 83.59 % 84.21 % 84.70 % 85.12 % 85.55 % 85.97 % 86.39 % 86.80 % 86.93 %
3432008 Hemsedal Energi KF 82.52 % 81.73 % 80.96 % 80.21 % 79.47 % 78.75 % 78.04 % 77.35 % 76.67 % 76.01 % 75.36 %
5492008 Fortum Distribution AS 83.22 % 83.30 % 83.39 % 83.48 % 83.56 % 83.59 % 83.59 % 83.58 % 83.58 % 83.58 % 83.57 %
962008 Kvam Kraftverk AS 84.36 % 83.77 % 83.19 % 82.61 % 82.05 % 81.50 % 80.96 % 80.43 % 79.82 % 79.23 % 78.64 %
1462008 Odda Energi AS 84.51 % 84.59 % 84.58 % 84.52 % 84.04 % 83.58 % 83.12 % 82.68 % 82.24 % 81.81 % 81.38 %
882008 Jæren Everk Komm. f. i Hå 84.67 % 84.14 % 83.60 % 83.06 % 82.53 % 82.00 % 81.49 % 80.98 % 80.48 % 79.98 % 79.49 %
652008 Hammerfest Energi Nett AS 84.88 % 85.66 % 86.42 % 87.18 % 87.93 % 88.67 % 89.41 % 90.13 % 90.75 % 91.26 % 91.39 %
3112008 Nordmøre Energiverk AS 86.12 % 86.87 % 87.61 % 88.35 % 89.08 % 89.81 % 90.54 % 91.19 % 91.72 % 92.25 % 92.77 %
5422008 Vokks Nett AS 86.37 % 86.50 % 86.62 % 86.70 % 86.77 % 86.84 % 86.91 % 86.94 % 86.91 % 86.76 % 86.61 %
2752008 Hallingdal Kraftnett AS 86.45 % 86.45 % 86.45 % 86.45 % 86.45 % 86.45 % 86.44 % 86.39 % 86.22 % 86.05 % 85.86 %
2182008 Sørfold Kraftlag AL 86.61 % 85.62 % 84.65 % 83.66 % 82.70 % 81.79 % 80.92 % 80.08 % 79.28 % 78.23 % 77.14 %
6152008 EB Nett AS 87.75 % 87.67 % 87.59 % 87.51 % 87.43 % 87.35 % 87.27 % 87.19 % 87.12 % 87.04 % 86.96 %
5782008 Flesberg Elektrisitetsverk AS 87.81 % 87.33 % 86.87 % 86.39 % 85.92 % 84.74 % 83.57 % 82.43 % 81.32 % 80.25 % 79.20 %
1532008 Orkdal Energi AS 87.99 % 87.56 % 87.13 % 86.70 % 86.07 % 85.44 % 84.82 % 84.21 % 83.62 % 83.03 % 82.41 %
532008 Fosenkraft AS 88.03 % 87.74 % 87.42 % 87.11 % 86.80 % 86.50 % 86.20 % 85.91 % 85.62 % 85.33 % 85.05 %
1732008 Røros Elektrisitetsverk AS 88.98 % 89.15 % 88.76 % 88.38 % 88.00 % 87.63 % 87.27 % 86.91 % 86.56 % 86.19 % 85.69 %
DEA Efficiency as Industry adds DG:
 
LIV  APPENDIX 
 
ID Selskap Orig 5MW 10MW 15MW 20MW 25MW 30MW 35MW 40MW 45MW 50MW
1492008 Oppdal Everk AS 89.67 % 89.73 % 89.27 % 88.83 % 88.40 % 87.97 % 87.55 % 87.14 % 86.73 % 86.28 % 85.66 %
2512008 Vest-Telemark Kraftlag AS 89.83 % 90.04 % 90.26 % 90.47 % 90.68 % 90.89 % 91.10 % 91.30 % 91.51 % 91.63 % 91.66 %
2052008 Stryn Energi AS 90.31 % 90.13 % 89.94 % 89.74 % 89.31 % 88.77 % 88.24 % 87.72 % 87.21 % 86.68 % 86.15 %
972008 Kvinnherad Energi AS 90.50 % 90.19 % 89.88 % 89.58 % 89.28 % 88.96 % 88.64 % 88.31 % 87.91 % 87.51 % 87.08 %
4332008 Hålogaland Kraft AS 91.23 % 91.93 % 92.62 % 93.31 % 93.96 % 94.60 % 95.15 % 95.62 % 96.07 % 96.53 % 96.98 %
1192008 Gauldal Energi AS 92.25 % 91.64 % 91.04 % 90.46 % 89.88 % 89.32 % 88.77 % 88.18 % 87.61 % 87.05 % 86.49 %
1332008 Nord Troms Kraftlag AS 93.17 % 93.52 % 93.87 % 94.21 % 94.55 % 94.89 % 95.22 % 95.35 % 95.43 % 95.52 % 95.61 %
7262008 BE Nett AS 93.35 % 93.62 % 93.88 % 94.08 % 94.19 % 94.30 % 94.41 % 94.52 % 94.62 % 94.73 % 94.84 %
5742008 Eidsiva Energi Nett AS 93.74 % 93.71 % 93.68 % 93.65 % 93.62 % 93.60 % 93.57 % 93.54 % 93.51 % 93.48 % 93.45 %
1622008 Rauma Energi AS 93.87 % 94.06 % 94.24 % 94.42 % 94.38 % 94.19 % 94.00 % 93.66 % 93.27 % 92.82 % 92.39 %
862008 Istad Nett AS 94.08 % 94.15 % 94.23 % 94.30 % 94.37 % 94.43 % 94.48 % 94.52 % 94.56 % 94.60 % 94.62 %
1632008 Kvikne-Rennebu Kraftlag AL 95.04 % 94.22 % 93.43 % 92.65 % 91.89 % 91.16 % 90.43 % 89.73 % 89.04 % 88.37 % 87.71 %
1162008 Meløy Energi AS 95.52 % 95.36 % 95.07 % 94.78 % 94.50 % 94.21 % 93.91 % 93.61 % 93.32 % 93.04 % 92.75 %
6752008 Hafslund Nett AS 96.39 % 96.44 % 96.49 % 96.54 % 96.59 % 96.64 % 96.69 % 96.74 % 96.79 % 96.84 % 96.89 %
2272008 Troms Kraft Nett AS 97.16 % 98.10 % 99.04 % 99.97 % 100.89 % 101.82 % 102.74 % 103.65 % 104.56 % 105.40 % 106.24 %
182008 Ballangen Energi AS 97.79 % 98.00 % 97.26 % 96.55 % 95.85 % 95.17 % 94.44 % 93.72 % 93.02 % 92.34 % 91.68 %
632008 Trollfjord Kraft AS 98.70 % 99.22 % 99.73 % 100.24 % 100.74 % 101.23 % 101.71 % 102.19 % 102.55 % 102.63 % 102.71 %
5112008 Lyse Nett AS 99.27 % 99.26 % 99.25 % 99.24 % 99.22 % 99.19 % 99.17 % 99.14 % 99.12 % 99.09 % 99.07 %
2382008 Indre Hardanger Kraftlag AS 99.88 % 100.82 % 101.44 % 102.05 % 102.64 % 103.19 % 103.65 % 104.08 % 104.47 % 104.75 % 105.02 %
372008 Eidefoss AS 100.15 % 100.11 % 100.07 % 100.03 % 99.99 % 99.95 % 99.89 % 99.82 % 99.75 % 99.69 % 99.61 %
6132008 Nordvest Nett AS 100.96 % 101.24 % 101.52 % 101.79 % 102.06 % 102.32 % 102.57 % 102.81 % 103.05 % 103.28 % 103.51 %
1042008 Luster Energiverk AS 103.06 % 103.09 % 102.77 % 102.46 % 102.15 % 101.75 % 101.33 % 100.71 % 100.01 % 99.34 % 98.68 %
1352008 Nord-Østerdal Kraftlag AL 104.88 % 104.91 % 104.92 % 104.92 % 104.93 % 104.94 % 104.95 % 104.86 % 104.70 % 104.54 % 104.38 %
6992008 Nord-Trøndelag Elektrisitetsverk107.55 % 108.15 % 108.76 % 109.36 % 109.96 % 110.53 % 111.07 % 111.61 % 111.80 % 111.88 % 111.96 %
1212008 Modalen Kraftlag BA 108.18 % 99.29 % 91.85 % 85.52 % 80.05 % 75.29 % 71.12 % 67.43 % 64.14 % 61.19 % 58.53 %
2042008 Stranda Energiverk AS 108.98 % 108.38 % 107.79 % 107.14 % 106.02 % 104.92 % 103.84 % 102.79 % 101.76 % 100.76 % 99.77 %
2332008 Tydal Kommunale Energiverk KF110.01 % 108.73 % 105.69 % 102.81 % 100.08 % 97.49 % 95.04 % 92.70 % 90.48 % 88.36 % 86.34 %
5932008 Nesset Kraft AS 115.75 % 115.17 % 114.60 % 114.02 % 113.46 % 112.59 % 111.41 % 110.27 % 109.16 % 108.08 % 107.04 %
1322008 Nord-Salten Kraftlag AL 118.71 % 119.72 % 120.71 % 121.69 % 122.65 % 123.59 % 124.52 % 125.45 % 126.36 % 127.25 % 128.14 %
5362008 Trondheim Energiverk Nett AS 121.69 % 121.57 % 121.46 % 121.34 % 121.23 % 121.11 % 121.00 % 120.88 % 120.77 % 120.66 % 120.54 %
92008 Andøy Energi AS 128.13 % 126.92 % 125.73 % 124.59 % 123.48 % 122.40 % 121.35 % 120.33 % 119.34 % 118.37 % 117.43 %
1712008 Rødøy-Lurøy Kraftverk AS 133.77 % 133.60 % 133.42 % 133.25 % 133.08 % 132.91 % 132.75 % 132.58 % 132.42 % 132.26 % 132.11 %
DEA Efficiency as Industry adds DG:
 
APPENDIX  LV 
 
32 DEA Efficiency as Industry adds DG (Non-DG 
Companies) 
ID Selskap Orig 5MW 10MW 15MW 20MW 25MW 30MW 35MW 40MW 45MW 50MW
1082008 Løvenskiold Fossum Kraft 40.91 % 41.10 % 41.28 % 41.47 % 41.66 % 41.85 % 42.04 % 42.22 % 42.41 % 42.60 % 42.79 %
1812008 Sandøy Energi AS 51.19 % 51.66 % 52.12 % 52.59 % 53.05 % 53.52 % 53.98 % 54.45 % 54.91 % 55.38 % 55.84 %
2102008 Sunnhordland Kraftlag AS 56.15 % 56.20 % 56.26 % 56.31 % 56.37 % 56.42 % 56.48 % 56.54 % 56.59 % 56.63 % 56.65 %
1472008 Evenes Kraftforsyning AS 58.37 % 58.93 % 59.47 % 59.95 % 60.43 % 60.91 % 61.39 % 61.86 % 62.26 % 62.66 % 63.07 %
1112008 Malvik Everk AS 61.55 % 61.60 % 61.65 % 61.70 % 61.75 % 61.79 % 61.84 % 61.89 % 61.94 % 61.99 % 62.04 %
2672008 Årdal Energi KF 64.09 % 64.48 % 64.88 % 65.27 % 65.67 % 65.91 % 66.08 % 66.25 % 66.42 % 66.59 % 66.75 %
422008 Fauske Lysverk AS 64.19 % 64.60 % 65.01 % 65.42 % 65.83 % 66.18 % 66.35 % 66.51 % 66.67 % 66.84 % 67.00 %
1942008 Skjåk Energi 66.38 % 66.68 % 66.97 % 67.26 % 67.56 % 67.85 % 68.15 % 68.44 % 68.73 % 69.03 % 69.32 %
842008 Høland og Setskog Elverk 68.81 % 69.04 % 69.28 % 69.52 % 69.76 % 69.96 % 70.05 % 70.13 % 70.22 % 70.30 % 70.38 %
412008 Etne Elektrisitetslag 69.12 % 69.28 % 69.45 % 69.61 % 69.78 % 69.94 % 70.10 % 70.27 % 70.43 % 70.60 % 70.76 %
462008 Fjelberg Kraftlag 70.87 % 71.34 % 71.81 % 72.02 % 72.23 % 72.43 % 72.63 % 72.79 % 72.95 % 73.11 % 73.24 %
2192008 Tafjord Kraftnett AS 73.91 % 74.28 % 74.65 % 74.99 % 75.19 % 75.39 % 75.59 % 75.78 % 75.93 % 76.08 % 76.23 %
222008 Bindal Kraftlag AL 74.31 % 75.13 % 75.96 % 76.78 % 77.50 % 78.21 % 78.88 % 79.53 % 80.18 % 80.83 % 81.48 %
552008 Fusa Kraftlag 76.61 % 76.72 % 76.83 % 76.93 % 77.04 % 77.14 % 77.25 % 77.35 % 77.46 % 77.56 % 77.62 %
2422008 Uvdal Kraftforsyning AL 77.78 % 78.77 % 79.77 % 80.77 % 81.77 % 81.80 % 81.80 % 81.80 % 81.80 % 81.80 % 81.80 %
822008 Hurum Energiverk AS 79.93 % 80.01 % 80.05 % 80.05 % 80.06 % 80.06 % 80.06 % 80.07 % 80.07 % 80.08 % 80.08 %
6692008 Stange Energi Nett AS 80.35 % 80.35 % 80.35 % 80.35 % 80.35 % 80.35 % 80.35 % 80.35 % 80.35 % 80.35 % 80.35 %
1612008 Rauland Kraftforsyningslag 91.30 % 96.03 % 97.92 % 99.81 % 101.70 % 102.94 % 103.31 % 103.69 % 104.06 % 104.44 % 104.81 %
432008 Finnås Kraftlag 93.14 % 93.38 % 93.61 % 93.85 % 94.09 % 94.32 % 94.56 % 94.76 % 94.92 % 95.08 % 95.24 %
232008 Elkem Bjølvefossen AS 93.38 % 93.53 % 93.65 % 93.76 % 93.86 % 93.91 % 93.97 % 94.02 % 94.07 % 94.13 % 94.16 %
1022008 Lier Everk AS 93.50 % 93.50 % 93.51 % 93.51 % 93.52 % 93.53 % 93.53 % 93.54 % 93.54 % 93.55 % 93.56 %
142008 Askøy Energi AS 95.30 % 95.71 % 96.12 % 96.53 % 96.94 % 97.35 % 97.76 % 98.02 % 98.05 % 98.09 % 98.12 %
162008 Austevoll Kraftlag BA 104.92 % 105.70 % 106.48 % 107.26 % 108.05 % 108.74 % 109.36 % 109.97 % 110.58 % 111.16 % 111.75 %
2312008 Trøgstad Elverk AS 105.73 % 105.77 % 105.81 % 105.86 % 105.90 % 105.95 % 105.99 % 106.03 % 106.08 % 106.12 % 106.17 %
322008 Fredrikstad Energi Nett AS 106.66 % 106.72 % 106.77 % 106.83 % 106.87 % 106.90 % 106.93 % 106.97 % 107.00 % 107.04 % 107.07 %
912008 Klepp Energi AS 108.65 % 108.72 % 108.80 % 108.87 % 108.94 % 109.00 % 109.06 % 109.12 % 109.17 % 109.23 % 109.29 %
2622008 Ørskog Energi AS 109.79 % 110.31 % 110.83 % 111.34 % 111.86 % 112.36 % 112.49 % 112.61 % 112.74 % 112.86 % 112.99 %
6142008 Energi 1 Follo-Røyken as 111.43 % 111.51 % 111.60 % 111.68 % 111.77 % 111.86 % 111.94 % 112.03 % 112.12 % 112.20 % 112.29 %
2342008 Tysnes Kraftlag PL 144.75 % 145.01 % 145.26 % 145.51 % 145.76 % 146.01 % 146.26 % 146.51 % 146.51 % 146.51 % 146.51 %
952008 Krødsherad Everk KF 153.64 % 155.04 % 156.45 % 157.85 % 159.25 % 160.66 % 162.06 % 163.47 % 164.87 % 166.27 % 167.27 %
DEA Efficiency as Industry adds DG:
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33 Total DEA Efficiency before Calibration (DG 
Companies) 
ID Company Original 5MW 10MW 15MW 20MW 25MW 30MW 35MW 40MW 45MW 50MW
1972008 Sognekraft AS 57.05 % 56.70 % 56.33 % 56.15 % 56.05 % 55.99 % 55.95 % 55.92 % 55.89 % 55.87 % 55.86 %
522008 Forsand Elverk KF 60.68 % 60.21 % 59.77 % 59.55 % 59.45 % 59.40 % 59.37 % 59.35 % 59.34 % 59.33 % 59.33 %
3062008 Valdres Energiverk AS 64.84 % 64.78 % 64.71 % 64.68 % 64.66 % 64.66 % 64.65 % 64.64 % 64.64 % 64.64 % 64.63 %
4182008 Aurland Energiverk AS 65.02 % 63.98 % 62.89 % 62.35 % 62.05 % 61.89 % 61.77 % 61.68 % 61.61 % 61.55 % 61.50 %
1682008 Rollag Elektrisitetsverk LL 66.05 % 65.71 % 65.36 % 65.18 % 65.09 % 65.03 % 64.99 % 64.96 % 64.94 % 64.92 % 64.90 %
1062008 Lærdal Energi 66.10 % 65.44 % 64.85 % 64.58 % 64.48 % 64.43 % 64.43 % 64.43 % 64.44 % 64.46 % 64.47 %
5912008 Midt Nett Buskerud AS 69.78 % 69.46 % 69.17 % 69.05 % 69.00 % 68.99 % 68.99 % 69.00 % 69.00 % 69.02 % 69.03 %
3732008 Nore Energi AS 70.09 % 69.40 % 68.66 % 68.30 % 68.09 % 67.98 % 67.90 % 67.84 % 67.78 % 67.74 % 67.71 %
4642008 Vesterålskraft Nett AS 70.33 % 70.06 % 69.76 % 69.62 % 69.54 % 69.49 % 69.46 % 69.43 % 69.41 % 69.39 % 69.37 %
3542008 Lofotkraft AS 70.56 % 70.33 % 70.07 % 69.94 % 69.87 % 69.82 % 69.79 % 69.77 % 69.75 % 69.73 % 69.71 %
342008 Dragefossen Kraftanlegg AS 71.07 % 70.83 % 70.57 % 70.44 % 70.37 % 70.33 % 70.30 % 70.28 % 70.26 % 70.25 % 70.23 %
1382008 Nordkyn Kraftlag AL 71.22 % 70.79 % 70.35 % 70.13 % 70.00 % 69.93 % 69.89 % 69.85 % 69.82 % 69.79 % 69.77 %
1642008 Repvåg Kraftlag AL 71.27 % 71.12 % 70.94 % 70.85 % 70.80 % 70.77 % 70.74 % 70.72 % 70.71 % 70.69 % 70.68 %
2232008 Tinn Energi AS 71.55 % 71.34 % 71.14 % 71.05 % 71.01 % 70.99 % 70.97 % 70.97 % 70.96 % 70.96 % 70.96 %
5032008 Haugaland Kraft AS 72.54 % 72.46 % 72.37 % 72.33 % 72.30 % 72.29 % 72.28 % 72.27 % 72.26 % 72.26 % 72.25 %
6112008 Skagerak Nett AS 73.49 % 73.40 % 73.31 % 73.27 % 73.24 % 73.23 % 73.22 % 73.21 % 73.21 % 73.20 % 73.20 %
5992008 Sunndal Energi KF 73.69 % 72.66 % 71.58 % 71.04 % 70.73 % 70.56 % 70.44 % 70.34 % 70.27 % 70.21 % 70.16 %
2482008 Vang Energiverk KF 74.59 % 74.20 % 73.78 % 73.58 % 73.47 % 73.40 % 73.36 % 73.32 % 73.29 % 73.27 % 73.25 %
2142008 Sør-Aurdal Energi BA 75.43 % 74.49 % 73.50 % 73.01 % 72.73 % 72.58 % 72.47 % 72.38 % 72.31 % 72.25 % 72.21 %
1832008 Hjartdal Elverk AS 75.58 % 74.41 % 73.19 % 72.59 % 72.25 % 72.06 % 71.93 % 71.83 % 71.75 % 71.69 % 71.64 %
4912008 Elkem Energi Bremanger AS 75.60 % 74.71 % 73.88 % 73.49 % 73.33 % 73.26 % 73.24 % 73.23 % 73.23 % 73.24 % 73.25 %
1842008 Selbu Energiverk AS 76.09 % 75.47 % 74.87 % 74.58 % 74.44 % 74.36 % 74.32 % 74.30 % 74.28 % 74.26 % 74.25 %
6242008 Agder Energi Nett AS 76.63 % 76.40 % 76.16 % 76.04 % 75.97 % 75.93 % 75.90 % 75.88 % 75.87 % 75.85 % 75.84 %
2132008 Sykkylven Energi AS 76.78 % 76.10 % 75.39 % 75.04 % 74.84 % 74.74 % 74.66 % 74.60 % 74.56 % 74.52 % 74.49 %
872008 Jondal Energi KF 76.90 % 76.41 % 75.90 % 75.65 % 75.52 % 75.45 % 75.40 % 75.37 % 75.34 % 75.32 % 75.30 %
1662008 Rissa Kraftlag BA 77.15 % 77.02 % 76.88 % 76.82 % 76.78 % 76.76 % 76.74 % 76.73 % 76.72 % 76.71 % 76.71 %
722008 Hemne kraftlag BA 77.39 % 77.04 % 76.68 % 76.50 % 76.40 % 76.34 % 76.30 % 76.26 % 76.24 % 76.21 % 76.19 %
2642008 Øvre Eiker Nett AS 78.16 % 77.68 % 77.19 % 76.95 % 76.81 % 76.73 % 76.68 % 76.64 % 76.60 % 76.57 % 76.55 %
6372008 Narvik Energinett AS 78.32 % 78.25 % 78.17 % 78.13 % 78.11 % 78.09 % 78.09 % 78.08 % 78.07 % 78.07 % 78.07 %
6932008 Ringeriks-Kraft Nett AS 79.07 % 78.96 % 78.84 % 78.79 % 78.76 % 78.74 % 78.73 % 78.72 % 78.72 % 78.71 % 78.71 %
2572008 Dalane Energi IKS 79.23 % 78.67 % 78.15 % 77.91 % 77.80 % 77.75 % 77.73 % 77.72 % 77.72 % 77.72 % 77.72 %
2152008 TrønderEnergi Nett AS 79.61 % 79.48 % 79.33 % 79.26 % 79.21 % 79.19 % 79.17 % 79.15 % 79.14 % 79.13 % 79.12 %
5662008 BKK Nett AS 79.79 % 79.60 % 79.42 % 79.34 % 79.30 % 79.29 % 79.28 % 79.28 % 79.28 % 79.28 % 79.28 %
72008 Alta Kraftlag AL 80.05 % 79.72 % 79.44 % 79.31 % 79.26 % 79.24 % 79.24 % 79.24 % 79.25 % 79.25 % 79.26 %
2692008 SFE Nett AS 80.23 % 79.34 % 78.40 % 77.92 % 77.66 % 77.51 % 77.40 % 77.32 % 77.25 % 77.19 % 77.14 %
2952008 Gudbrandsdal Energi AS 81.17 % 81.04 % 80.91 % 80.85 % 80.81 % 80.79 % 80.78 % 80.77 % 80.76 % 80.75 % 80.75 %
712008 HelgelandsKraft AS 82.21 % 82.02 % 81.82 % 81.71 % 81.65 % 81.61 % 81.59 % 81.57 % 81.55 % 81.53 % 81.51 %
1032008 Luostejok Kraftlag AL 82.75 % 82.61 % 82.56 % 82.55 % 82.59 % 82.63 % 82.68 % 82.73 % 82.77 % 82.81 % 82.85 %
2492008 Varanger Kraftnett AS 82.92 % 82.80 % 82.68 % 82.62 % 82.59 % 82.57 % 82.56 % 82.55 % 82.54 % 82.53 % 82.53 %
2742008 Svorka Energi AS 83.06 % 82.68 % 82.31 % 82.13 % 82.04 % 82.00 % 81.97 % 81.95 % 81.94 % 81.93 % 81.93 %
4602008 Tussa Nett AS 83.19 % 82.32 % 81.40 % 80.94 % 80.68 % 80.54 % 80.43 % 80.35 % 80.28 % 80.22 % 80.17 %
352008 Drangedal Everk KF 83.52 % 83.10 % 82.67 % 82.46 % 82.36 % 82.30 % 82.26 % 82.23 % 82.21 % 82.20 % 82.18 %
6252008 Voss Energi AS 83.54 % 83.26 % 83.07 % 82.98 % 82.98 % 83.00 % 83.03 % 83.06 % 83.09 % 83.12 % 83.15 %
562008 Sunnfjord Energi AS 83.58 % 82.54 % 81.43 % 80.88 % 80.56 % 80.39 % 80.26 % 80.16 % 80.08 % 80.01 % 79.95 %
1962008 Skånevik Ølen Kraftlag 83.59 % 83.35 % 83.10 % 82.98 % 82.91 % 82.88 % 82.85 % 82.83 % 82.82 % 82.81 % 82.80 %
6592008 Midt-Telemark Energi AS 83.97 % 83.58 % 83.20 % 83.02 % 82.93 % 82.89 % 82.86 % 82.85 % 82.84 % 82.83 % 82.83 %
932008 Kragerø Energi AS 84.50 % 83.87 % 83.23 % 82.92 % 82.78 % 82.70 % 82.66 % 82.63 % 82.61 % 82.59 % 82.57 %
1572008 Rakkestad Energiverk AS 84.74 % 84.46 % 84.19 % 84.06 % 84.00 % 83.97 % 83.95 % 83.94 % 83.93 % 83.93 % 83.93 %
4952008 Elverum Energiverk Nett AS 84.81 % 84.67 % 84.56 % 84.51 % 84.49 % 84.48 % 84.49 % 84.49 % 84.49 % 84.50 % 84.51 %
452008 Fitjar Kraftlag BA 85.84 % 85.66 % 85.36 % 85.18 % 85.07 % 84.98 % 84.92 % 84.85 % 84.78 % 84.71 % 84.63 %
652008 Hammerfest Energi Nett AS 85.93 % 85.79 % 85.64 % 85.57 % 85.53 % 85.51 % 85.49 % 85.48 % 85.46 % 85.45 % 85.45 %
622008 Hadeland Energinett AS 86.06 % 85.76 % 85.50 % 85.38 % 85.34 % 85.32 % 85.32 % 85.32 % 85.33 % 85.34 % 85.34 %
5492008 Fortum Distribution AS 86.77 % 86.67 % 86.59 % 86.55 % 86.55 % 86.55 % 86.56 % 86.56 % 86.57 % 86.58 % 86.59 %
3112008 Nordmøre Energiverk AS 86.90 % 86.84 % 86.77 % 86.73 % 86.71 % 86.70 % 86.69 % 86.69 % 86.68 % 86.68 % 86.67 %
1362008 Norddal Elverk AS 87.07 % 85.54 % 83.93 % 83.12 % 82.67 % 82.42 % 82.24 % 82.10 % 81.99 % 81.90 % 81.82 %
2752008 Hallingdal Kraftnett AS 87.85 % 87.61 % 87.35 % 87.22 % 87.15 % 87.11 % 87.09 % 87.06 % 87.05 % 87.03 % 87.02 %
5422008 Vokks Nett AS 87.87 % 87.76 % 87.65 % 87.60 % 87.57 % 87.56 % 87.55 % 87.55 % 87.55 % 87.54 % 87.54 %
6152008 EB Nett AS 88.59 % 88.57 % 88.55 % 88.54 % 88.54 % 88.55 % 88.55 % 88.55 % 88.55 % 88.55 % 88.56 %
5782008 Flesberg Elektrisitetsverk AS 88.76 % 88.61 % 88.45 % 88.37 % 88.33 % 88.31 % 88.29 % 88.28 % 88.27 % 88.26 % 88.25 %
962008 Kvam Kraftverk AS 89.20 % 88.36 % 87.48 % 87.04 % 86.79 % 86.66 % 86.56 % 86.48 % 86.42 % 86.37 % 86.33 %
3432008 Hemsedal Energi KF 89.38 % 89.23 % 89.13 % 89.09 % 89.10 % 89.11 % 89.13 % 89.15 % 89.17 % 89.20 % 89.21 %
532008 Fosenkraft AS 89.56 % 89.47 % 89.37 % 89.32 % 89.28 % 89.26 % 89.25 % 89.24 % 89.23 % 89.22 % 89.21 %
1532008 Orkdal Energi AS 89.81 % 89.48 % 89.13 % 88.96 % 88.86 % 88.81 % 88.77 % 88.74 % 88.72 % 88.70 % 88.68 %
2182008 Sørfold Kraftlag AL 89.85 % 89.26 % 88.65 % 88.34 % 88.17 % 88.08 % 88.01 % 87.95 % 87.91 % 87.88 % 87.85 %
1492008 Oppdal Everk AS 90.44 % 90.30 % 90.15 % 90.08 % 90.04 % 90.02 % 90.00 % 89.99 % 89.98 % 89.97 % 89.96 %
2062008 Suldal Elverk 90.85 % 89.69 % 88.53 % 87.96 % 87.66 % 87.50 % 87.41 % 87.34 % 87.28 % 87.24 % 87.21 %
2512008 Vest-Telemark Kraftlag AS 92.16 % 91.74 % 91.30 % 91.08 % 90.96 % 90.89 % 90.85 % 90.81 % 90.78 % 90.75 % 90.73 %
1732008 Røros Elektrisitetsverk AS 92.77 % 92.51 % 92.26 % 92.15 % 92.09 % 92.06 % 92.05 % 92.04 % 92.03 % 92.03 % 92.03 %
4332008 Hålogaland Kraft AS 92.90 % 92.71 % 92.49 % 92.39 % 92.33 % 92.29 % 92.27 % 92.25 % 92.23 % 92.22 % 92.20 %
1192008 Gauldal Energi AS 93.05 % 92.91 % 92.75 % 92.68 % 92.63 % 92.61 % 92.59 % 92.58 % 92.57 % 92.56 % 92.55 %
882008 Jæren Everk Komm. f. i  Hå 93.21 % 93.09 % 93.03 % 93.01 % 93.04 % 93.07 % 93.10 % 93.13 % 93.17 % 93.20 % 93.22 %
1462008 Odda Energi AS 93.92 % 92.75 % 91.54 % 90.94 % 90.61 % 90.43 % 90.31 % 90.22 % 90.14 % 90.09 % 90.04 %
DG Companies add:
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ID Company Original 5MW 10MW 15MW 20MW 25MW 30MW 35MW 40MW 45MW 50MW
5742008 Eidsiva Energi Nett AS 94.26 % 94.16 % 94.06 % 94.01 % 93.99 % 93.97 % 93.96 % 93.95 % 93.95 % 93.94 % 93.94 %
1332008 Nord Troms Kraftlag AS 95.33 % 95.14 % 94.93 % 94.82 % 94.76 % 94.72 % 94.70 % 94.68 % 94.66 % 94.64 % 94.63 %
862008 Istad Nett AS 95.66 % 95.58 % 95.49 % 95.44 % 95.41 % 95.40 % 95.38 % 95.37 % 95.36 % 95.35 % 95.34 %
2052008 Stryn Energi AS 95.98 % 95.41 % 94.83 % 94.55 % 94.41 % 94.33 % 94.28 % 94.24 % 94.21 % 94.19 % 94.18 %
6752008 Hafslund Nett AS 96.55 % 96.53 % 96.52 % 96.51 % 96.50 % 96.50 % 96.50 % 96.50 % 96.49 % 96.49 % 96.49 %
1632008 Kvikne-Rennebu Kraftlag AL 96.57 % 96.35 % 96.11 % 96.00 % 95.93 % 95.90 % 95.87 % 95.86 % 95.84 % 95.83 % 95.82 %
7262008 BE Nett AS 96.67 % 96.41 % 96.12 % 95.98 % 95.89 % 95.84 % 95.80 % 95.77 % 95.74 % 95.72 % 95.70 %
1622008 Rauma Energi AS 96.77 % 96.25 % 95.70 % 95.43 % 95.28 % 95.20 % 95.14 % 95.09 % 95.05 % 95.02 % 94.99 %
2272008 Troms Kraft Nett AS 98.15 % 98.03 % 97.91 % 97.85 % 97.81 % 97.79 % 97.78 % 97.77 % 97.76 % 97.75 % 97.74 %
1162008 Meløy Energi AS 99.90 % 99.63 % 99.34 % 99.20 % 99.12 % 99.07 % 99.04 % 99.01 % 98.99 % 98.97 % 98.95 %
972008 Kvinnherad Energi AS 100.56 % 99.11 % 97.57 % 96.81 % 96.38 % 96.14 % 95.97 % 95.84 % 95.74 % 95.65 % 95.58 %
6992008 Nord-Trøndelag Elektrisitetsverk 100.96 % 100.83 % 100.69 % 100.62 % 100.58 % 100.56 % 100.55 % 100.53 % 100.52 % 100.51 % 100.51 %
1352008 Nord-Østerdal Kraftlag AL 101.21 % 101.04 % 100.86 % 100.77 % 100.73 % 100.70 % 100.68 % 100.67 % 100.66 % 100.65 % 100.64 %
372008 Eidefoss AS 101.37 % 101.12 % 100.86 % 100.73 % 100.66 % 100.61 % 100.59 % 100.56 % 100.55 % 100.53 % 100.52 %
1322008 Nord-Salten Kraftlag AL 101.48 % 101.38 % 101.27 % 101.21 % 101.18 % 101.16 % 101.14 % 101.13 % 101.12 % 101.11 % 101.10 %
5932008 Nesset Kraft AS 103.89 % 103.19 % 102.45 % 102.09 % 101.88 % 101.76 % 101.68 % 101.62 % 101.57 % 101.52 % 101.49 %
6132008 Nordvest Nett AS 104.30 % 104.26 % 104.22 % 104.19 % 104.18 % 104.17 % 104.16 % 104.16 % 104.15 % 104.15 % 104.14 %
5112008 Lyse Nett AS 104.44 % 104.28 % 104.12 % 104.05 % 104.02 % 104.01 % 104.01 % 104.01 % 104.01 % 104.01 % 104.01 %
182008 Ballangen Energi AS 105.06 % 104.53 % 103.99 % 103.73 % 103.60 % 103.52 % 103.48 % 103.44 % 103.41 % 103.39 % 103.37 %
1042008 Luster Energiverk AS 105.85 % 104.87 % 103.83 % 103.31 % 103.02 % 102.86 % 102.75 % 102.66 % 102.59 % 102.53 % 102.48 %
2382008 Indre Hardanger Kraftlag AS 107.96 % 107.40 % 106.86 % 106.61 % 106.48 % 106.42 % 106.39 % 106.37 % 106.35 % 106.35 % 106.34 %
1712008 Rødøy-Lurøy Kraftverk AS 107.98 % 107.93 % 107.80 % 107.71 % 107.66 % 107.62 % 107.58 % 107.55 % 107.51 % 107.46 % 107.42 %
1212008 Modalen Kraftlag BA 108.65 % 107.13 % 105.51 % 104.70 % 104.24 % 103.98 % 103.80 % 103.66 % 103.54 % 103.45 % 103.37 %
2332008 Tydal Kommunale Energiverk KF 109.54 % 108.52 % 107.45 % 106.91 % 106.61 % 106.44 % 106.32 % 106.22 % 106.15 % 106.09 % 106.04 %
5362008 Trondheim Energiverk Nett AS 110.71 % 110.65 % 110.59 % 110.56 % 110.55 % 110.54 % 110.53 % 110.53 % 110.52 % 110.52 % 110.52 %
632008 Trollfjord Kraft AS 112.45 % 112.15 % 111.94 % 111.85 % 111.86 % 111.88 % 111.92 % 111.96 % 111.99 % 112.03 % 112.07 %
92008 Andøy Energi AS 113.13 % 113.05 % 112.98 % 112.94 % 112.92 % 112.91 % 112.90 % 112.89 % 112.89 % 112.88 % 112.88 %
2042008 Stranda Energiverk AS 118.18 % 116.04 % 113.76 % 112.61 % 111.95 % 111.59 % 111.33 % 111.13 % 110.97 % 110.84 % 110.73 %
DG Companies add:
 
34 Total DEA Efficiency before Calibration (Non-DG 
Companies) 
ID Company Original 5MW 10MW 15MW 20MW 25MW 30MW 35MW 40MW 45MW 50MW
1082008 Løvenskiold Fossum Kraft 40.91 % 40.91 % 40.91 % 40.91 % 40.91 % 40.91 % 40.91 % 40.91 % 40.91 % 40.91 % 40.91 %
2102008 Sunnhordland Kraftlag AS 59.03 % 59.03 % 59.02 % 59.01 % 59.01 % 59.01 % 59.01 % 59.01 % 59.01 % 59.01 % 59.00 %
1112008 Malvik Everk AS 61.55 % 61.55 % 61.55 % 61.55 % 61.55 % 61.55 % 61.55 % 61.55 % 61.55 % 61.55 % 61.55 %
1472008 Evenes Kraftforsyning AS 62.85 % 62.81 % 62.82 % 62.82 % 62.85 % 62.87 % 62.89 % 62.92 % 62.93 % 62.95 % 62.97 %
1812008 Sandøy Energi AS 63.28 % 63.31 % 63.22 % 63.15 % 63.10 % 63.05 % 63.01 % 62.96 % 62.91 % 62.85 % 62.79 %
422008 Fauske Lysverk AS 64.19 % 64.19 % 64.19 % 64.19 % 64.19 % 64.19 % 64.19 % 64.19 % 64.19 % 64.19 % 64.19 %
2672008 Årdal Energi KF 64.58 % 64.57 % 64.57 % 64.57 % 64.58 % 64.58 % 64.58 % 64.58 % 64.59 % 64.59 % 64.59 %
1942008 Skjåk Energi 66.84 % 66.84 % 66.84 % 66.84 % 66.84 % 66.84 % 66.85 % 66.85 % 66.85 % 66.85 % 66.85 %
842008 Høland og Setskog Elverk 69.01 % 68.98 % 68.94 % 68.92 % 68.91 % 68.90 % 68.90 % 68.89 % 68.89 % 68.89 % 68.89 %
462008 Fjelberg Kraftlag 71.24 % 71.23 % 71.23 % 71.24 % 71.24 % 71.24 % 71.24 % 71.24 % 71.24 % 71.25 % 71.25 %
412008 Etne Elektrisitetslag 73.65 % 73.61 % 73.60 % 73.61 % 73.63 % 73.65 % 73.67 % 73.69 % 73.71 % 73.73 % 73.75 %
2192008 Tafjord Kraftnett AS 74.44 % 74.43 % 74.43 % 74.42 % 74.42 % 74.42 % 74.42 % 74.42 % 74.42 % 74.43 % 74.43 %
222008 Bindal Kraftlag AL 75.56 % 75.56 % 75.55 % 75.54 % 75.54 % 75.53 % 75.53 % 75.52 % 75.52 % 75.51 % 75.50 %
2422008 Uvdal Kraftforsyning AL 77.79 % 77.79 % 77.78 % 77.78 % 77.78 % 77.78 % 77.78 % 77.78 % 77.78 % 77.78 % 77.78 %
552008 Fusa Kraftlag 78.44 % 78.37 % 78.30 % 78.27 % 78.26 % 78.26 % 78.26 % 78.26 % 78.26 % 78.26 % 78.27 %
822008 Hurum Energiverk AS 79.93 % 79.93 % 79.93 % 79.93 % 79.93 % 79.93 % 79.93 % 79.93 % 79.93 % 79.93 % 79.93 %
6692008 Stange Energi Nett AS 84.83 % 84.80 % 84.80 % 84.81 % 84.83 % 84.85 % 84.88 % 84.90 % 84.92 % 84.94 % 84.95 %
1022008 Lier Everk AS 93.51 % 93.51 % 93.51 % 93.51 % 93.50 % 93.50 % 93.50 % 93.50 % 93.50 % 93.50 % 93.50 %
432008 Finnås Kraftlag 95.23 % 95.23 % 95.22 % 95.21 % 95.21 % 95.21 % 95.20 % 95.20 % 95.20 % 95.19 % 95.19 %
232008 Elkem Bjølvefossen AS 96.33 % 96.31 % 96.31 % 96.32 % 96.33 % 96.35 % 96.36 % 96.38 % 96.39 % 96.40 % 96.41 %
1612008 Rauland Kraftforsyningslag 96.74 % 96.70 % 96.70 % 96.70 % 96.73 % 96.75 % 96.77 % 96.79 % 96.81 % 96.83 % 96.84 %
2622008 Ørskog Energi AS 100.00 % 100.00 % 100.00 % 100.00 % 100.00 % 100.00 % 100.00 % 100.00 % 100.00 % 100.00 % 100.00 %
142008 Askøy Energi AS 100.77 % 100.73 % 100.73 % 100.74 % 100.77 % 100.80 % 100.83 % 100.85 % 100.88 % 100.90 % 100.92 %
2312008 Trøgstad Elverk AS 102.78 % 102.77 % 102.77 % 102.77 % 102.78 % 102.78 % 102.79 % 102.79 % 102.80 % 102.80 % 102.80 %
6142008 Energi 1 Follo-Røyken as 103.23 % 103.22 % 103.21 % 103.20 % 103.20 % 103.20 % 103.20 % 103.20 % 103.19 % 103.19 % 103.19 %
322008 Fredrikstad Energi Nett AS 105.16 % 105.13 % 105.13 % 105.13 % 105.15 % 105.16 % 105.18 % 105.19 % 105.20 % 105.21 % 105.22 %
2352008 Tyssefaldene Aktieselskabet 106.26 % 106.21 % 106.21 % 106.22 % 106.26 % 106.29 % 106.32 % 106.35 % 106.38 % 106.40 % 106.43 %
162008 Austevoll Kraftlag BA 106.93 % 106.94 % 106.90 % 106.86 % 106.84 % 106.82 % 106.80 % 106.77 % 106.75 % 106.72 % 106.69 %
912008 Klepp Energi AS 108.15 % 108.09 % 108.09 % 108.11 % 108.16 % 108.19 % 108.23 % 108.27 % 108.31 % 108.34 % 108.37 %
2342008 Tysnes Kraftlag PL 115.06 % 114.98 % 114.90 % 114.86 % 114.84 % 114.83 % 114.82 % 114.81 % 114.81 % 114.80 % 114.80 %
952008 Krødsherad Everk KF 115.70 % 115.70 % 115.70 % 115.70 % 115.70 % 115.70 % 115.70 % 115.70 % 115.70 % 115.70 % 115.70 %
6862008 Yara Norge AS 119.71 % 119.57 % 119.58 % 119.61 % 119.71 % 119.79 % 119.88 % 119.97 % 120.05 % 120.12 % 120.19 %
DG Companies add:
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35 Coefficients when Industry Adds 5 MW Increments of 
DG 
Coefficients Constant Interfaces Islands DG
Original 4.459007 -0.004735 -1.266974 -0.726778
5MW 4.457716 -0.004703 -1.272053 -0.593999
10MW 4.455170 -0.004719 -1.266105 -0.455734
15mw 4.454095 -0.004735 -1.259386 -0.387166
20MW 4.453687 -0.004765 -1.254016 -0.348351
25MW 4.453597 -0.004787 -1.248864 -0.326913
30MW 4.453615 -0.004812 -1.244086 -0.311634
35MW 4.453658 -0.004836 -1.238641 -0.299610
40MW 4.453694 -0.004857 -1.232506 -0.289966
45MW 4.453739 -0.004878 -1.226000 -0.282164
50MW 4.453759 -0.004896 -1.218727 -0.275735  
 
